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Hope as an Interpretive Virtue: The Grounds, Contents and Action of Christian Hope 
in the Theological Interpretation of Scripture 
 
Richard Wyld  
 
This thesis examines the theological interpretation of the Bible as Christian scripture 
in the light of the Christian doctrine of hope, with specific reference to hope as a 
human characteristic. Hope is thus discussed in terms of interpretive virtue, as one 
human characteristic that leads to good biblical reading. The doctrine of hope is 
examined with reference to Jürgen Moltmann and James Cone, and in both lines of 
thought is outlined in terms of grounds, contents and action. Common contours are 
drawn; hope is grounded in God’s promise and presence, and contains the dignity 
and transformation of humans in relationship with God and one another. Hope’s 
grounds and contents directly shape the hermeneutical situation in which scripture is 
read. The action of hope involves living in accordance with one’s grasp of these 
grounds and contents, and because these parameters have hermeneutical 
consequences, so living hopefully will shape the action of reading. The hopeful 
reader perseveres with the text in a tension between openness to God through the 
text, and ‘closed’ steadfastness in the reader’s grip on their perspective of hope. By 
incorporating Garrett Green’s description of the imagination, this steadfastness is 
described as a hopeful construal of reality that remains alert to alternatives. It is then 
argued that because Christian hope pertains to the renewal of human community, the 
hopeful reader seeks to read alongside diverse others. Finally, this thesis is tested by 
showing how hope is manifest in the reading of Howard Thurman and the South 
Sudanese People to People Peace initiatives. The thesis describes the hermeneutical 
circle in terms of Christian hope where hope aids, and results from, good biblical 
reading. Through this, the thesis creates a framework for theological interpretation 
which takes seriously the centrality of hope in Christian theology.  
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Introduction 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to argue that theological interpretation of the Bible 
as Christian scripture may be approached in hope. Studies of the theological 
interpretation of scripture have benefitted much from a close engagement with the 
field of hermeneutics, and this has led to an increased awareness of some of the 
complexities and difficulties involved in interpretation. In particular, the possibility 
of misunderstanding and the problem of manipulative, self-interested use of the texts 
have been directly related to human nature itself, and hence also to human 
relationships. This situation has been brought sharply into focus through 
hermeneutical theories, but Christian theology also has much to say about what it 
means to be human, and hence what it means to interpret and understand. More than 
this, Christian theology has spoken of hope for humanity, for the transformation and 
renewal of human nature and the restoration of human relationships with God and 
one another. This thesis will argue this hope has hermeneutical consequences; the 
restoration of human relationships through love entails the possibility of genuine 
understanding, free from self-interest and alienation. But this is not only hope for a 
distant future; hope shapes present actions. It will be argued that the hopeful reader 
perseveres, and because this hope is grounded in God, they draw out those aspects of 
the text which point towards God’s promised future, the redemption of humanity and 
the renewal of creation. But inasmuch as hope challenges the problems of the 
present, it also entails resistance against the fragmentation of human communities; 
thus the hopeful reader also actively seeks out dialogue partners from a wide variety 
of backgrounds. They do so to generate hope for others, and to be formed in hope by 
others. There can be no formal guarantee of the fruitfulness of this enterprise, but to 
read in hope is to persevere in spite of the risks.  
 In essence, this thesis will thus provide a way of thinking about the 
hermeneutical circle in a way which takes full account of the significance of hope 
within Christian theology. On the one hand, close attention to theologies of hope will 
help generate a framework for thinking about how and why Christian readers may 
seek to grow in hope through biblical reading. But this will in turn lead to a focus on 
10 
 
why being hopeful is itself significant in the process of reading, and why hope may 
become an important ‘interpretive virtue’. The result of this double movement will 
be an approach to the questions of theological interpretation which accounts for the 
centrality of hope within the very texts under discussion. But beyond this, as it has 
been increasingly argued that theological interpretation cannot occur in abstraction 
from the world and the Church, this thesis provides a framework for biblical reading 
that takes seriously the human need for, and the divine offer of, hope.  
  
1.1. Interpretive Virtue: The Character of the Reader  
 
 One might legitimately ask why this approach is being proposed over others. 
After all, discussion of theological interpretation of the Bible has been something of 
a growth industry for some considerable time. Given this, and despite the title of this 
thesis, it would be perhaps overoptimistic to attempt to offer a definitive approach. 
For example, in a recent article Richard Briggs demonstrates how one may arrive at 
several thousand potentially legitimate questions that the interpreter might bring to 
the biblical texts.
1
 Even within the more limited field of explicitly theological 
interpretation, there are countless ways of articulating why we might read the Bible, 
and thus how we should interpret the texts. Given this, this thesis is an attempt to 
offer one approach that may sit alongside others, but with a specific focus on the way 
in which the Bible, in some sense, is intended to form hope in its readers. Coupled 
with a focus on human character, I will go on to explore the significance of the 
character of the interpreter, and thence why one might wish to become a hopeful 
interpreter. 
The idea that the character of the interpreter might positively relate to their 
interpretation is somewhat controversial, given the general modern concern for 
interpretive neutrality. Yet the idea derives from a perspective that has some 
precedent in Christian tradition, not least because that very tradition has much to say 
about the pervasive effects of human nature. In this line of thought, John Webster 
                                                          
1
 Richard S. Briggs, ‘How to Do Things with Meaning in Biblical Interpretation’, STR, 2, 2 (2011), 
143-160, (146-147). 
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argues that even if hermeneutics is useful for biblical interpretation, there is a deeper 
issue that requires our attention:  
If sophisticated hermeneutical theory fails to persuade, it is largely because, 
in the end, it addresses the wrong problems, and leaves untouched the real 
difficulty with reading Scripture. That difficulty [...] is spiritual and therefore 
moral; it is our refusal as sinners to be spoken to, our wicked repudiation of 
divine address, our desire to speak the final word to ourselves. From those 
sicknesses of the soul, no amount of sophistication can heal us.
2
 
Setting aside the specifically Reformed flavour of this comment, a more general but 
vital point is being made. In this particular instance, Webster makes the explicit link 
between the Bible and the Word of God, but even before that link is made his 
argument is worth considering. If our nature influences all that we do, then it may be 
that our nature and character as human beings has some bearing on how we interpret 
texts.  
 In this more general sense, a number of scholars have revived an interest in 
the relationship between character and interpretation, and this interest primarily 
derives from the recognition that readers often interpret unwisely, carelessly or 
selfishly. This is not just a matter of a failure to apply critical tools correctly; rather, 
it is the character of the interpreter that makes the difference. Even if it were agreed 
that objectivity is desirable in interpretation, the moral ambiguity of the human 
condition makes such a goal elusive at best. For even at a subconscious level, it is all 
too possible for individual desires to creep into the interpretive process. However, 
the premise of this discussion is that it is in fact neither possible nor desirable to 
separate ourselves from our interpretation. As such, the question we are faced with is 
not one of how we keep ourselves separate from the process of reading, but what 
kind of person we should seek to become, so that we might interpret well. In this 
respect, the more negative recognition that human nature might inhibit interpretation 
sits alongside a more positive corollary; some lives are so compellingly good that we 
are naturally drawn to examine them. In one of the earliest contemporary treatments 
of this area, Reading in Communion, Stephen Fowl and Gregory Jones argue that 
                                                          
2
 John Webster, Word and Church: Essays in Church Dogmatics, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 
109. 
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figures like Bonhoeffer display such discernible goodness that their work as 
interpreters becomes compelling.
3
 
Most recent discussion of this topic has taken place using the concept of 
‘interpretive virtue’, an idea which undoubtedly draws some momentum from the 
rising interest in virtue ethics since MacIntyre. While this concept generates complex 
offshoots of discussion, the basic idea is that if a virtue is a characteristic that aids a 
person in pursuing the good in life, then an ‘interpretive virtue’ is a disposition that 
leads one to the good in interpretation. Broadly in parallel with virtue ethics, the 
concept of ‘interpretive virtue’ shifts the focus from interpretation to the interpreter. 
Without artificially driving a wedge between the person and the practice, the main 
focus is on what makes a good interpreter, and hence which characteristics should be 
pursued for the sake of good interpretation. Some writers remain ambiguous towards 
virtue theory, while David Ford in particular engages with the discussion 
independently of it altogether, preferring to talk in terms of interpretive wisdom.
4
 
While I will highlight some potential problems with virtue theory in this context, the 
field offers a useful starting point, primarily because it remains prevalent in the 
literature, but also because it couples the question of character with the sense of goal; 
classically this goal is described in terms of that which is good. 
Inevitably, this begs the question of what counts as ‘good’ for interpretation, 
and this is perhaps one of the reasons why there is a substantial range of interpretive 
virtues offered within the relevant literature. Furthermore, because some writers are 
ambivalent about the fit between the classical virtue framework and the content of 
the biblical texts, a number of ‘virtues’ are drawn directly from specific scriptural 
narratives. The result of this is that contemporary authors have collectively proposed 
the interpretive virtues of faith, hope, love, honesty, openness, attention, obedience, 
receptivity, humility, truthfulness, courage, imagination, trust and wisdom.
5
 Aside 
                                                          
3
 Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian 
Life, (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1998; orig., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 135-159.  
4
 See for example; David F. Ford, Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and learning in Love, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In chapter one it will be noted that Webster is also 
very uneasy about the use of virtue theory, though he does concede the idea that character is 
important. The main problem is that virtue theory is sometime used without explicit reference to God, 
and so we will need to consider how God relates to the process of human character growth. 
5
 This list is drawn from the work of Vanhoozer, Jones and Briggs. Gregory Jones includes 
‘receptivity, humility, truthfulness, courage, charity and imagination.’ Vanhoozer suggests faith, 
hope, love, alongside honesty, openness, attention and obedience, and Briggs’s list comprises 
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from looking exhausting, this vast list begs the question of why any particular 
characteristic should count as an interpretive virtue. However, while this is a valid 
question it is perhaps less helpful to try to pre-determine what counts as a virtue in 
the abstract, than it is to consider potential virtues as they arise. The main reason for 
this is that it is not clear that the Bible offers its own theoretical discussion of virtue 
or human character in general, but it does depict good character in concrete 
situations. Given this, it is probably more helpful to begin with a specific virtue or 
character trait, and then ask whether and how it is appropriate for the practice of 
interpretation. This is a more heuristic approach, but as we shall see, it is 
necessitated by the degree of circularity involved in working towards a theological 
depiction of theological interpretation. Even though it makes the task more 
complicated, it seems appropriate to allow the Bible some role in working out a 
theological depiction of the hermeneutical situation, and in turn, which 
characteristics are desirable for readers.
6
  
The three ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope and love have sufficient weight 
within Christian tradition and the Bible to commend themselves as good starting 
places. There has been some recent interest in the regula fidei, though in general this 
refers to the use of creedal formulae as a lens for interpretation, rather than faith as a 
virtue.
7
 Similarly, Augustine’s regula caritatis has also garnered support within the 
broader discussion of theological interpretation.
8
 Notably, Augustine’s emphasis was 
on the cultivation of love through interpretation rather than for interpretation, but 
nonetheless a significant number of contemporary writers have drawn on Augustine 
to argue for the importance of being loving or charitable as an interpreter. By 
contrast, while some writers do mention hope within their general discussion of 
interpretive virtue, it has received relatively little attention. Might there be such a 
thing as a regula spei for biblical interpretation, and if so, what would it look like?  
                                                                                                                                                                    
humility, wisdom, trust, love and receptivity. See L. Gregory Jones, ‘Formed and Transformed by 
Scripture: Character, Community, and Authority in Biblical Interpretation’, in Character and 
Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 18-33, 32; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The 
Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 376-
377; Richard S. Briggs, The Virtuous Reader: Old Testament Narrative and Interpretive Virtue, 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010). 
6
 See below for further discussion of this point. 
7
 See e.g., Kathryn Greene-McCreight, ‘Rule of Faith’ in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of 
the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (London: SPCK, 2005), 703-704. 
8
 For a recent analysis, see: Joshua Marshall Strahan, ‘An Ecclesially Located Exegesis Informed by 
Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana’, JTI, 6, 2 (2012), 219-239. 
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1.2. Hope as an interpretive virtue 
 
Beyond filling an apparent gap in the discussion, there is a more serious 
reason for exploring hope as a desirable character trait for readers. As noted, a key 
factor driving the discussion of interpretive virtue is the recognition that human 
nature has some impact on interpretation, and in particular, the negative aspects of 
human nature may have a negative impact on reading. However, if this depiction is 
true but unalterable, then all that this discussion can do is highlight some of the 
reasons why interpretation is difficult, why disagreement occurs, or why readers use 
the text to serve their own ends. But the real energy behind the concept of 
interpretive virtue is the idea that our character is not fixed, and that some change or 
growth is possible. If this possibility exists, there are good reasons to pay close 
attention to what kind of readers we are becoming.  
However this growth or change occurs, most scholars recognize the 
ambiguity inherent to ‘becoming’ a better reader; no reader is either wholly good or 
wholly bad and there turn out to be significant theological reasons for maintaining 
this point. For example, Paul is particularly critical of those Christians who already 
claim to be wise (e.g. 1 Cor. 3.18), and even those whose wisdom is acknowledged 
are capable of mistakes. But if we are still able to speak of growth, then this very 
possibility calls forth hope; indeed hope is the characteristic that uniquely captures 
the expectation of positive change. Even if such growth were purely a matter of 
external influence, then hope would still describe this expectation in some sense or 
other. But passive waiting is unlikely to characterise genuine hope, not least because 
in the context of this discussion, reading is still very much an active human 
endeavour. Thus, if there is some development to be expected as a reader, some 
means of pursuing growth, then to take up this pursuit is to act in the hope of 
becoming a better reader, and to read in the hope of growing as a human being. 
Furthermore, if hope as such is desirable as a human character trait, then it is worth 
considering what it means to read the Bible hopefully. In this respect hope might 
turn out to have a primary role in the matrix of interpretive virtues because it 
energises the journey. Of course, as with any other human characteristic, hope may 
be problematic; we may hold unhealthy hopes, a problem that will be discussed in 
15 
 
chapter two. But at this stage, it is sufficient to suggest that if we are to discuss 
interpretive virtues, hope is worthy of attention.  
The other main reason for considering hope relates back to the question of 
why we read scripture; what is the interpretive goal? In one sense, any reading is 
grounded in some kind of hope. One reader might read in the hope of personal 
edification, while another might read in the hope of learning something about the 
origins of Christianity. Both draw on hope in the sense that they adopt some view to 
the future which relates to their specific goals in interpretation. As noted there are 
many legitimate ways of construing the goal of reading scripture, but one important 
option is the deepening of our appreciation of God’s promise for the future. In other 
words, one goal of reading scripture is the formation of hope in God. As Barth so 
eloquently argued, the Bible presents a ‘strange new world’, and reading scripture 
might thus become an exercise in anticipating and inhabiting that world in the 
present.
9
 From this viewpoint, reading the Bible is not strictly an end in itself; rather 
it is a means to understanding God and God’s promised future. 
 As a result, my proposal will not be to read in the hope of understanding the 
text per se, but to read in the broader economy of hope in God for creation, to read in 
the hope of God’s promised transformation of creation. To be explicit, I will thus 
deal with a kind of virtuous cycle; the hopeful reader is disposed in turn to generate 
hope, not just for themselves but for others. The process of rereading is thus a 
process of deepening hope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Karl Barth, ‘The Strange New World within the Bible’, in The Word of God and the Word of Man, 
trans. Douglas Horton, (Pilgrim Press, 1928), 28-50. 
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2. Methodological Issues 
 
i) The question of circularity: Reading scripture to interpret scripture 
 
 Describing the process in cyclical terms is not new to this thesis, but it does 
raise methodological questions. Firstly, there is the question of how one joins the 
circle; if hope is the product and the prerequisite of reading, how does one read the 
text in the first place? This will be addressed in the next chapter with regard to 
interpretive virtue in general, but my argument is that theological hope actually 
offers good reasons for maintaining the possibility of being ‘addressed’ through the 
text, independently of one’s context. Hope is thus best understood in terms of an 
ongoing process, and not as a hermeneutical prolegomenon.  
However, in terms of the methodology of this thesis, there is a more serious 
theoretical issue. If hope aids good reading of scripture, how can we be sure that our 
understanding of that hope, drawn from scripture, is correct? Is not reading scripture 
in order to understand how to read scripture, a hopelessly circular enterprise? The 
question of how we enter the circle is not just a problem for the reader, but for this 
argument.  
 This problem will be addressed more directly in chapter one, but it warrants 
some attention at this stage. At least since Schleiermacher, the concept of circularity 
has been fairly familiar in hermeneutics. Even so, if scripture is simply used to refer 
back on itself then it does seem to leave the interpreter chasing their tail. But even 
among those who argue for a more objective or value-neutral approach to the Bible, 
it is commonly and increasingly recognized that nobody comes to any text as a blank 
slate, free from presuppositions. Given this, the thesis opens as a reflective 
exploration of theological pre-understanding, or as Thiselton puts it in the manner of 
Wittgenstein, ‘home language-games’.10 I will begin with an initial discussion of 
hope in theological tradition and the Bible, recognizing that this is necessarily 
provisional. This will yield enough of a working concept of Christian hope to go on 
to explore how it might relate to further interpretation of biblical texts. To begin in 
                                                          
10
 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), xxi-xxii. 
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this way is by no means value natural, and the cost of the approach will be the lack 
of hermeneutical prolegomena. However, if we are to take seriously the idea that 
theology and scripture might having something true to say about reality, then it 
becomes more hermeneutically coherent to take this approach, allowing the results of 
engagement with the texts and the tradition to shape the subsequent hermeneutical 
endeavour. Put simply, as the reader’s understanding and appropriation of hope 
develops, so will their interpretive activity. The structure of chapter two will thus 
attempt to model the approach of the whole thesis. As described below, I will begin 
with an initial discussion of hope following Moltmann, and then revise this picture 
by engaging with an alternative tradition to my own. 
 
ii) The approach to a Theology of Hope 
 
 Recent discussion of theological hope has of course been dominated by the 
figure of Jürgen Moltmann, and thus I will begin with certain aspects of Moltmann’s 
work to frame the discussion. However, Richard Bauckham is right to note that 
Moltmann’s use of scripture tends to be sporadic and often exegetically unusual, and 
this perhaps makes him an odd choice for a thesis primarily concerned with the 
Bible.
11
 Despite this, there are at least two reasons for taking a more systematic 
approach. The first is that to address the question of Christian hope as such is to 
tackle a concept that is abstracted from the Bible, though it finds much treatment 
therein. Rather than asking questions about the concept of hope depicted in any 
given text, my aim is to ask how people may reasonably hope in the present day in 
the light of God. This certainly requires engagement with specific texts, but my aim 
is to consider a bigger picture for hope. Secondly, because I am asking whether there 
is hope for understanding, and for the reader, it is helpful to explore biblical hope in 
categories that relate more directly to the questions of hermeneutics and interpretive 
virtue. Additionally, because I am describing this task in terms of examining pre-
understanding, there is necessarily an element of self-involved reflection; in other 
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words, I will aim to examine the broad tradition concerning hope within which I 
have been formed. 
 This aspect of self-involvement is an important part of the thesis for another 
reason. The discussion of interpretive virtue requires a degree of self-involvement, 
because if biblical interpreters are subject to the influences of their character, so are 
hermeneutical theorists. If my biblical interpretation may be influenced by self-
interest, then so might my description of hope. Given this possibility, I will attempt 
to engage in dialogue with a separate tradition, not just on the question of Christian 
hope, but throughout the thesis. As noted earlier, I will argue that the hopeful reader 
seeks to generate hope not only for themselves but for others too. And because I will 
argue that Christian hope is for everyone, reading hopefully actually necessitates an 
attempt to enter into dialogue with other contexts.  
Many possibilities for this suggest themselves, but I will explore Black 
liberation theology, and in particular African-American theology and hermeneutics. 
Apart from providing an alternative perspective to my own, Black liberation 
theology presents a different angle on the question of hope. In my judgement, 
Moltmann represents a broader tendency to conflate eschatology and hope, which is 
conceptually unhelpful at certain points. But more than this, Black theology shows 
that hope may be drawn not only from eschatology, but from other aspects of 
doctrine such as creation. In other words, the distinction is not just between different 
eschatologies, but different grounds of hope for the present. 
It is worth noting that ‘Black theology’ is a complex term with many 
different strands. Because it draws on the emphasis on experience and praxis within 
liberation theology, Black liberation theology finds varied expressions in America, 
Britain, the Caribbean, South Africa, and other parts of Africa. Furthermore, 
womanism has highlighted the multiple aspects of oppression and liberation by 
addressing gender, race and class issues (among others) simultaneously. It is 
important to be aware of this diversity in the remaining discussion, because failing to 
do so undermines some of the key arguments of liberation theology in general. 
Having said that, for the most part the contextual specificity of more recent liberation 
theology goes alongside dialogue with other contexts, and so I will discuss writers 
from America, South Africa and Britain under the same heading. The reason for 
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doing this is not to imply homogeneity, but to attempt to hear a more comprehensive 
critique of what is perceived to be the ‘standard’ range of perspectives.  
 
3. The Argument in Outline 
 
 In pursuit of the character traits of the good biblical interpreter, hope has 
arisen as one possibility worthy of exploration. This is because of the more general 
significance of hope within theology and the Bible, but also because of the manner in 
which that hope speaks to the questions of hermeneutics. It was suggested that if 
there are the grounds of hope for understanding and interpretation, then there are also 
grounds for being hopeful. In other words there are broadly two dimensions to this 
thesis. Firstly I will argue that Christian hope provides grounds for hope in 
hermeneutics, in the sense that the content of that hope directly shapes the situation 
in which we interpret. Following this, I will argue that this perspective provides 
grounds for being hopeful, and as such I will explore what it means to be hopeful as 
a reader, and why this may lead to good reading. In particular, this aspect of the 
study will take place with reference to the idea that scripture itself is concerned with 
the cultivation of hope in the lives of its readers. In this respect, it will be argued that 
hope has the potential to influence interpretation in a theologically and 
hermeneutically legitimate manner. 
 In chapter one I will discuss the concept of interpretive virtue in more detail, 
outlining the various perspectives that have led writers to consider the topic, and the 
ways in which such virtues are expected to affect interpretation. I will highlight some 
of the issues involved in using virtue theory, and particularly the question of how 
well virtue theory fits with the biblical texts. One issue that emerges is the question 
of whether virtues are cultivated through human formation or divine action. It will be 
argued that this is an unnecessary dichotomy, but that it is important to emphasize 
divine action even as it pertains to human activity. There are several reasons for this, 
but the main reason will be that Christian hope is primarily grounded in the activity 
of God. Even so, human action remains important.   
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I will also address the question of whether drawing a hermeneutics of 
scripture from scripture is methodologically problematic because of its circularity. I 
will argue that a degree of circularity is inherent to the whole enterprise, and that the 
fruitfulness of that circle rests on the wager that the text does somehow depict 
reality. Alongside this, it was noted that the concept of interpretive virtue requires 
some account of the goal of biblical interpretation. One perspective on this question 
is that the goal of reading the Bible is the cultivation of hope, because the Bible itself 
conveys the promises of God for human beings. Thus I maintain that hope may be 
drawn from the text by those who have no hope. However, the appreciation and 
action of that hope is deepened by rereading in hope, and thus the circularity remains 
necessary to my proposal. Given this, it must be noted that what follows contains a 
necessary element of provisionality. It can be seen that there are clear affinities with 
the medieval anagogical sense of scripture, but while a more detailed engagement 
with that tradition may prove fruitful, I have largely avoided it for the sake of 
working within the categories of the contemporary discussion of interpretive virtue 
and theological hermeneutics, and to manage the scope of the thesis as a whole. 
Having said that, growing interest in pre-modern exegesis suggests that further 
research into Medieval anagogy could be beneficial.  
 Chapter two addresses Christian hope in more general terms, using the 
parameters of grounds, contents and action. As noted above, this will occur in 
dialogue with Moltmann and African-American theology, and in particular, the work 
of James H. Cone. I will follow Moltmann in noting the significance of divine 
promise as the ground of future hope, which nonetheless leads to present action. 
However, Cone shows that hope is also grounded in the doctrine of creation, because 
it is that perspective that has underpinned the dignity of humankind in African-
American theology. Put simply, Christian hope is grounded in God. The content of 
this hope is more difficult to determine because its fulfilment partially stands outside 
present experience. However, it will be shown that it is necessary to speak of the 
contents of hope (i.e., what is hoped for), and in particular I will focus on the 
renewal of humankind before God which is prominent in both traditions under 
investigation. Finally I will discuss what it means to be hopeful in terms of the action 
of hope. It will be argued that through the dialogue of traditions, to be hopeful can be 
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described as living with a perspective of reality shaped by divine promise and 
presence. 
 Chapters three and four draw on this depiction to describe the hermeneutical 
circle of biblical reading in terms of hope. Firstly, chapter three will show how the 
grounds and contents of hope have implications for the hermeneutics of biblical 
reading. I will argue that there are theological grounds for being hopeful about 
reaching genuine understanding, and thus being able genuinely to ‘hear’ something 
distinct through reading the text. Firstly I will discuss the relationship between 
meaning and community, arguing that because Christian hope is grounded in God’s 
gracious action, independent of human circumstance, there is hope of genuinely 
hearing something other in the text, something that is not preconditioned by our own 
social context. This hearing constitutes a primary ‘good’ for theological 
interpretation. Further, the relationality of human nature as divine creation creates 
space for the possibility of properly hearing one another across cultural boundaries. 
Secondly, I will discuss the question of self-interested interpretation, and the 
suggestion that universal truth claims disguise bids for power. With particular 
reference to Anthony Thiselton, it will be argued that this problem is very much real, 
but that there is hope for the transposition of self-interest with love. As a result, the 
argument of this chapter is not that genuine understanding is guaranteed, but that in 
hope it is possible. Furthermore, the possibility of transcending self-interest leaves 
hope for properly equal moments of dialogue between cultures.  
 Chapter four will consider what it means to be a hopeful interpreter, how the 
interpretive virtue of hope might lead the reader to good interpretation. By drawing 
on the relationship between hope and imagination, it will be argued that hopeful 
reading involves perseverance in tension between openness to the voice of God 
through the text, and a kind of ‘closed’ steadfastness in holding on to hope as it 
stands in tension competing perspectives on reality. It will be argued that to read 
hopefully is thus to read in a way which points beyond the confines of present 
existence, through commentary and action, in a manner that coheres an emerging 
sense of the promise and presence of God. On this basis, hopeful reading may be 
simultaneously encouraging and costly. It will then be argued that not only is cross-
cultural reading provisionally possible, but that it is necessitated by Christian hope. 
Hope is not primarily an individualistic concept, and thus the hopeful reader must 
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seek to cultivate and receive hope beyond their own horizons. At times, this will 
mean that hope is in fact costly for some, and so hopeful interpretation is not merely 
optimism. In chapter three I will address the question of interpretive communities in 
more general terms, so that in chapter four it will be argued that an understanding of 
the Church as a reading community must consider the Church in eschatological 
terms. Reading in the Church thus becomes an act of witness to a global hope. 
 Chapter five will offer a test case for the thesis. Because a key part of this 
thesis is that hope entails reading scripture with other contexts, I explored biblical 
interpretation in the context of tribal conflicts in Southern Sudan. Jesus’ command to 
love enemies emerged from this initial exploration, and so I adopt that text as a test 
case. This in turn led to the discovery of Howard Thurman’s writing on love in the 
context of racial inequality in the USA. Thurman addresses the question of love for 
enemies where the enemy is clearly an oppressor, while the Sudanese context also 
raises the question where enemies are at times equals. Thus I will explore two 
different contexts in an attempt to work out the suggestion that hopeful reading must 
seek dialogue with other communities. Within these contexts, the main aim is to 
explore the first aspects of hopeful reading, namely that to read hopefully is to 
persevere in hope, and that such perseverance results in good readings of scripture 
which cultivate hope in others. Finally, I will draw the results of the investigation 
back into my own context. In this section I will highlight the necessity of allowing 
the preceding dialogue to reshape my own reading, so that the readings examined are 
not merely presented as encouraging artefacts. In fact, it will be shown that they pose 
serious challenges to the privileged reader, but these challenges remain properly 
hopeful because they cohere theologically with the encouragement offered to the 
specific contexts.  
 It is worth concluding by noting that this proposal is necessarily heuristic 
from the start, because it takes the form of an exploration of one option for 
theological interpretation. Furthermore, I self-consciously recognize the circularity 
involved in reading and rereading texts that seek to shape our understanding of 
reality. But most importantly hope, by its very nature, strains beyond that which we 
can experience or understand in the present. To hope in the sense described in this 
thesis is to anticipate something decisively new, something that cannot be fully 
comprehended now because it does not arise from the possibilities of the present. In 
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this respect, this thesis cannot be accepted on the basis that it successfully closes 
down all other options. Rather, it draws its force from the possibility that God will in 
fact finally renew creation, a possibility that invites not certainty, but hopeful trust. 
As such, this thesis will not suggest a regula spei in terms of a rule that can be 
applied for the sake of correct interpretation. But it will create a framework for 
thinking about theological interpretation of scripture which not only takes account of 
the importance of hope within scripture and theology, but takes account of the fact 
that theological interpretation must itself be understood to take place within an 
economy of hope, and must thereby seek to bring hope to the world.  
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Chapter One 
Interpretive Virtue, the Bible and Hope 
 
1.1.Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of interpretive virtue in 
more detail. By noting some questions that this field raises, I will argue that hope has 
a significant enough place in theology to warrant the attention of this thesis. Firstly, I 
will outline the turn to virtue in interpretation, noting that interest in this area 
actually derives from a wide range of concerns. From here, two prominent 
interpretive virtues will be discussed; the exploration of love will show how 
interpretive virtues work in practice, while looking at wisdom will address the 
relationship between virtue theory and biblical tradition. This will lead to the 
consideration of three potential objections to interpretive virtue. In raising these 
objections, I will argue that a framework of hope will go a long way to addressing 
them, and that for this thesis the basic concept remains viable. Finally I will return to 
the question of the goal of reading scripture, one that is presupposed by the very 
notion of an interpretive virtue. It will be argued that the cultivation of hope is one of 
the ends of biblical reading, but that it is not in fact problematic to describe hope as 
character trait that draws hope from the text. Rather, I will argue that reading the 
Bible as Christian scripture involves a cycle of growth in hope through reading. 
 
1.2. The Bible and the Reader 
 
 Returning to square one, it is my judgement that Krister Stendahl’s famous 
distinction between what the text ‘meant’ and what it ‘means’, holds sway in much 
discussion of contemporary scriptural interpretation.
1
 Christians understand the Bible 
as being applicable to contemporary life, but the process of interpretation requires 
                                                          
1
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some expert understanding of its original context. This distinction remains familiar 
within the world of biblical studies, and as a result the ‘expert’ task has recently been 
wryly depicted as the ‘paleontological’ method.2 Blount et al describe how it is 
assumed that something called ‘meaning’ lies within the text, and the task of the 
interpreter is to use the correct tools and methods to dig it out. This is of course a 
caricature, and Moberly has rightly cautioned against asserting that there is 
something called the historical-critical method, or that all users of this method adopt 
the same approach to theological questions.
3
 Even so, the caricature represents quite 
a broad perception within some areas of scholarship, and as such is perhaps a 
symptom of a more general discontent with historical or critical approaches to 
interpretation. This discontent seems to stem from at least three areas. 
 Firstly, systematic theologians have lamented the ‘relay-race’ relationship 
between biblical studies and theology, in which theologians must wait for assured 
results before they can legitimately utilise the text.
4
 Shifts in scholarly consensus 
about standard interpretations suggest that this creates an unsatisfactory situation of 
endless deferral, which would force theologians either to abandon the Bible, or to 
admit that their use of it is at the mercy of other disciplines. Secondly, the notion of 
scholarly objectivity associated with modernism has been critiqued at length from a 
vast array of philosophical and hermeneutical thinkers, ranging from Gadamer’s 
critique of method, to questions about the social construction of meaning itself. In 
Stephen Fowl’s terms, one may legitimately ask questions about authorial context 
and intention, but this is by no means the only way to talk about the meaning of the 
text.
5
 Coupled with questions about theology and truth, this has led to an increased 
interest in pre-modern or pre-critical exegesis, which has allowed scholars to discuss 
theological truth, polyvalent meaning and the formation of the reader.
6
 The question 
of meaning per se will occupy a major part of chapter three, but suffice to note here 
that it has garnered widespread interest in the study of theological interpretation.  
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 The third complaint about ‘traditional’ scholarship is perhaps most germane 
to this thesis, and comes from various kinds of liberation theology. Drawing on the 
previous two concerns, liberation theologians have argued that not only are 
traditional critical methods not value-neutral, but they have in fact served to 
reinforce the power-interests of the privileged.
7
 In some cases it is argued that the 
critical tools themselves are value-laden, while in others it is argued that whatever 
the tools employed, interpreters cannot assume neutrality as though their own 
interests and situations did not shape their deployment of methodological tools. This 
point has been given a good deal of attention in hermeneutical philosophy, but it 
does in fact also have a strong theological pedigree. As well as Webster’s more 
specific interest in human response to the word of God, Thiselton has argued at 
length that selfishness and self-deception in interpretation cohere with a traditional 
theological understanding of the human condition. Thiselton argues: 
Freud’s emphasis on self-deception [...] entirely coheres with Christian 
theology. [...] Christian theology also coheres with Freud’s analysis of the 
self as falling victim to forces which it does not fully understand and which 
certainly it cannot fully control. The postmodern self at this point stands 
closer to biblical realism than to the innocent confidence of modernity.
8
 
Following Thiselton I shall argue that this is not the ‘last word’ on the subject, but it 
is an important ‘first word’. Some of the language here can seem harsh, and at times 
western biblical scholars have been unnecessarily portrayed as nefariously working 
to strengthen their own power interests. But the crucial point is far subtler than that, 
which is perhaps why the argument may at times fail to ring true. In a recent article 
on the character of the interpreter, Stephen Pardue reflects this position by 
suggesting that the choice to read a Greek genitive as either subjective or objective 
can hardly be put down to ‘moral deficiency’.9 The point seems self-evident, yet it is 
only half true; such choices remain under the influence of theological preference, the 
context of one’s learning, feelings towards opponents and so forth. Of course, it does 
not follow that such things always influence choices, but the fact that it is at least 
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possible should give us cause to consider our character as interpreters in even the 
most technical debates. The reason for this is simply that the theological problem of 
the human condition in not necessarily a conscious one. In other words, it is not that 
historical critics are consciously trying to gain power for themselves, but rather that 
we simply cannot separate ourselves from our interpretations. This issue will be 
treated further in chapter three, but the basic insight stands behind most discussions 
of ‘interpretive virtue’, the concept under discussion in the remainder of this chapter. 
As Stephen Fowl and Gregory Jones put it, ‘the interpretation of Scripture [...] 
requires the moral formation and transformation of people’s lives because of the 
manifold ways in which people do not judge wisely’.10 
 
2.1. Perspectives leading to Interpretive Virtue  
 
 If a virtue is a characteristic that leads one to the good in life, then an 
interpretive virtue is a characteristic that leads one to good interpretation. The use of 
virtue theory perhaps stems from the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics, but 
because of the specific focus on interpretation, the use of the term ‘virtue’ is quite 
wide ranging, leading writers in this field to describe a vast range of actual 
interpretive virtues.
11
 The theory itself is primarily at the service of the more general 
notion that if the character of the interpreter affects their interpretation, then it is 
worth exploring what kind of character is desirable for biblical reading. But of 
course, this requires some understanding of the nature of interpretation and why we 
interpret the Bible in the first place. With potentially infinite variations on this 
theme, it similarly turns out that ‘interpretive virtue’ is the answer to quite a variety 
of questions in relevant literature.  For example, we will see that scholars describe 
the interpretive virtue of love in terms of both loving the text, and loving other 
interpreters. Of course these two positions are by no means incompatible, but it will 
be necessary to consider to what question ‘hope’ is the answer, and thus how hope 
will operate in the process of reading the Bible. I shall begin by tracing three strands 
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of thought that have led to the concept of interpretive virtue. These three strands are 
distinct, but inevitably they do overlap. 
 
i) Virtue Epistemology: Vanhoozer, Treier and Pardue 
 
If knowledge is in some sense a ‘good’, and virtues are those traits which 
lead one towards the good in life, then it could be argued that the pursuit of 
knowledge draws on the formation of virtue.
12
 In other words, the acquisition of 
knowledge may relate not only to the application of rules and methods, but also to 
the formation of habits and dispositions. Thus in turn, theological knowledge may 
also be said to require formation in virtue. In this case, ‘interpretive virtue’ is the 
answer to the question of how we come to know things through reading, given the 
limits of human nature. While such a proposition may be controversial now, Daniel 
Treier argues that it is fundamental to pre-modern thought: 
Theologians were in hot pursuit of sapientia (wisdom), a kind of knowledge 
with a teleology: the formation of virtue in God’s people. [...] By 
Enlightenment times [...] virtue could no longer be an orienting goal within 
theology, for it was methodologically excluded on principle.
13
 
Treier’s aim is broadly to reinstate the pre-enlightenment perspective, and this leads 
him to argue for the necessity of growing in ‘practical wisdom’ for the epistemic 
good of knowing God. He argues that the goal of interpreting scripture theologically 
is ‘knowledge of God, ingredient to which is the formation of Christian identity and 
virtue, unto human flourishing and God’s glory’.14 In this respect, while knowledge 
is a good in itself, it also leads to other goods. This latter point overlaps with Fowl’s 
and Jones’s focus on discipleship, and it is helpful in showing that it is possible to 
speak of the goal of knowledge without it becoming the only goal in interpretation.  
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 As a starting point however, the argument is that certain virtues are useful for 
guiding the enquiring mind towards some kind of knowledge; in Treier’s argument 
the primary virtue is practical wisdom (on which more below). This view necessarily 
retains the idea that there is knowledge in some sense ‘out there’ to be acquired, a 
view that has received sustained attacks from various postmodern perspectives 
within hermeneutics. It is these attacks – in the form of Fishian social-pragmatism 
and Derridean deconstruction – to which Vanhoozer responds in Is There a Meaning 
in this Text? Working with the trio of author, text and reader, Vanhoozer aims to 
restore the concept of textual realism, and along with it a chastened view of the 
importance of authorial intention. In attempting to restore the author and the text, he 
also recognizes the need to attend to the reader, and in particular to their character 
and virtues. This leads him to define interpretive virtue as ‘a disposition of the mind 
and heart that arises from the motivation for understanding, for cognitive contact 
with the meaning of the text’.15 Because Vanhoozer’s argument is that God gives 
humankind language in covenant for communication, his aim, in reverse of the more 
common approach, is to develop a general hermeneutics from the special 
hermeneutics of theological interpretation.
16
 Thus, ‘the text’ in this quotation refers 
to any text, but later in the book he describes the specific case of reading scripture, 
arguing that ‘the theological aim of biblical interpretation is to grow in the 
knowledge of God, as well as in wisdom and righteousness’.17 
 While both Treier and Vanhoozer see the goal of biblical interpretation as 
extending beyond ‘cognitive contact’ with the text, their arguments nonetheless rest 
on the idea that virtue is required even in a more traditional account of biblical or 
textual interpretation. This is clear in Pardue’s article, where the usefulness of 
interpretive virtue is evaluated as it relates to biblical scholarship as it stands. In this 
context, Pardue helpfully suggests that it is better to speak of ‘epistemic goods’ 
beyond knowledge alone. For example, we might speak of the ‘epistemic good’ of 
coherence, and thus argue that the formation of virtue in the reader will lead to more 
coherent arguments.
18
 He raises the question of whether or not this point could be 
made in the form of a rule, such that interpreters are simply told to be charitable or 
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coherent and so forth. In response, he rightly notes that the distinction is one of 
formation; all other things being equal, one whose character is charitable will be 
more likely to follow the ‘rule’ of acting charitably.19 
 It can already be seen that following the line of virtue epistemology on its 
own could do a lot to address the problem described in the previous section. If the 
development of virtues guides the gathering of knowledge and understanding, then 
the problem of making selfish judgements is at least provisionally addressed. In 
other words, with some attention to the character of the interpreter, the methods of 
‘traditional’ biblical interpretation could remain largely unchanged. But this is not 
yet sufficient to our task. Even if it were possible to establish the possibility of 
gaining cognitive understanding of the text, we are still left with the question of why 
one might want to follow the results of the interpretation. In other words, if we are to 
consider how virtue might relate to interpreting the Bible for theology and faith, we 
must go further (as in fact do Treier and Vanhoozer), in considering the specific 
scenario of reading the Bible as Christian scripture.    
 
ii) The Interpretive Virtues of the implied reader: Briggs and Bockmuehl 
 
In The Virtuous Reader, Richard Briggs is fairly heuristic about the exact 
goal behind biblical interpretation; towards the end of the book, he describes the 
hope that the virtuous interpreter would ‘bear “hermeneutical fruit” in due season’.20 
This description of ‘bearing fruit’ anticipates a general trend, to which we will turn 
shortly, of relating interpretation to discipleship. However, the major part of the 
book is taken up with describing the virtues depicted within the text itself, and as 
such, ‘interpretive virtue’ becomes a framework for describing the kind of person, 
and hence reader, described therein. Briggs argues that the biblical texts describe 
their own vision of  ‘the kind of character most eagerly to be sought after, and this in 
turn is the implied character of one who would read these texts, especially one in 
search of their own purposes and values’.21 Here then, ‘interpretive virtue’ becomes 
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a framework for describing a kind of virtuous hermeneutical circle. The text sets the 
agenda for the kind of virtues worth pursuing in life, but as such they also pertain to 
the act of reading the text itself. As one is formed by the text, so one’s understanding 
of the text might deepen. Briggs develops this idea using the literary-critical concept 
of the ‘implied reader’, primarily drawing on Wolfgang Iser. He does not dwell 
heavily on the theoretical issues involved in this concept, but draws on the core 
notion that texts ‘presuppose’ certain kinds of reader. Thus he focuses on ‘the sense 
in which the texts presuppose certain interpretive virtues on the part of the reader 
they are aimed at’.22 What follows is a series of detailed character portraits drawn 
from specific biblical texts, and a discussion of how such traits might apply to the 
task of interpretation.  
 In his final chapter, Briggs rightly notes that there is a distinction between 
discerning the positive evaluation of a virtue in a given text, and choosing to pursue 
that virtue. Firstly, the reader may not wish to occupy the place of the implied reader, 
a point Briggs highlights in relation to the hermeneutics of suspicion.
23
 The text may 
commend trust, but is trust always hermeneutically appropriate? Secondly, this raises 
the question of whether a virtue described in one text should be pursued in the 
interpretation of another. This point suggests some limitations to the usefulness of 
the concept of the implied reader with regard to biblical interpretation, but Briggs 
does recognize this issue. In the case of scripture, the second issue is in part 
subsumed by the first, in the sense that the decision to pursue this or that virtue 
described by the text comes down to personal stance on theological questions about 
the nature of God and the Bible.
24
 This does not resolve the problem as such, but the 
point here is that the degree of self-involvement in the process of interpretation 
largely undergirds the question of whether or not one will pursue the virtues of the 
text. In this sense, Briggs’s approach primarily commends itself to readers with some 
kind of theological commitment to the Bible. 
 This point is made clearer in the work of Alan Jacobs and Markus 
Bockmuehl. Because Jacobs does not draw on the concept of the implied reader, he 
is able to begin with a theological commitment to a biblical character portrait, and 
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then relate that to the interpretation of any text. Jacobs begins with Jesus’ double 
love commandment (Matthew 22.37-40) as a summary of the law and prophets. He 
argues that if the law pertains to every aspect of life, then ‘it follows that there can be 
no realm of distinctively human activity in which Jesus’ great twofold 
commandment is not operative’. If this is so, then the Christian reader (of any text) 
must seek to be a loving reader.
25
 I will discuss how this might work in due course, 
but the point to note here is that adopting a self-involved commitment towards the 
specific text (in this case, Matthew) allows Jacobs to relate the described virtue to 
other interpretive situations, because the text in Matthew relates directly to the 
reality of human life. As we shall see, this also allows Jacobs to discuss particular 
cases where the specific virtue may seem problematic.  
 Overlapping with the scriptural focus of Briggs and the self-involved 
approach of Jacobs, Bockmuehl argues that ‘the implied reader of the New 
Testament has a personal stake in the truthful reference of what it asserts’.26 Thus the 
implied reader becomes the ‘implied disciple’.27 This formulation suggests a 
theological way of expressing that which is expressed hermeneutically by Briggs; 
that the texts themselves invite a response in the life of the reader. While Bockmuehl 
works with the language of wisdom rather than virtue,
28
 the basic thrust of his 
argument is close to Briggs, because the text itself is allowed to shape its reader. In 
this respect we have moved beyond the concerns of virtue epistemology, in the sense 
that the kind of change in the reader that is being discussed extends beyond the realm 
of cognitive understanding, and into every aspect of life. In particular, if we 
understand the text as somehow inviting a response from the reader, then the very 
nature of interpretation might be understood to extend beyond verbal description. 
Furthermore, I will argue that the potential virtues described in scripture sit within a 
larger narrative that itself must take part in shaping the depiction of biblical reading. 
We will need to say more about how the virtues described in the text relate to the 
question of the activity of God. 
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iii) Interpretive Virtue and Good Interpretive Performance: Fowl, Jones and 
Nicholas Lash 
 
Strictly speaking, even if the reader recognizes an invitation to follow the 
text, as suggested by Bockmuehl, they are still left with the choice of whether or not 
to take up this invitation. The choice to take it up, to become a ‘disciple’ stands 
behind a third strand of thought within the discussion of interpretive virtue, because 
this choice reshapes the reading situation. Stephen Fowl makes this point explicit in 
his dictionary article on interpretive virtue: 
The role of virtue in the theological interpretation of Scripture must be 
closely tied to the ends and purposes for which Christians are called to read 
Scripture. [...] Those ends and purposes are themselves tied to the ultimate 
end of the Christian life.
29
 
This ‘end’ is described in a variety of ways through Christian tradition, but Fowl and 
Jones offer a broadly helpful start by arguing that ‘Christian communities interpret 
Scripture [...] so that believers might live faithfully before God in the light of Jesus 
Christ’.30 Alongside this, Fowl talks of interpretation as part of an ‘ongoing journey 
into ever-deeper communion with God’.31 Given this interpretive goal, the concept 
of interpretive virtue takes shape in two specific ways. 
 Firstly, Fowl has argued at various points for abandoning the concept of the 
meaning of a text. Following a broadly social-pragmatic line of thought, both he and 
Jones argue that different communities should be allowed to pursue their own 
‘interpretive interests’ alongside one another.32 This approach raises certain 
questions which will be discussed in depth in chapter three, but it does allow them to 
carve out a theoretical space for the specific task of reading the Bible as Christian 
scripture, without negating the value of other approaches. However, in arguing for a 
plurality of interpretive approaches, the question of whether or not ‘anything goes’ is 
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raised; are there ways of determining legitimate approaches to reading? The response 
to this question comes in the form of interpretive virtue. For a community to avoid 
reading scripture to support ‘sinful practices’, they must form readers in virtues that 
will lead to good readings of the text.
33
 Methodologically, this means that any 
community can in theory choose its own interests and hence interpretive virtues, but 
Fowl and Jones turn their attention to the specific interests of the Church. Here, the 
virtues are themselves given shape by scripture because of the Church’s specific 
canonical relationship to the biblical texts, and thus, following Bonhoeffer, Fowl and 
Jones argue that part of this formation comes from reading the text ‘over and against’ 
ourselves.
34
 Once again, we are faced with a situation of circularity; the text must be 
allowed to form the virtues of the reader, but these virtues are themselves required 
for good interpretation. Thus, virtues are both ‘the prerequisite for, and the result of, 
wise readings of Scripture’.35 This raises a serious question about whether or not this 
circle is thus theoretically closed to new readers, a problem that will be discussed 
shortly, though Fowl and Jones do talk of the role of the Holy Spirit in formation as 
well. On this basis, I will argue that the circle remains open and laden with promise 
if the process is located within a broader picture of God’s activity in the world. For 
now, it should be noted that the circularity is not a problem to the extent that for 
Fowl, Jones and other writers discussed here, reading scripture is generally 
understood as a long process of growth and rereading. In other words, the theological 
concept of interpretive virtue has less to do with a one-off reading of the Bible, and 
more to do with long term engagement and learning.  
 The second dimension within this perspective has to do with the specific ends 
of reading ‘circumscribed’ within the Church. For Fowl and Jones, interpretation is 
not only a matter of cognition or verbal commentary, but is also a matter of how life 
is lived. In this, they draw on Nicholas Lash, and thus implicitly on Gadamer. In 
Lash’s view: 
 The poles of Christian interpretation are not, in the last analysis, written texts 
[...] but patterns of human action: what was said and done and suffered, then, 
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by Jesus and his disciples, and what is said and done and suffered, now, by 
those who seek to share his obedience and his hope.
36
 
Thus, for Lash, ‘the fundamental form of the Christian interpretation of scripture is 
the life, activity and organization of the believing community’.37 To develop this 
point, Lash uses the analogy of ‘performance’, suggesting that there are many texts, 
such as a play or piece of music, ‘that only begin to deliver their meaning in so far as 
they are ‘brought into play’ through interpretive performance’.38 This is only an 
analogy, and obviously the biblical texts are different kinds of texts to scores or 
scripts. But inasmuch as they deal with forms of life, Lash’s analogy offers a helpful 
way of describing how appropriating those forms of life in the present, actually 
constitutes an interpretation of the text. The analogy is perhaps clearer with respect 
to texts that deal with ethics, because such texts more obviously suggest patterns of 
living. There must be some space for simply appreciating the truth of God as 
described in the texts. But even in this case, the life of the interpreter in some sense 
displays their own understanding of theological truth; a person’s manner of living 
may tell us something about their understanding of even fairly abstract ideas.  
Stephen Barton rightly notes that the analogy must not be allowed ‘to 
obscure the distinction between acting and play-acting’.39 Because musical 
performances are ‘circumscribed in time’, interpretive performance could appear to 
be a relatively mechanistic process of exegesis and application, one of the issues 
Lash was keen to avoid.
40
 For the analogy to be of use, Barton argues that 
performance must be seen as a ‘full time affair’ and thus we must argue that the 
performative aspect of interpretation is not merely an add-on to the exegetical 
process.
41
 To be sure, critical examination of the text may still be important, but it 
does not do all that must be done with the text if it is to be read as Christian 
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scripture. This non-mechanistic understanding of ‘performance’ is summed up well 
by Rowan Williams: 
 Christian interpretation is unavoidably engaged in ‘dramatic’ modes of 
reading: we are invited to identify ourselves in the story being contemplated, 
to re-appropriate who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of 
the story. This has some affinity with what exegetical tradition has called 
‘moral’ interpretation, in that the text is read as something requiring change 
in the reader, change of the kind depicted in the text itself.
42
 
Williams’ suggestion leads us into the question addressed by Fowl and Jones, 
concerning what counts as a good performance of scripture, and thus what it means 
to be a good performer. This question again shapes their description of interpretive 
virtue; if good interpretation consists in living well, then interpretive virtues are 
those characteristics which lead to good living in the light of the biblical text. This 
formulation is complex, in my judgement, because the word ‘performance’ does not 
quite capture the argument that reading, interpreting and living are fundamentally 
integrated. Furthermore, if the reading of scripture is integrated within a broader 
Christian understanding of the good in life, then virtues that lead to good 
interpretation are in any case likely to be virtues that lead to good living. For 
example, if love helps us read the text, and this leads to growth in love, then that love 
will also lead to better ways of living in general. To clarify this, Fowl and Jones offer 
the example of Bonhoeffer as an ‘exemplary performer of Scripture’.43 Their 
argument is that aspects of Bonhoeffer’s life became a good performance of scripture 
because he had been formed in the virtues that would lead him to read or perform 
well. In turn, his reading would help form him into someone who would live well, 
specifically in a manner that fitted with the focus of the texts themselves.   
 As with Briggs and Bockmuehl, this perspective suggests that the virtues 
germane to biblical interpretation might be integrated with virtues germane to living 
the good life, from a Christian perspective. But by drawing on the concept of 
performance, Fowl and Jones argue that the reading of scripture is not an end in 
itself, but an activity which nurtures new life and communion with God. This seems 
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to me to be essential to an account of interpreting the Bible theologically as Christian 
scripture. Furthermore, the concept of ‘good performance’ will aid the dialogue with 
Black liberation theology, given its emphasis on praxis. However, while Fowl and 
Jones do talk about the question and activity of God, because they draw on a more 
pragmatic view of the text they leave little space for considering how the text might 
be heard outside of Christian communities, and thus also whether God might speak 
through the text independent of community formation in virtue. This problem will be 
addressed shortly. 
 
iv) Initial Comments 
 
Thus far I have outlined three strands of thought that give rise to arguments 
for interpretive virtue; the concerns of virtue epistemology, the nature of the text 
itself and the relationship between the text and the life of Christian discipleship. 
These perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive, and most of the writers 
discussed directly or indirectly interweave them. Indeed, I have noted potential 
problems created by taking individual strands on their own, but this has been done to 
illustrate the breadth of the discussion. The main point at this stage has been to 
highlight how the stated goal of biblical interpretation shapes the concept of 
interpretive virtue. It has been suggested that interpreting the Bible as Christian 
scripture requires some account of interpretation that extends beyond the cognitive 
dimension, but without eclipsing it. At the end of this chapter, I will return to this 
question with the aim of focusing the question of interpretive goals around the 
framework of hope. We must also consider whether or not the Bible has any 
potential to be ‘heard’ independently of the virtues of the reader. And, because virtue 
theory tends to focus on the question of human formation, we will need to consider 
in more detail how the activity of God changes the picture. These questions will be 
addressed shortly by discussing three main criticisms of interpretive virtues. Firstly 
however, I shall examine two suggested interpretive virtues to explore how they 
operate in practice; love and wisdom. This will allow us to explore the concept of 
interpretive virtue in more detail, but will also open up various points germane to the 
discussion of hope. 
38 
 
The importance of love in Christian theology is so uncontroversial that it 
frees us to explore how virtues operate in interpretation, and thus what is and is not 
at stake in following its guidance.
44
 Focusing on wisdom allows us to explore the 
question of how appropriate virtues theory as such is to the biblical texts. Fowl, 
Treier, Briggs and Vanhoozer describe wisdom as one interpretive virtue, though 
with some kind of regulative role. In this respect they either implicitly or explicitly 
draw on Aristotle’s concept of phronesis. But David Ford talks of interpretive 
wisdom by bypassing the field of virtue ethics altogether, highlighting the fact that 
the Bible has its own distinct flavours of wisdom.   
 
2.2. Love as an interpretive virtue 
 
 Though a number of interpretive virtues could be used to explore the working 
of this theory in practice, love commends itself because of its widespread discussion 
in the literature. This probably also stems from its own theological heritage, as the 
summation of the law (Matthew 22.37-40) and as the greatest of what would become 
Paul’s three theological virtues (1 Corinthians 13.12). However, it is worth noting 
that there are at least three relatively distinct proposals that come under the heading 
of ‘interpretive charity’ or love. Firstly, Jacobs, Briggs and Vanhoozer argue that 
love should be extended towards the text. Secondly, while Fowl and Jones also 
discuss virtues as pertaining to the text, their discussion of love revolves around 
being charitable towards other interpreters.
45
 There are good reasons within virtue 
theory itself for suggesting that these two should go hand in hand, but it is worth at 
least noting the distinction. Many writers draw on Augustine concerning the 
relationship between love and interpretation, but it is less commonly noted that 
Augustine proposes a third perspective. Famously, he argues that: 
 If it seems to you that you have understood the divine scriptures, or any part 
of them, in such a way that by this understanding you do not build up this 
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twin love of God and neighbour, then you have not yet understood them. If 
on the other hand you have made judgments about them that are helpful for 
building up this love, but for all that have not said what the author you have 
been reading actually meant in that place, then your mistake is not pernicious, 
and you certainly cannot be accused of lying.
46
 
Here, the focus is on the cultivation of love as the end, rather than the means, of 
reading scripture. Again there is no inherent theoretical incompatibility between 
Augustine’s perspective and the others, but the distinction helps to clarify the 
varying emphases within the modern discussion. Augustine’s remarks also suggest a 
fourth dimension to interpretive love, namely the focus of loving God in the act of 
reading. 
 
i) Love towards the text 
 
As noted, Alan Jacobs argues that if love is required in every aspect of 
Christian life, then this includes reading. To love is to situate oneself in a certain way 
in relation to others, where needs and weaknesses are shared. This point is 
emphasized by Jacobs to distinguish between the Aristotelian virtue of friendship, 
and the view of friendship derived from a Christian understanding of love. Thus, 
whereas for Aristotle friendship was for the ‘aristocratic few’, who sought friends to 
share and complement their strengths, the Christian community is open to anyone, 
and involves a sharing of both strengths and weaknesses.
47
 This relatively 
unbounded view of love assumes a stance of reciprocal need against self-sufficiency; 
it is the recognition of human value. This leads Jacobs to suggest that interpretive 
charity begins with the possibility of receiving ‘a poem, a story – a work – as a 
gift’.48 Implicitly then, there is also a giver, and charity must be extended towards 
them, especially with the humility to recognize that they may at times have more to 
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say than does the reader.
49
 Notably this perspective is fairly close to Barth and 
Bonhoeffer. Barth argued against the empathetic hermeneutical tradition on the basis 
that its desire to dig under the surface of the author was built on an ‘anthropology 
based on alienation’.50 The concomitant failure to allow the author to speak for 
themselves led Barth to exclaim ‘What lack of love!’51 With regard to scripture, 
Briggs makes a similar argument with regard to the text of Ruth. He argues that as 
‘Ruth pledges loyalty to Naomi, so the interpreter might pledge loyalty to the text: to 
go where it goes in the sense of following its own terms’.52 If love is a kind of 
fidelity to another, so interpretive charity offers fidelity to the text as other.  
At this point, interpretive love may seem hopelessly naïve given the many 
problematic texts in and out of the Bible. However, Jacobs and Briggs address this 
issue directly. Jacobs notes that some texts are not so benign and thus do not feel like 
gifts or neighbours. Yet he offers a way of construing problematic texts as potential 
bearers of gifts, despite their presenting difficulty. In an ‘interlude’ he offers the 
example of the critic Jane Tompkins, who was able to discover some value in the 
character of Buffalo Bill, despite the latter representing violence, subjugation, and 
the oppression of women.
53
 Tompkins rightly never came to accept these things, but 
in considering him more carefully ‘“came to love Buffalo Bill”’54 discovering more 
appreciable qualities such as hope and generosity. Jacobs suggests that ‘Tompkins’s 
charity consists in the wholeness of her attention, her refusal to sacrifice attention to 
the one truth so that another may be privileged. [...] Had Tompkins been more 
decisive, her essay perhaps would have been more coherent, but less charitable and 
less  truthful’.55 
Jacobs’ argument is that a hermeneutic of love is directly at odds with an a 
priori hermeneutic of suspicion, because love invites attention with trust, whilst, in 
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view of his discussion of Nietzsche’s later writing, suspicion comes from fear. 
However, it is specifically the ‘a priorism’ of suspicion that is critiqued, rather than 
suspicion itself; ‘[a] healthy suspicion, bounded by a commitment to the love of my 
neighbour, is more properly called discernment’.56 In a manner similar to Barth’s 
‘emergency clause’57 the loving reader works with an a priori assumption of trust, 
which can be broken if the text proves untrustworthy, but the movement is in that 
order, and not the reverse. The a priori assumption of trust is rooted in the hope that 
love will prove fruitful.
58
  
  
ii) Love towards other interpreters 
 
Much of what has been said so far applies to Fowl’s work, and so a brief note 
is in order regarding his view of interpretive charity. His primary concern is to argue 
that interpreters must act charitably towards one another, particularly in the course of 
interpretive disagreement. This involves close attention to differences of opinion, 
willingness to listen patiently to other points of view, and effort to render another’s 
viewpoint as intelligible as possible. This last point derives from close attention to 
the varied contexts within which interpreters work, and thus the various ways in 
which rationality is construed. Fowl follows Donald Davidson in assuming that the 
ability to recognize another’s language as language provides the theoretical basis for 
translatability, and thus understanding.
59
 Thus in the realm of interpretive discourse, 
the ability to recognize that two competing projects share anything at all in common, 
is the beginning of mutual understanding. Charity is the virtue that allows an 
interpreter to patiently persist with the possibility of mutual understanding. 
 In practice, this means that charitable interpreters take time to find common 
ground where possible, and to take the other viewpoints seriously. Fowl argues that 
in his disagreement with the Donatists, Augustine displays this kind of interpretive 
charity, highlighting the resulting point that being charitable does not equate to 
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‘being nice’.60 While Fowl’s basis for being charitable derives from Christian 
commitments, it is worth noting that his argument could apply to historical-critical 
debates without being seen as controversial.  
 
iii) Love and God 
 
Despite the theological focus on love, the argument so far effectively applies 
to any text, but Jacobs’ comment about extending charity to the author refocuses the 
question raised from Augustine about how the love of God relates to biblical 
interpretation. Bonhoeffer responds to this point with characteristic boldness: 
When a dear friend speaks a word to us, do we subject it to analysis? No, we 
simply accept it, and then it resonates inside us for days. The word of 
someone we love opens itself up to us the more we “ponder it in our hearts,” 
as Mary did.
61
 
Of course, this raises questions about the relationship between divine and human 
authorship, and that takes us beyond the scope of this thesis. But bearing in mind the 
caveats of Jacobs, Briggs and Barth, this point seems germane to the question of 
what it means to hear God in the process of reading. It might remain the case that 
hearing God actually requires reading against the grain of a text, but this only makes 
sense within a broader economy of love. However to make the move from being 
generally charitable in the course of reading, to seeking to love God and live in the 
light of God’s love, is a specific facet of thinking theologically about interpretation. 
Anthony Thiselton highlights this point with respect to pastoral theology. He notes 
that pastoral theology is influenced by ‘criteria of relevance’, where the focus of 
study on sociology, psychology and so on may be determined by what counts as 
relevant information in any given context. Following Ronald Cox, Thisleton argues 
that criteria of relevance are socially influenced, and thus are always open to change. 
To explain this point more clearly, he suggests the example of a couple from 
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relatively different social groups falling in love. The process of loving another 
person leads the criteria of relevance of each to expand and change, as they learn to 
appreciate what counts to the other. But by bringing in the notion of love, 
Thiselton’s argument takes a decisive turn: 
In theological terms, however, love represents the major transforming force 
of all systems and criteria of relevance. Interests which have hitherto 
gathered around the self as a system of self-centred relevance begin to be re-
grouped and re-ranked round the self of another, or even the Other. [...] In 
this case, the outgoing love from the heart of God to his creation will 
constitute a new motive-force that re-defines criteria of relevance for the 
believer: the goal of transformation into the image of Christ is to see the 
world through the eyes and interests of God’s purposes for the world [italics 
original].
62
 
 
iv) Conclusion 
 
Thiselton’s argument marks a decisive shift in the discussion so far. While 
the abstract notion of allowing love to become a guiding principle seems 
methodologically controversial, much of what has been said by Jacobs, Briggs and 
Fowl would not be controversial in practice. This is because love, in their accounts, 
either of the text of the interpretive opponent, equates to close attention and a 
willingness to listen. Thus it can be seen that quite often, interpretive virtue seems 
more problematic in its abstract form than it will in practice; even if the conceptual 
work relies on theological presuppositions, much of the content will be accessible to 
a wider group of readers.  
 The more difficult turn occurs when God is brought into the picture as both 
the object and subject of love, and as one who decisively shifts our understanding of 
the human situation. The difficulty takes the form of not only addressing the 
character of the reader, but of shaping the role of interpretation itself around 
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theological concerns about love and God. However, because such concerns have to 
do with the fundamental nature of reality, they must be allowed to speak to the 
question of how the Bible is interpreted as scripture. Finally, by way of anticipation, 
Jacobs and Briggs show that love does not always require naïve assent to a text, and 
this in part derives from the reality that not all texts give life. But also, our love is 
not perfect. In this tension, hope suggests itself as a way of characterising the reader 
seeking to read in love, fully aware of their need to grow in that virtue, and holding 
the expectation that such growth is possible. 
 
2.3. Virtue, Phronesis and Wisdom 
 
 Reading the Bible wisely is widely recommended by a number of writers 
surveyed. Wisdom is not only offered as one interpretive virtue, but is quite often 
giving prominence as an overarching regulative virtue.
63
 There may be several 
reasons for this, but clearly the notion of wisdom offers something of a bridge 
between Aristotelian and biblical traditions. However there are clear differences and 
so this discussion will allow us to disentangle the Aristotelian and biblical views of 
wisdom, thereby addressing the question of how appropriate virtue ethics as such is 
to the biblical texts. The key distinction will be that as the tradition develops, biblical 
wisdom becomes increasingly associated with divine gift.  
 
i) Phronesis 
 
 Daniel Treier argues that taking account of the limits of human knowledge, 
‘theology’s prime epistemological challenge is understanding the role of Christian 
practical reason, or phronesis, in biblical interpretation for the Word of God’.64 
Phronesis is one of Aristotle’s qualities of the mind which is focused on discerning 
action that leads to the good in life. Both Treier and Vanhoozer modify the concept 
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with a specifically Christian emphasis, such that for Vanhoozer, the ‘good’ is 
understood through the gospel.
65
 Treier maintains the Aristotelian distinction 
between higher order wisdom (Sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis), and thus 
argues that ‘Christian Sophia takes shape with reference to Jesus Christ, so that 
phronesis must understand present contexts of obedience in the light of his work pro 
nobis, and in view of his pattern to which we are being conformed’.66 Thus his view 
of phronesis is ‘Christianized’ by drawing on Philippians, the one place in the New 
Testament where the language is prominent. Fowl also argues that Christian 
phronesis is best understood through Philippians, and thus with Treier he argues that 
it must be characterised by humility. Judgements on how to live are counted wise to 
the extent that they are in continuity with the humble and self-giving character of 
Christ.
67
 As a result, scripture is interpreted wisely when the character of the 
interpreter reflects that of Christ, and thus a wise interpretation of scripture will raise 
practical and specific approaches to living well in the light of the text. Put simply, 
this Christianized phronesis describes the ability to make sound judgements in novel 
or ambiguous situations, judgements that reflect the character of Jesus. 
 While the idea of prudence or practical wisdom seems self-evidently good, it 
remains unclear as to whether phronesis as such is the best term for describing this 
faculty. Colin Gunton suggests that Christ’s humility is so far removed from the 
world of Aristotle that his actions can hardly be described as resulting from 
phronesis.
68
 It is perhaps this distinction that leads to Paul’s description of the cross 
as foolishness (1 Corinthians 1), and this at least raises the question of whether 
conventional presuppositions about wisdom are necessarily compatible with a 
Christian perspective. Moreover, this draws into focus the more general question of 
how well virtue ethics as a distinct area fits with the biblical texts.  
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ii) Wisdom and the Bible 
 
In addressing the above question, Briggs notes that the biblical wisdom 
traditions do resonate with virtue ethics in their general concern for the development 
of character.
69
 Similarly, Ellen Davis has highlighted the use of phronesis in the 
LXX, and demonstrates several points of contact between classical virtue ethics and 
Proverbs among other wisdom texts.
70
 However, both writers recognize that these 
resonances do not equate to a theoretical take on virtue ethics. Even so, while the 
Bible may lack a comprehensive theory of virtue, it does not follow that one cannot 
discern coherent portraits of desirable characteristics. Rather, the main problem with 
attaching the conceptual framework of virtue theory to the Bible comes with the 
question of how one’s character is developed. 
 The answer to this question seems to develop through the tradition. 
Bockmuehl argues that in the earliest biblical wisdom texts, wisdom is to be sought 
and may be found. Even at this stage the pursuit of wisdom is a struggle, but by the 
time of the post-exilic wisdom texts, wisdom is more specifically depicted as a gift 
to be sought from God.
71
 In the New Testament, wisdom finds its locus in Jesus 
Christ, especially in the gospel traditions, thus heightening the sense that wisdom is 
revealed as a gift by God.
72
 Charting the tradition in this way allows Bockmuehl to 
suggest that for the biblical and patristic writers, ‘the meaning of the sacred text is 
understood not primarily by creative genius or scientific dissection, but by the 
interplay of divine gift and human delight’.73 Thus the reading of Scripture is 
properly undertaken with a receptive and open spirit, open to transformation and 
formation in wisdom by God. In turn, ‘[t]he object of biblical interpretation [...] is 
the interpreter as much as it is the text’.74 
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 Briggs’s discussion of wisdom focuses on detailed exegesis of Solomon’s 
wisdom in 1 Kings 3, and displays a balance between viewing wisdom as a human 
pursuit and as a divine gift. As with Bockmuehl, his approach ultimately bypasses 
the discussion of virtue theory by prioritizing exegesis, and thus he offers no 
theoretical discussion of phronesis as a virtue per se. His depiction of exegetical 
wisdom nonetheless resonates with Treier’s work, but is perhaps clearer due to its 
narrative focus. In particular, Briggs notes the many indeterminacies faced by 
Solomon, and draws parallels with the significant indeterminacies in the relevant 
texts. Thus exegetical wisdom becomes a matter of discerning which textual 
difficulties matter, distinguishing between ‘what can and cannot be known’ and 
finding a practical and faithful way to navigate interpretive disputes.
75
 The 
acknowledgement of potential indeterminacies coheres with Fowl’s perspective, but 
in Briggs’s case it leaves space for the use of standard critical tools when the text 
seems clearer. Again, Briggs’s portrait of wisdom in operation is perhaps 
uncontroversial, but the idea that such wisdom is received as a gift is not. 
Furthermore, the notion of divine gift moves us away from pure virtue ethics and 
will be picked up shortly in our broader evaluation of this field.  
 Independently of the concept of interpretive virtue, David Ford also argues 
for a ‘wisdom interpretation’ of scripture, suggesting that ‘Christian Theology 
requires an engagement with scripture whose primary desire is for the wisdom of 
God in life now [italics original]’.76 Similarly, ‘[h]ow one interprets scripture wisely 
within the horizon of the purposes of God and God’s relation to ‘everything’ is 
perhaps the core issue for theology’.77 Once again we are aware of the cyclical 
nature of growing through biblical interpretation, and in this case, Ford foregrounds 
the presence and activity of God in the process. Again, Ford’s view of wisdom 
involves navigating indeterminacies, but also the specific and infinitely varied 
interactions between the ‘ramifications’ of the text, and the realities of human 
existence.
78
 In Christian Wisdom, Ford focuses on moments of ‘crying out’ in the 
Bible and contemporary life, suggesting that such expressions carry ramifications 
beyond words. The culmination of these cries is the cry of Jesus on the cross (Luke 
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23.46). As a result, these texts can never be explained by abstractions without loss, 
and thus their canonization constitutes a permanent invitation to ‘reread’ them.79 
Furthermore, Ford argues that ‘[i]f Jesus embodies wisdom, then wisdom is vitally 
concerned to hear and respond with compassion to the cries of those who are 
suffering’.80 This suggests that the wise interpretation of the Bible must occur with 
some sense of reference to the realities of the human condition and present 
sufferings.  
 This perspective has three important implications. Firstly, wise interpretation 
might extend beyond the navigation of textual difficulties into the navigation of 
textual interactions with human experience. This is to stake much on the 
contemporary relevance and truth of the scriptures’ witness. Even accounting for 
problematic texts, any theological account of biblical interpretation requires some 
presuppositions along this line. Secondly, Ford argues that for the theologian seeking 
wisdom, ‘the core activity is crying out for it’.81 This coheres with themes in the 
wisdom of James
82
 and appears as an attempt to balance the roles of self-formation 
and gift. Wisdom here is a gift from God, and the human response is described as a 
matter of stance rather than practice per se. This leads to the third point that as a gift, 
wisdom may be bestowed on anyone, a point explicit in Luke 10.21-22 or 1 
Corinthians 1-3.
83
 Thus, a Christian perspective on wise reading must take account 
of the possibility that anyone can theoretically display exegetical wisdom, but that 
God has a history of bestowing true wisdom of those whom the world might deem 
unlikely recipients. Again, this point will be elaborated shortly. 
 
iii) Conclusion 
 
By focusing on wisdom it has been shown that a biblically informed 
approach to interpretive virtue must take account of the activity of God as giver of 
wisdom. As a result, any virtue ethics that works predominantly with the notion of 
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human formation apart from the activity of God will be theologically deficient. This 
does not rule out the usefulness of virtue theory, but suggests that it requires some 
critical engagement, a subject to which we now turn. Before proceeding, it is worth 
noting that the pursuit of wisdom involves a sense of orientation towards future 
growth, and this again suggests that the pursuit of virtue in general calls forth hope 
in the seeker. Indeed, as with love, the very notion of interpretive wisdom requires a 
view to the future, because such a ‘virtue’ is not something that can be simply 
‘applied’ in the moment. If such transformation comes as a gift, then the hope of 
being formed is staked on the promise of God. Either way, this is suggestive of the 
idea that hope is a crucial animating part of the pilgrimage of human growth. Thus as 
we now discuss three criticisms of interpretive virtue, it will be argued that a focus 
on hope may clarify what is at stake.  
 
3. Three Criticisms of Interpretive Virtue 
 
 So far I have described three perspectives that have led to the discussion of 
interpretive virtue, and two specific virtues in practice. At several points critical 
issues have been raised, and in this section I will address them more directly in turn. 
In each case it will be argued that a focus on hope in interpretation will allow us to 
address the questions put to the broader field. This is not to argue that hope will 
become the definitive concept for biblical interpretation, or even the definitive 
interpretive virtue, but more modestly that it offers one way of dealing with some of 
the questions arising from our discussion that draws on an important strand of 
Christian theology. 
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i) Scripture is not for the virtuous, but sinners 
 
Recently a number of writers have argued that biblical interpretation is best 
learned in dialogue with the ‘saints of the Church’, and this includes scholars in the 
field of interpretive virtue who offer the saints as ‘exemplars’.84 As Fowl puts it: 
Given that Christians are called to interpret Scripture as part of their 
ongoing journey into ever-deeper communion with God, it is not surprising 
that those who have grown and advanced in virtue will tend to be masterful 
interpreters of Scripture.
85
 
But does this simply produce a shift in interpretive elitism, from the academic 
scholar to the saint? If Jesus came ‘to call not the righteous, but sinners’ (Matthew 
9.13), then is not the implied reader of scripture a sinner, rather than a saint?  
 Something like this critique is in view in Rowland and Robert’s book The 
Bible for Sinners. Early on, they suggest that: 
If it comes to a disagreement, the question is raised: what right do sinners and 
nobodies, individuals with their own agendas – people, in fact, in similar 
positions to that of Jesus – have to interpret the Bible in the light of their own 
experience? Shouldn’t we get out interpretations from those above and before 
us, our moral or religious betters?
86
 
The answer is a resounding ‘no’, and setting aside the slightly subversive tone of the 
argument, they raise a very important point. If, from a theological perspective, 
scripture is part of God’s activity in redeeming humankind, then is not its message 
intended for those who are not virtuous at all? If so, then it becomes self-defeating to 
argue that it can only be interpreted by those who are already virtuous, and thus 
seemingly not in need of God’s grace. Obviously this dualistic description overstates 
the case, but the basic point remains. If God’s message is for sinners, then it is 
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pointless - perhaps evil - to suggest that they (or rather, we) are somehow incapable 
of hearing it. 
 A similar point is raised by Briggs and Treier, with regard to the presenting 
circularity of virtue ethics. Treier notes that classical Aristotelian virtue ethics 
suffered from a kind of ‘chicken and egg’ problem, whereby only one who was 
virtuous was able to pursue the virtues. In this context, the school of virtue becomes 
very much a closed community.
87
 Similarly Briggs notes that the necessity of 
interpretive virtue runs the risk of looking like an ‘entrance requirement’ such that 
the formation of virtue becomes a task prior to the actual moment of reading a text.
88
 
Even if it is accepted that there is value in the concept of a virtuous cycle of 
interpretation, the question of how one enters that cycle is nonetheless begged. It is 
my view that this question can only be addressed by locating this movement within a 
framework of divine grace. 
 Firstly, in the above quotation, Rowland and Roberts saw off the branch on 
which their argument rests by erroneously referring to ‘sinners’ and ‘nobodies’ in the 
same sentence. Implicitly equating these two groups ironically gives the impression 
of upholding the perspective not of Jesus, but of his opponents. The ‘sinners’ to 
whom Jesus refers are quite often not ‘nobodies’ but moralising religious leaders or 
the relatively wealthy.
89
 But more than this, it is often the marginalised or outsiders 
that turn out to display wisdom or virtue of some kind.
90
 Rooted in biblical tradition, 
interpretive virtue cannot be the preserve of the ‘officially righteous’ but as a fruit of 
divine grace, it is open to anyone. 
 Even so, this still fails to address the question of whether the circle of 
interpretive virtue leaves the Bible closed. If the formation of virtue is simply left to 
the imminent capacities of the reader and their community, then this risk stands, 
though in practice it seems highly obtuse to argue that someone who has not 
undergone formation is unable to understand anything at all in a text. Though 
Hauerwas’s polemical style comes close, I am not aware that anyone has argued for 
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virtue as an ‘entry requirement’ for understanding.91 Formation of interpretive virtue 
is better depicted as a refining and deepening of the interpreter’s faculties of 
judgement, the ‘transformation of the mind’ (Romans 12.1-2). My argument 
however, is that the circle is opened and held, so to speak, by the grace of God. 
Rowland and Roberts are entirely correct to assert that the testimony of scripture is 
for all, and this is best understood as a result of the gracious redemption of the world 
by God, in Christ. But to talk of redemption is to highlight the point that even if 
Christ calls sinners, he does not do so only to leave the human condition unchanged. 
The call of the gospel is in some sense a call to transformation and growth, or in the 
language of much of Christian tradition, discipleship. 
 Thus Treier in particular argues that any Christian description of virtue must 
begin with the breaking in of divine grace, and the call of Christ to a life of 
discipleship.
92
 This discipleship is not only a pattern of human action, but also the 
‘first-fruits’ of the Holy Spirit. This point will be elaborated shortly in balancing the 
concepts of formation and transformation, but the point at this stage is that locating 
the process of reading within the economy of divine grace allows us to retain the 
specific idea that anyone may read scripture, and in some sense hear its message, or 
hear God. Interpretive virtue then becomes a framework for describing the specific 
act of discipleship that relates to the ongoing reading and hearing of scripture.
93
 
 Even with the specific interruption of God’s activity, this process of reading 
occurs in time, and thus retains a view to the future. This is because, as I will argue 
in chapter two, God’s activity also has a view to the future in terms of the 
transformation of the human condition. To read the Bible theologically as Christian 
scripture is thus to situate oneself in this narrative of God’s transformation and 
renewal of the world, and so this approach to biblical interpretation is undertaken in 
a specific kind of hope. The major task of this thesis is to explore how this narrative 
of hope shapes the situation in which we come to scripture, and furthermore how 
being hopeful shapes the interpretive activity of the reader. On the specific question 
at hand, the virtue of hope carries with it the sense that no human can claim to be 
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virtuous in some complete way, and thus the interpretation of scripture cannot be 
fenced off as the preserve of this or that group of readers. Equally, it will be argued 
that Christian hope begins with the gracious action of God, and therefore does not 
depend on the prior condition of the person. The concept of hope may thus carry the 
significance of personal growth alongside the insistence that the testimony of 
scripture remains open to all.  
 
ii) Virtue Theory and Public Agreement 
 
In a brief but significant comment, Christopher Seitz complains that Fowl 
offers no ‘comprehensive, public, agreed-upon statement of what actually counts for 
virtue’.94 One could respond by suggesting that there is very little left in biblical 
studies that could be described as ‘comprehensive’ or ‘agreed-upon’, but Seitz’s 
point is worth considering. It was noted that many of the writers surveyed work with 
different virtue lists, and thus Seitz rightly raises the question of how one should 
decide what counts as a virtue. This concern is not trivial; humility was not always a 
virtue, and in contemporary biblical studies the virtue of trust, even with caveats, 
may prove problematic for those engaged in ideological criticism.  
 Ellen Davis rightly points out that classically, the virtues were understood to 
operate as a whole, and that while ‘the biblical writers are less inclined to draw fixed 
categories for the various dispositions they commend, they also strive to represent a 
moral unity’.95 Virtues such as love or wisdom have such a strong basis in the Bible 
and tradition that they are unlikely to cause conceptual problems as good 
characteristics, even if their relationship to interpretation does. But the more detailed 
the character portrait becomes, the more likely we are to find disagreement about 
what constitutes good moral character, and this is likely to stem for varying pre-
theoretic, and theoretical notions of what is good.  
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 Caution is thus needed, but I would concede that the search for a 
comprehensive account of good moral character is likely to be in vain, and at the 
very least would lead to the endless deferral of actually reading the texts. But if the 
interpretive virtues are themselves working concepts, in the sense that they are open 
to refinement and discussion, then this actually allows us to make some progress 
with the activity of interpreting the text. This seems to be necessitated by the very 
fact that if interpreters need formation because they fail to make wise judgements, so 
too our judgments about wisdom or the content of the virtues must be provisional 
and open to correction. But given this, it is perhaps unwise to hang too much on 
virtue theory as an abstract concept, simply because scripture seems to question such 
abstractions. Rather, what we are faced with is a set of character portraits and ideals 
that operate through specific contexts, and thus the process of discerning what it 
means to live well is an ever growing and reforming act of engagement. 
 In short the process is necessarily heuristic, but this is by no means 
problematic within a theological and hermeneutical framework that recognizes our 
own human limitations. In this respect, the decision to consider the virtue of hope in 
the context of interpretation is far from arbitrary, even if it is provisional. One could 
appeal to the tradition of regarding hope as a theological virtue, following Augustine, 
and picked up more recently by Vanhoozer.
96
 However, the main focus of my thesis 
is that hope offers one particularly significant dimension to understanding the 
theological narrative within which we come to interpret the Bible as Christian 
scripture. This has to do with the argument that there is hope in God for all for 
growth in character, and hence deeper understanding and more fruitful interpretation. 
As with love, hope cannot strictly command public agreement, but its centrality to 
Christian theology suggests that it is a viable option for a compelling account of 
interpretive virtue.  
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iii) Formation and Transformation 
 
The use of virtue ethics brings with it the idea that moral growth is a matter 
of steady progress through various habits and practices. This emphasis is particularly 
strong in Fowl and Jones, and at least implicit in Briggs, Bockmuehl and Treier. But 
even if some biblical texts display an interest in human character, it is not necessarily 
the case that they portray character development through human formation. For 
example, John Barton argues that even in the wisdom texts, which display the closest 
affinity to virtue ethics, human character seems essentially ‘fixed’. The only means 
of transference from one course of life to another is ‘conversion’.97 This of course 
has close affinities with more Protestant concerns in the realm of ethics, and is 
certainly reflected in the language of John Webster. He shares concerns over the 
effects of the human condition on interpretation, but is unconvinced by the concept 
of interpretive virtue: 
Contemporary theories of hermeneutical ‘virtues’ move us in something of 
the right direction, especially insofar as they insist that fitting reading of a 
canonical text requires the acquisition of moral and spiritual habits and not 
simply right critical technology. But it remains doubtful whether virtue 
theory can successfully break free of the tug towards immanence; these 
accounts of hermeneutical activity still threaten to leave us within the 
relatively self-enclosed worlds of readerly psyches and habit-forming 
communities. If what has been said so far about the place of the canon in a 
network of soteriological relations between God and humanity is of any 
value, then it will require a much more vigorously charismatic-eschatological 
understanding of habits and their acquisition than has been offered in the 
quasi-Aristotelian accounts so far produced.
98
 
Webster’s concern lies with his understanding that the Bible, as Christian scripture, 
is ‘annexed’ to God’s saving and transforming activity. Thus ‘[r]eading Scripture is 
an episode in the history of sin and its overcoming; and overcoming sin is the sole 
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work of Christ and the Spirit’.99 Interestingly, he does concede that there is value in 
various habits and practices of the Church, but his argument draws on the same basic 
issue raised by Barton, namely that the texts themselves give far more weight to 
God’s transforming activity, over the formative effect of human communities. To the 
extent that this is correct, one door is closed for biblical interpretation, and another 
opens. On the one hand if humans have little control over their character 
development, then the only hope for good reading is to wait on God. If this is the 
case, then however accurate our understanding of the relationship between character 
and interpretation, all this study can do is clarify why interpretation is difficult; it 
would offer nothing in terms of what interpreters could actually do to better their 
reading. On the other hand, if good character, and hence good interpretation, is a 
matter of divine grace, then as noted in our discussion of Rowland and Roberts, good 
biblical interpretation may not be the preserve of any one group of readers. The 
social disruption of much of God’s activity suggests that good reading may be found 
where it is not conventionally expected. However, while I wish to maintain this latter 
point as a crucial part of the thesis, the picture is more nuanced than a formation-
transformation dualism allows. In fact, there are good reasons for maintaining that 
God’s transforming action takes flesh in human action, and that to oppose 
transformation and formation is to create a false dichotomy.   
 Firstly, Barton notes that while the Old Testament does not conceptualize 
human moral growth, its narrative character portraits capture the complexity of 
moral living highlighted by virtue ethics.
100
 In this sense, there may be an implicit 
commendation of moral growth through real human examples. Briggs endorses this 
view and thus adopts it as a framework for his whole study. He points out that 
though certain texts do enshrine a wise/foolish dichotomy, the narrative portraits 
show that the wise do sometimes act foolishly (as in the case of Solomon or 
David).
101
 Helpfully, he thus concludes that wisdom ‘does not serve as a form of 
insurance against ever going wrong again’.102 There is a subtle difference however, 
between moral ambiguity and moral growth. Briggs shows that in practice, biblical 
characters are rarely entirely wise or foolish, but this is not the same thing as 
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showing that a foolish character may gradually become wise. Even so, against 
Barton there are clear indicators that certain courses of action are expected to lead to 
growth in wisdom.
103
 Furthermore, even when wisdom is received as a gift, the fact 
that it does not operate automatically suggests that divine transformation and human 
formation are not incompatible.  
 Somewhat ironically, the New Testament text that has sparked perhaps the 
most discussion over the nature of scripture argues that one of its purposes is 
‘training in righteousness’ (paideian tēn en dikaiosunē, 2 Timothy 3.16). There is no 
need to raise anxieties about a righteousness that can be ‘learned’, lest we slip into 
the mire of debates about justification. The thrust of the text is towards growing into 
that which has already been made real in Christ.
104
 In this manner, N.T. Wright 
represents a number of scholars who have argued that within a framework of grace 
one still finds character forming habits and practices commended in the New 
Testament.
105
 Having said that, he correctly highlights differences between the 
Christian and Aristotelian traditions; in particular, the Aristotelian virtue of pride 
becomes a vice in Christianity, replaced by the virtue of humility. But this seems to 
beg an etymological question; if, as Wright points out, ‘virtue’ has something to do 
with ‘strengths’ that lead to the good, what are we to make of Paul’s emphasis on his 
weaknesses?
106
 This question has obviously produced a great deal of discussion from 
various perspectives, and it does not negate the value of human effort, even if only as 
a response to divine grace, held within the activity of the Spirit. But it does suggest 
that an interpreter could never legitimately claim virtue in support of their argument. 
In this respect, Fowl’s emphasis on interpretive humility seems entirely right. Given 
this, perhaps the primary practice of virtue in the New Testament is prayer, as Ford 
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suggests, ‘crying out’ to God for wisdom.107 This is of course James’ response to the 
quest for wisdom, and finds resonances in Paul and the Gospels.
108
 For example, 
Paul’s exhortation to be transformed by the renewal of the mind (metamorphousthe 
tē anakainōse tou noos, Romans 12.2) suggests a similar perspective. The exact 
meaning of the phrase is a little obscure, but the focal point of the text is a choice 
between two paths in life, the transformation of the mind in the following of God, or 
conformity with the world. Even if the work is located fully in the economy of 
divine grace, the very nature of the exhortation calls forth a human response. This 
idea also captures the aspect of ‘testing’ by God as way of developing character. The 
initiative lies with God, yet it carries the implicit notion of human response.
109
 As 
such, human activity in the formation of character may still be seen as an aspect of 
God’s transformative activity.  
 
iv) Formation, Transformation and Hope 
 
The key point behind the preceding discussion is that the viability of 
interpretive virtue as a concept depends on whether or not human character is able to 
change, and if so, how. Because all theories of virtue have some sense of orientation 
towards future change, one could argue that there must always be some working 
concept of hope involved in pursuing the virtues. But equally, any perspective on 
human character must account for the ambiguities and frustrations of human 
morality, and in my judgement it is here that Christian theology has its most 
distinctive contribution to the discussion. Wright correctly argues that any Christian 
concept of virtue must see its telos in eschatological terms,
110
 and in turn, this will 
make a decisive difference for theological interpretation of the Bible. The hope of 
the gospel is that our nature and character are not finally fixed, nor will they always 
be subject to the frustration of our human situation. Christian hope derives from the 
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promise that our humanity will be finally redeemed by God. As Thiselton has 
argued: 
At the heart of the Christian doctrine of the human person stands the belief 
that God can impart new life, grant new birth, and bring about a new 
beginning through new creation... It is God who has proven his creative 
power who can “create new heavens and a new earth” [italics original].111 
 My argument is that ‘hope’ uniquely describes the situation in which we 
navigate the moral ambiguities involved in biblical interpretation. But just as there 
may be hope for moral growth which leads to understanding, hope itself has a moral 
dimension; hope is as much a character trait as love or trust. Here is the crucial point 
from which this thesis essentially begins; if the whole life of discipleship and human 
growth (including as a reader) is animated by the hope that such growth is possible 
through God, then this hope is itself a character trait worth pursuing. Furthermore, 
whether or not we are able to describe a perfect, eternal hope, hope is a characteristic 
that has particular significance for persons engaged in the path of discipleship and 
the struggles of life. As such, my argument is that it is worth considering hope itself 
as a virtue germane to biblical interpretation for Christian theology. Vanhoozer 
rightly notes that the kind of virtues required to read the bible are ‘virtues 
commensurate with the status of the interpreter-servant in relation to the scriptural 
text’.112 The language of ‘interpreter-servant’ is indicative of Vanhoozer’s emphasis 
on humility as an interpretive virtue. But if he is correct in arguing that the 
interpreter’s status in relation to the text matters, then the virtue of hope becomes 
crucial if the interpreter’s status in relation to God’s redeeming history is helpfully 
described in terms of hope. 
To be sure, just as we might fail to love, so too hope is subject to the present 
problems of our existence. On the one hand, selfish desires may be projected onto 
theological hopes. On the other hand, the weight of circumstance may make it nearly 
impossible to feel hopeful. The question of the subjective appropriation of hope will 
be addressed in the next chapter, but it remains worth exploring if Christian theology 
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is understood to posit objective grounds for hope, primarily the resurrection of Jesus. 
I will argue that on this basis, ‘hope’ best expresses the interpretive characteristic of 
actively waiting on God, anticipating the future in trust and persevering in reading 
for the sake of knowing God and witnessing to the possible flourishing of creation.  
 It is finally worth noting that the idea of moral growth raises the question of 
moral perfection noted briefly above. If part of Christian hope is that our character is 
not finally fixed, and furthermore, we recognize that humans hope imperfectly in the 
present, is there some concept of perfected hope, some hope that endures 
eschatologically? In other words, might we hope for being perfected in hope? This is 
an important question which derives in part from differing interpretations of 1 
Corinthians 13.12, concerning the question of whether hope’s endurance extends into 
eternity. However, I will not address this question in great detail, partly because I 
will argue that it is necessary to remain circumspect about the exact content of 
Christian hope, but predominantly because it is enough to recognize that hope is a 
gift for the present, regardless of its own future. It is possible to speak of hope as a 
gift for people ‘on the way’, a fruit of God’s transforming grace in the present. In 
turn, we may recognize that humans do not always hope well but that one may grow 
in hope, without needing to define what perfect hope looks like.  
 
4. Hope and the aim of Bible Reading 
 
 So far I have argued that the usefulness of interpretive virtue as a concept 
depends on the possibility of moral growth. Christian theology provides grounds for 
hope that moral transformation and growth are possible, not just ultimately, but in 
the present. But hope itself is a virtue, a human characteristic that is part of the fruit 
of that present transformation, and thus I have argued that it is worth exploring what 
it means to read hopefully, alongside other interpretive virtues.  This is the task of 
the present thesis. However before we proceed, it is worth returning to the question 
of why we read scripture; what is the interpretive good to which hope might lead? 
Already it can be seen that this hope for biblical interpretation is itself partly the fruit 
of biblical interpretation, and as such we are coming against the question of 
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circularity in this proposal. But equally, this perspective suggests that the 
conveyance of hope is one of the ends of scripture itself, and thus from a theological 
perspective, it is reasonable to suggest that good biblical interpretation may cultivate 
hope. In this final section I will attempt to reconcile these two perspectives, arguing 
that a cycle of hope is an essential element of a theological depiction of biblical 
reading.  
 Firstly, it can be seen that many of the biblical texts explicitly aim at 
encouraging hope in their readers. The texts are rarely if ever disinterested 
repositories of historical information; narrative memory and exhortation serve the 
function of exhorting and encouraging the first recipient communities. Given this, 
the canonization of these texts turns their transformative purpose into the present 
situation, but even before we talk of canonization there has been an increasing 
emphasis among theological interpreters on the sense in which the biblical texts 
already point beyond themselves, through the present and into the future. In other 
words it is argued that the contemporary relevance of these texts is not in the first 
instance an imposition, but a recognition that the texts themselves bleed into the 
present. 
 This idea has close affinities with the pre-modern anagogical sense of 
scripture, as that sense which ‘builds up’ in hope.113 Without direct reference to that 
tradition, the idea re-emerges in Barth’s ‘Strange new World within the Bible’. Barth 
noted that it is possible to read the Bible with many aims in mind, most of which will 
bear some kind of interpretive fruit. But he argued that the Bible itself has its own 
agenda, its own questions for our world. The Bible presents us with a strange new 
world, the world of God, and as such the end of scripture is transformation. ‘We are 
offered the magnificent, productive, hopeful life of a grain of seed, a new beginning, 
out of which all things shall be made new’.114 This line of thought has been picked 
up more recently by Hays, Davis, Bauckham and Webster, who variously argue that 
the Bible narrates a history of creation, sin and regeneration. This narrative 
encompasses the whole of creation, and as such encompasses our present existence 
as contemporary readers. To read the Bible theologically is thus not only to read 
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about this narrative, but within it.
115
 In this economy, part of the end of reading 
scripture is the discovery of hope in this new world of God. 
 This idea is given particular focus by Moltmann and Thiselton who draw on 
the concept of promise to describe scripture. This should not be surprising given the 
etymological link between ‘Testament’ and ‘covenant’, ‘covenant’ and ‘promise’. 
Moltmann describes scripture as ‘promissory history’, the history of God’s promises 
and promise fulfilment from Abraham through Israel to Christ.
116
 But Moltmann 
sees these promises as ‘endorsed’ but not completely fulfilled in scripture; the 
promise of new creation ‘points beyond itself to the eschatological coming of the 
kingdom of God [Italics original]’.117 Given this: 
The biblical testimonies are by no means theoretical testimonies. They do not 
aim simply at comprehension. They are witnesses to a suffered, experienced, 
acted-out promissory history, which prompts our own suffering, experiencing 
and acting within that history.
118
 
The concept of promise will be discussed in chapter two, but it can be seen that 
Moltmann among others overstates the case somewhat. Clearly, not all biblical texts 
function in this manner, and here the significance of canonicity comes into play. But 
it does not need to be proven that all biblical texts have a promissory, hope-fostering 
function to suggest that many do, or at least that this is part of the significance of 
taking the Bible as scripture.  
 Thiselton is right to highlight the significance of covenant throughout the 
Bible, and in turn the importance of divine promise within this idea. In particular, 
Thiselton draws on the concept of promise within Searle’s development of speech 
act theory to argue that promise has a function in shaping the world, not just in the 
future, but through the history between promise and fulfilment. In this sense, the 
covenantal, promissory aspect of scripture has a present, transformative function: 
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The world order is characterized by failure, evil, suffering, and fallenness, 
which does not accord with God’s will for its future. Hence transformation 
and change constitute the purposive goal of god’s word: of the word as 
Christ, the word as scripture, and the word to which the Church bears witness 
through its life and preaching [italics original].
119
 
While speech act theory clarifies the working of this idea, it is not in fact necessary 
to the basic argument. To the extent that the texts of scripture narrate a view of the 
frustration and final transformation of the history of creation, then scripture itself is 
inherently taken up into its own story. As such, a theological depiction of the Bible 
should understand it as an agent within the purposes of God, an aspect of God’s 
saving history.
120
 It becomes part of God’s transformative purposes, and so reading 
scripture becomes one dimension in the process of being transformed. Even if this 
transformation is only partial, which in chapter two I will argue it must be, it can be 
seen that a theological depiction of scripture recognizes that one of its key ends is the 
conveyance of divine promise, which in turn cultivates hope in the present. Thus one 
goal of reading the Bible theologically must be the hearing of divine promise, and 
growth in hope. As such, the cultivation of hope may itself be described as an 
interpretive good.  
 If this is so, then it is here that the circularity becomes most clear. Can it 
really be said that hope is a virtue that leads to hope, or does this formulation leave 
the reader chasing their tail? This issue will be clarified in chapter four, but it must 
be noted that circularity need not be a problem in and of itself. In the first case, this 
grasp of hope within the biblical texts goes hand in hand with the recognition of 
human fallibility, and if human beings are fallible, so too will be our grasp of this 
hope. This point will be expanded in chapter two, but in this sense it should not be 
controversial to suggest that one outcome of the initial apprehension of hope will be 
a return to the source, to deepen and develop that hope.   
 This idea will be clarified by splitting the broad concept of hope into some 
component parts. In chapter two, I will describe hope in terms of grounds, contents 
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and action. Put simply, the contents of hope describes that which is hope for, and the 
grounds of hope describes the basis on which that hope might come to fulfilment. 
The action of hope describes the difference made by hope in the present; in other 
words, it describes what it means to be hopeful on that specific basis. Using these 
terms, I will suggest that one aim of biblical reading is growth in being hopeful, 
through an appropriation of the grounds and contents of Christian hope as conveyed 
in the texts. One action of being hopeful in a specifically Christian sense must be to 
return to the grounds and contents of that hope for deeper appreciation, precisely 
because this hope does not claim perfect understanding. The virtue of hope thus leads 
to the interpretive good of better appreciating the grounds and contents of that hope 
as conveyed through scripture. In other words, the circle of hope exists between the 
grounds and contents of that hope on the one hand, and the action of being hopeful 
on the other. While this may seem a little artificial, it means that the circle is not 
closed for two reasons. Firstly, as argued above, all of this sits within the economy 
of divine grace that gives it currency in the first place. The address of hope is first 
and last a matter of divine grace. The circle of growth depicts the response of the 
vocation to discipleship. But secondly, in terms of the methodology of this thesis, it 
means that we can begin as noted above with a reflection on theological pre-
understanding. In the next chapter I will describe the nature of Christian hope, all the 
while recognizing that this description is provisional on its own terms.  
 All of this is to anticipate the argument of this thesis, but my aim at this stage 
has been to argue that hope is an important concept worth exploring for a theological 
depiction of biblical interpretation. Crucially, I have begun to show that the 
cultivation of hope as an end of scripture is not incompatible with the idea that hope 
aids the reading of scripture. Indeed the two are inherently linked; hope is not 
something that one either has or does not have. Rather, it is something that may be 
grown into, and because it will be argued that Christian hope awaits eschatological 
fulfilment, there is no theoretical end to this growth in the present time. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter it has been argued that our interpretive judgements are subject 
to the moral ambiguities of the human condition. Disentangling our interpretation 
from our own interests is a highly complex process, and as a result, we do not always 
read wisely. Given the impact of character on interpretation, a number of writers 
have explored the concept of ‘interpretive virtue’. This field of enquiry is focused on 
what kind of readers we ought to become. This has led us to consider how we 
become such readers, and in particular, how we might perceive the interrelation of 
human effort with divine grace in the formation of good character. In response to this 
question it was argued that Christian theology bears the promise of God’s 
redemption of humanity; in God, there is hope for the renewal of human character, 
and thus hope for the possibility of better understanding. But hope itself is an 
important character trait, and if the whole process of character growth is energised 
by hope, then hope as such is worth pursuing for the task of reading. Even though 
hope may also be subject to the problematic nature of human existence, it is 
nonetheless worth exploring what it might mean to approach the Bible in this 
economy of hope, in anticipation of the renewal of humanity depicted in scripture 
itself. This is the task of the rest of this thesis.  
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Chapter Two 
Christian Hope: Grounds, Contents and Action 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter one demonstrated that discussion of the theological interpretation of 
scripture would benefit from attention to the theology of hope. On the one hand, 
hope for the human person relates directly to any account of growth as readers, while 
on the other hand, scripture itself represents a rich source of theological hope. As 
such, the hermeneutical circle may be examined with regard to hope as that which 
both aids good reading, and is itself a product of good reading. This chapter will 
describe in greater detail what may be said about a Christian theology of hope, 
though clearly there will not be space to construct a novel approach to such a 
complex doctrine. Rather, I will describe various contours of hope from within two 
strands of Christian theology, in order to provide the conceptual tools for chapters 
three and four, where the question of what it means to approach biblical reading in 
hope will be discussed. The first strand of theology follows Jürgen Moltmann, whose 
work has been particularly influential in this area. Moltmann is helpful in 
simultaneously reinstating the significance of the future for Christian eschatology, 
whilst arguing that Christian hope is vitally active in the present through the 
anticipation of that future. These emphases will be maintained, though some critical 
engagement will be important. The second strand of theology follows James Cone, 
whose approach to Black liberation theology maintains a constant focus on the 
experience of many who are in the greatest need of hope. Whilst there are 
similarities between these strands, the latter places a greater emphasis on hope that is 
grounded in created human dignity, and in turn stresses a greater sense of God’s 
ability to change the present. As noted, the broadly systematic approach of this 
chapter is adopted so that the concept of hope may be directly related to the 
questions of hermeneutics and reading which follow.  
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From the outset we are still faced with the question of what kind of thing we 
are talking about when discussing hope in general. Settling upon an abstract 
definition of the term poses some difficulty, not least because it covers a wide range 
of possibilities in ordinary usage. As a result, we are faced with a series of questions 
about what exactly is under discussion, concerning whether or not hope pacifies, 
whether hope depends on an optimistic nature, and how hope relates to external 
circumstances. These questions will be addressed as we proceed, but one can find 
everyday descriptions of hope that will answer them differently. Thus it is too 
cumbersome a task to define hope in the abstract, and then outline a Christian 
version. Rather, the whole of this chapter will constitute a description of hope as the 
concept is used within Christian theology. However, even within a more limited 
context such as the New Testament, the language of hope covers a range of 
possibilities and so it is worth clarifying some parameters of hope that will give 
shape to our answer. Drawing on New Testament examples, we will thus consider 
how hope may be described in terms of its grounds, contents and action. 
 
1.2. Hope as a general concept in the New Testament 
 
 The use of elpis and its cognates in classical Greek is fairly broad, referring 
to general expectations of the future whether positive or negative. As such, the words 
could be rendered in English in terms of either hope or fear. Whether expectations 
were positive or negative would come down to ‘what man [sic] considers to be his 
own possibilities’.1 These possibilities would be grounded in both external 
circumstances and a person’s ‘internal’ capabilities, and thus whatever future was 
imagined could come to fulfilment through a combination of human effort and, in a 
sense, luck. However, this usage narrows significantly in the biblical texts, where 
elpis and elpizō refer exclusively to positive expectation, and thus the language may 
reasonably be rendered in English with the connotations of ‘hope’ and ‘to hope’.2 
This positive shift is partly because both the New Testament and the LXX relate 
elpis and elpizō directly to trust in God, and thus writers such as Ziesler suggest that 
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in contrast to Greek and contemporary thought, biblical hope never involves risk.
3
 
This seems to overstate the case; even confident trust in God requires the letting go 
of human security, and on this basis it is possible to speak of risk without 
diminishing the trustworthiness of God. Furthermore, even when referring to 
positive expectation the biblical usage can refer to day-to-day matters and so the 
certainty of ‘hoping’ will be understood differently in conjunction with the grounds 
of that hope.
4
 This point is clarified by the fact that hope is expressed both verbally 
and as a noun, where hope is a thing that it is possible ‘to have’.5 The two are 
obviously related, but the distinction demonstrates that there are, so to speak, 
different parameters of hope, and distinguishing these will help clarify the nature of 
hope in its varying expressions. I will describe these parameters as the grounds, 
contents and action of hope.  
  
i) Grounds 
 
Towards the end of Romans, Paul is able to speak of hoping to visit Rome.
6
 
This hope must be grounded in a sense of possibility, without which it would simply 
become wishful thinking. Its fulfilment may be understood to come through the 
grace of God, but could also depend on Paul’s own capacity for travel, financial 
means and so on. In this sense it can be seen more generally that two people might 
hope for the same thing, but expect that hope to be fulfilled in different ways. The 
possibility of fulfilment will be described as the grounds of hope, a factor which is 
particularly important in the New Testament because as shall be argued, Christian 
hope is primarily grounded in God. Thus the question of the grounds of hope 
constitutes the focal issue in the writer to Timothy’s command that the rich should 
not ‘set their hopes on the uncertainty of riches, but rather on God’.7 However we 
understand ‘the life that is really life’ (6.19), the writer’s argument is that this life 
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will not come through trust in wealth, but trust in God. Clearly, it is implied that if 
riches are uncertain, God is certain, and thus Ziesler’s point about the lack of risk in 
biblical hope looks more convincing. But the degree of certainty derives not from the 
concept of hope as such, but from the grounds of the hope. Is it thus possible that 
some hopes equate to certainty? Clearly, there are good theological reasons for 
maintaining the certainty of God, but the rhetorical contrast between God and wealth 
suggests a more subtle perspective. Even if hope in God is objectively certain, it 
requires the relinquishing of other hopes, and this entails the letting go of human 
security. Thus, from a subjective perspective hope in God is not straightforwardly 
risk free, not because God is not trustworthy, but because only time will show that 
the choice to trust God was well made. If it were not so, then the temptation to trust 
in wealth would not be the problem that it so manifestly is. Thus, even when hope is 
grounded in God, it remains appropriate to speak in terms of faith or trust, lest 
theological hope should slip into presumption.
8
 Either way, it is important to 
consider what the grounds of contemporary hope should be, and indeed it will be 
argued that this is the primary question for a theology of Christian hope.  
 
ii) Contents 
 
As noted above, Paul is able to speak of hoping to visit Rome alongside 
eschatological hopes, and thus our second parameter is the contents of one’s hope. 
What unifies different expectations within the single concept of hope is not 
immediately obvious, but some view of the future is involved, a future which is both 
theoretically possible and in some sense desirable.  In the case of Paul’s travel plans, 
the content of his hope is clear, but in the case of 1 Timothy 6, what is being hoped 
for is less obvious. The writer speaks of ‘the life that is really life’ (6.19, NRSV, tēs 
ontōs zoēs), a phrase which at least implies a shift in the kind of future that is 
expected, if one chooses to hope in God. Thus some hopes may be more 
theologically appropriate than others, but at the same time it is clearly possible to 
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hope for several things simultaneously. These may seem like fairly banal 
observations, but they become important when considering how different hopes 
interact. The crucial point is that when describing the content of Christian hope, it 
will be important to remain alert to the risk of ‘reading’ our own hopes into the 
narrative of God’s promises. This may not always be inappropriate, but the fact that 
it is possible means that we should proceed with caution.  
 
iii) Action 
 
The third parameter concerns what difference hope makes in life; what does 
it mean to hope or to be hopeful? It is worth noting that the ability to choose the 
grounds of one’s hope suggests that being hopeful is not to be equated with being 
naturally optimistic, but nor does it rule out this possibility. However, this raises one 
of the most complex issues concerning hope, namely the relationship between action 
and disposition. On the one hand, Anthony Kelly argues that hope comes into play 
when ‘optimism reaches the end of its tether’, a point made with respect to Paul’s 
depiction of Abraham ‘hoping against hope’ (par’ elpida ep’ elpidi).9 Here, hope is 
manifest as action, often pursued through gritted teeth. But there is ambiguity in this 
text; most scholars argue that Paul’s focus is actually on the grounds of hope, and 
thus ‘against hope’ refers to God’s ability to do what is humanly impossible.10 
Watson represents a number of scholars who argue in distinction to Kelly that hope 
in this context essentially refers to ‘subjective confidence’.11 However, the question 
remains as to whether this confidence derives from Abraham’s temperament, or 
whether it arises from the encounter with God. On this, the texts are unclear, but a 
couple of points should be noted. Firstly, there are good reasons for the biblical 
writers’ desire to inspire subjective confidence in their readers, but the fact that this 
inspiration is needed suggests that hope has not come naturally. The fact that hope 
can be ‘seized’12 or ‘directed’13 suggests an element of control, and the priority of 
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grace in Romans 4 implies that hope is a response to God. Secondly, Watson sees 
Paul reinterpreting Abraham’s story not to contrast obedience to the law with the 
irrelevance of action, but obedience to the law with the obedience of faith. The entire 
post-history of Abraham’s faith is the manifestation of that faith, and in the same 
sense, Abraham’s hope is manifest in the course of life he subsequently follows. 
Thus Watson suggests that while the grace of the promise is ‘presupposed’ by Paul, 
‘a strenuous human response, encompassing one’s whole life, is required’.14 Clearly, 
it will not do to describe hope purely in terms of action, but it is clear that hope can 
entail the choice to pursue a particular path in life. Broadly, it can be seen that the 
action of hope may encompass both action and disposition, and at this point the 
language of virtue becomes more obviously relevant. Hope is that disposition which 
leads to good action as related to the hope’s grounds and contents.  
The relationship between action and disposition will be addressed more fully 
in due course, but this brief discussion reflects the fact that the texts do not define 
this relationship at a conceptual level. This is important because while some kinds of 
hope relate more naturally to personal temperament, hope as such need not directly 
derive from one’s disposition.  Thus, I will argue that to be hopeful in a specifically 
theological sense is possible independently of circumstance and temperament, 
because Christian hope is primarily a matter of grace. Indeed, Christian hope by its 
nature derives from God’s opening up of seemingly closed systems in history. What 
is important at this stage is that a general concept of hope is in one way or another 
manifest in the course of life, even if that course is passive.  
The purpose of this brief survey has been to highlight the range of ideas 
involved in a seemingly simple term, and in response three parameters have been 
described which will give shape to the following discussion of an explicitly Christian 
hope. The discussion of these parameters also helps to clarify why the methodology 
of this chapter will be systematic and dogmatic rather than exegetical. Firstly, the 
aim of this thesis is to depict the hopeful reader in terms of the theological reality 
they inhabit, and as such, theological categories are crucial to the task. But as can be 
seen, the depiction of theological hope involves the interaction of the three 
parameters; thus while the biblical texts will remain important, it is not 
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straightforward to locate texts which deal with the full picture on an individual basis; 
to oversimplify, if Romans 4 focuses on the grounds of Abraham’s hope, it does not 
describe the contents of hope. If Revelation 21 describes the contents of Christian 
hope, it has less to say about the action of that hope.
15
 A systematic approach will 
allow us to describe the interaction of the three parameters in an overall account of 
the question.  
 
2.1. Moltmann’s Hope and Modern optimism 
 
Christian eschatology and ‘secular’ hope have led parallel lives over the last 
century (if not longer). While it might be simplistic to argue that the decline of 
modernist hope has led to the re-ascendency of Christian eschatology, there are 
undoubtedly important connections. Moltmann opens The Coming of God by 
describing the horrors of the First World War as signalling the end of the Christian 
age. His argument was that a kind of realised millenarianism had flourished, 
whereby belief in the divinely ordained dominance of the Church was coupled with 
confidence that science (and those with power) would steadily improve the world. 
Such hopes came to a ‘terrible end’ in the wars of the 20th Century and the decline of 
Christendom, leading to a rekindling of eschatology.
16
 Writing in 1999, Richard 
Bauckham and Trevor Hart make a similar argument concerning the death of the 
modern ‘myth of progress’.17 They describe modern thought in its liberal, 
technological and Marxist forms as being characterised by a belief that humanity had 
within itself the capacity to perfect its world; hope was grounded in human 
capabilities. Again, such hopes seem dashed by the horrors of the twentieth century. 
In particular, they note that even where the hope of progress remains, it is called into 
question by the ‘horror of history’; if progress comes at the cost of so much 
suffering, then it must be asked whether it can be called progress at all.
18
 Beyond 
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this, David Wilkinson argues that scientific optimism itself has been tempered by 
astrophysics, which has shown that the earth as such cannot sustain life indefinitely. 
Thus even if progress can be achieved in the short term, there are cosmic limits to 
what humanity can achieve.
19
 
 Preceded by a general disinterest in Christian eschatology, Schweitzer and 
Weiss are credited with the rediscovery of the ‘eschatological’ Jesus. They argued 
that Jesus was an eschatological prophet, but that his expectation that the end of the 
world would come in his lifetime (or later at his death) went unrealised. Moltmann 
argues that this ‘rediscovery’ of the eschatological Jesus had, in fact, nothing to offer 
the present in terms of eschatological hope. If early Christian eschatology concerned 
the immediate future, but was also disappointed, New Testament eschatology could 
say nothing to our present.
20
 By contrast Barth and Bultmann had recognised the 
importance of eschatology for contemporary theology, but Moltmann complained 
that their existential approaches eclipsed any sense of futurity. Against all these 
developments, the Theology of Hope began with the need to reinstate the 
consideration of our future into the discussion of contemporary eschatology.
21
 
 
2.2. The Grounds of Hope: The Promise and Faithfulness of God 
 
Responding to Barth’s eschatology in the second edition of Romans, 
Moltmann asks: 
 What is the meaning of ‘eschatology’ here? It is not history, moving silently 
and interminably onwards, that brings a crisis upon men’s eschatological 
hopes of the future, as Albert Schweitzer said, but on the contrary it is now 
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the eschaton, breaking transcendentally into history, that brings all human 
history to its final crisis.
22
 
In both cases, Moltmann senses the loss of the ability to say anything about our 
future. If eschatology is confined to the unfulfilled hopes of Jesus or the first 
Christians, then it has nothing to do with our future in the present. Equally, if it has 
only to do with transcendent revelation, it remains focused on present experience, 
and not future hopes. By contrast Moltmann aimed to develop an eschatology that 
could speak about our future. Even so, he maintains a strong focus on present action, 
but all this draws its energy from an understanding of the future, and specifically the 
future of Christ.
23
 
To describe Christ’s future, Moltmann begins by separating his reading of 
Old Testament eschatology from the eschatology he finds in Barth and Bultmann. He 
outlines a distinction between ‘epiphany’ religions, and the ‘nomadic’ religion of the 
people of YHWH. For Moltmann, Barth and Bultmann had more in common with 
the epiphany religion of a settled people; here, eschatological revelation was 
understood as a present experience of something transcendent, such that the 
experiences of settled life were given divine meaning. By contrast, nomadic religion 
was mobile, and thus was focused on providing hope in ever-changing contexts. 
Moltmann argues that the religion of Israel took the latter form; ‘it was not in the 
logos of the epiphany of the eternal present, but in the hope-giving word of promise 
that Israel found God’s truth’.24 In other words, Israel did not experience God as the 
giver of timeless truths, but as the one whose gracious, in-breaking promises kept 
them on the move. In this scenario, God became known through a history of 
faithfulness to his promises, and not through transcendent revelation. Crucially 
though, Moltmann argues that when Israel did finally settle their religion of promise 
did not give way to epiphany religion, because while promises were understood to 
have been fulfilled they were not exhausted; the future remained. This pattern is all 
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the more clear after the return from exile, where the prophecies of the exile were 
both fulfilled and yet remained open.
25
 
Promise is crucial to Moltmann’s argument concerning Christian hope. The 
God of Jesus is known in faithfulness and promise, and yet his promises are in some 
sense inexhaustible. Within this framework, Moltmann describes the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus as the focal source of promise for Christians: 
This identity in infinite contradiction is theologically understood as an event 
of identification, an act of the faithfulness of God. It is this that forms the 
ground of the promise of the still outstanding future of Jesus Christ. It is this 
that is the ground of the hope which carries faith through the trials of the god-
forsaken world and of death.
26
 
The identity of the risen Jesus as the one who was crucified makes God known in his 
faithfulness that endures even death. God is the one who is faithful to his promises 
against hopelessness. Here there are apparent similarities with Cullmann, for whom 
the resurrection already fulfils God’s promises in Christ.27 However, Moltmann 
downplays the sense of assurance from the past event of Jesus’ resurrection, arguing 
instead that hope is grounded in Christ’s future which is seen ahead of time in his 
resurrection. The inexhaustibility of God’s promise means that the fulfilment of 
resurrection is yet to be awaited. Thus the resurrection of Jesus opens out a new 
history for human beings now, which is inaugurated in the past faithful action of God 
in Jesus’ resurrection, but is grounded in the future fulfilment of God’s promise in 
the final resurrection of the dead. More than this, it is not merely God’s ability to 
raise the dead that provides hope, but the sense of promise that Christ’s followers 
will somehow be raised in him; the earliest Christians ‘proclaimed that he is himself 
the resurrection and the life and that consequently believers find their future in him 
and not merely like him’.28 Finally, this promise now extends beyond pre-ordained 
human boundaries; it is a promise that in some sense speaks to the whole of 
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creation.
29
 The centrality of promise as grounds for hope represents the first major 
aspect of Moltmann’s contribution, though at times his language seem unnecessarily 
obscure; specifically, Moltmann is never clear as to why the past event of Christ’s 
resurrection should not serve as grounds for future promise. As Thiselton has argued, 
the concept of promise is best understood as linking past and future through actions 
of stated commitment.
30
 The significance of promise is only strengthened by the idea 
that Christ’s resurrection represents that commitment in some way. 
 Through the concept of promise, Moltmann demonstrates that Christian hope 
is first of all in God, before it is for something.
31
 It is for this reason that we begin 
with the grounds of Christian hope, rather than the contents. But the focus on 
resurrection introduces a second fundamental concept, the ‘new’ or ‘novum’.32 The 
promise of resurrection is not only that God will do something, but that God will do 
something new, something that is not latent within the capacities of that which 
already is. Divine promise is a matter of grace, breaking into history independent of 
the possibilities defined by historical systems. If the idea of promise calls human 
beings to put their hope in God, the concept of the new means that hope can only be 
fulfilled by a decisive act of God.
33
 This idea finds widespread support, but is also 
widely questioned because it looks like a hope that merely pacifies humans. I will 
show that this is not the case, but it is worth noting that Moltmann’s depiction of 
promise and newness require human action; in his description of nomadic hope, 
promise is inseparable from the vocation to ‘arise and go to the place to which the 
promise points’.34  
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2.3. The Content of Hope 1: Newness, Imagination and Judgement 
 
 Christian hope is grounded in God, yet the question of what Christians may 
hope for is inescapable, if this hope is to have any purchase on present existence. 
However, describing the content of this hope is difficult for two main reasons.
35
 
Firstly, promise must have some purchase on the human situation to be understood 
and received, and yet this creates a hermeneutical problem if the promise of God is 
for something qualitatively new. Secondly, there remains the risk of projecting our 
own hopes into the discussion of eschatology. If our nature awaits perfection then it 
is risky to imagine what that very perfection will look like, given the enduring 
potential for human selfishness. Thus, before we consider the content of hope, we 
must explore the limits of what can be said.  
 The hermeneutical difficulty in describing the promised future was raised by 
Pannenberg in response to Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. While Pannenberg agreed 
that Christian (and Jewish) hope derived from the promise of God, he suggested that 
Moltmann put too much emphasis on the sense of ‘contradiction’ between promise 
and present reality. I am not convinced that Pannenberg reads Moltmann rightly here 
but his point is valid; if the recipient of promise has no conception of what is 
promised, the promise cannot really foster hope. Indeed, it cannot be called promise 
at all, because a promise presupposes some relationship to extra-linguistic affairs.
36
 
If it has no relation to existing hopes then it will be perceived as ‘threat’ and not 
‘promise’.37 In this respect, Pannenberg turns the hermeneutical question round; 
instead of asking how something that is entirely new could be understood, he argues 
that because divine promise is comprehensible in hope, the object and content of that 
promise must have at least some connection to human hopes. In other words, even in 
the discontinuity of the new there must remain some continuity. Furthermore, were 
the ultimate hope of Christianity for something utterly new, hope in God is still 
grounded in past experiences of God’s faithfulness within history, and thus within 
human experience. Moltmann seems to address this in later work; a major emphasis 
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in The Coming of God is that just as the risen Jesus has continuity with the crucified 
Jesus, so too the new creation is a new creation of this creation, rather than a 
replacement creation.
38
 This argument is followed by Bauckham and Hart among 
others.
39
 The dialectic of continuity and discontinuity allows them to address the 
hermeneutical question through the category of imagination. It remains true for them 
that God’s promise can never be fully described by human beings because of its 
radical newness, yet the continuity creates space for the drawing of analogies. The 
imagination can then be used to describe something unknown in terms of that which 
is known.
40
 
 The concept of imagination is important to the extent that any hope involves 
some imaging of what may come to pass, but it leads us into the second problem 
raised above. There must be occasions when human hopes cohere well with the 
promise of God, especially if we wish to say that God is the God who hears the cries 
of his people.
41
 Yet the fulfilment of God’s promise cannot mean the fulfilment of all 
our hopes, given the human propensity for selfishness. The risk of the imagination 
running wild is great. Significantly, Margaret Adam argues that the concept of 
radical newness in Moltmann shifts towards ‘a more continuous development of new 
upon new’.42 The cost of this is that the priority of God’s own purpose may become 
once again eclipsed by historical progressivism, where hope’s content collapses back 
into human imagination through experience. The sense of transcendent newness 
remains crucial to the idea that Christian hope is not limited by human expectation. 
At the same time, Adam rightly highlights that the focus on radical newness is itself 
a product of the modern spirit which shows less interest for the endurance of history 
or the past.
43
 Once again, keeping a firm grip on the past of Christ’s resurrection is 
crucial to balancing the radical newness of God’s promise with God’s faithfulness to 
creation, and in turn this faithfulness through past and present is essential to guiding 
our understanding of the contents of future hope. The turn to Black theology will 
help to strengthen this balance. 
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 Rowan Williams addresses the problem of human experience coming to 
determine the content of hope. Writing on the resurrection of Jesus, he argues: 
When the power of given present facts is challenged as we come to see the 
present situation as the issue of contingent processes and choices, we gain 
resources for new decision, and openness to new stages of process. We learn 
to act and to hope. Memory, at this level, can be the ground of hope, and 
there is no authentic hope without memory.
44
 
To begin with, this statement follows Moltmann’s thought well. The newness 
witnessed already in the resurrection of Christ fundamentally challenges any 
suggestion that the world must remain fixed in its ways. Particularly for those who 
are the victims of history, the memory of the resurrection brings hope because its 
newness opens up an alternative future free from the seemingly closed systems of 
power and domination.
45
 But memory is also necessary for the transfiguration of 
false hopes. For example, Jesus’ post-resurrection encounter with Simon Peter has 
the potential to become a source of anguish and fear, precisely because it calls to 
mind the denials of the passion and the misdirection of the disciples’ hopes. But 
Jesus’ sustained invitation is both judgement and transfiguration of these former 
hopes into something new; ‘The hope of the early days is challenged and broken in 
the cross’ but a new hope is forged in the fact that the disciples’ ‘fantasies’, false 
hopes and failures are not the last word.
46
 It need not be said that the disciples’ early 
hopes were entirely wrong, but the basis of this transformed hope is the gift of God 
and thus it is no longer something that can be claimed as a possession. In this 
respect, Williams remains very cautious about saying anything concrete about the 
future or the content of Christian hope. Indeed, Myers describes Williams’ thought 
on hope as primarily ‘negative’ in the sense that he has more to say about projection 
and fantasy than hope as such.
47
 But the very fact that a view of the future (and thus 
the present) cannot, for Williams, be ‘possessed’ is in itself a source of hope, 
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precisely because it stands against the human tendency to claim control of our 
world.
48
 
 Two important points follow from this. Firstly, all our projections of the 
content of Christian hope remain under judgement, and are thus in some sense 
provisional. This does not invalidate strong conviction, nor does it mean that we can 
say nothing about the future of Christ. But, as Webster argues, the imagining the 
future is not first of all a ‘task’ that begins with us; rather hope begins with hearing 
and remaining open to the word of God.
49
 This may seem a little abstract, but I will 
argue in chapter four that if imagination retains a role in hope, it does so as a means 
of articulating that which we believe we have heard, rather than that which we would 
like to see. Thus, even as a bearer of promise for the world, the Church can never 
‘claim finality for itself’ or for its vision of the future.50  
 The second point is that judgement may be a hopeful concept, and may thus 
be part of hope’s contents. Timothy Gorringe notes that this point is no surprise to 
the oppressed, those who have most often recognized the hope of judgement as the 
hope of God setting the world right.
51
 By contrast, it is argued that those in power 
have no desire to see the world change, and thus take little interest in eschatology or 
apocalyptic literature.
52
 This is probably historically fair, but I wish to argue that 
even for the comfortable, hope contains judgement. Williams notes that even when 
the rich take solidarity with the poor, their existence is questionable because they are 
invariably beneficiaries of unjust systems.
53
 If Christian hope entails the destruction 
of those systems, then it may look more like threat than promise. But however costly 
the destruction of our selfish hopes and our systems of security, there is hope in 
relinquishing those systems if God’s promise is believed to bring life. Thus in 
chapters three and four I will argue that hopeful interpretation does not equate to 
easy-going optimism. Genuine hope may be costly, yet still hopeful.  
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2.4. The Content of Hope 2: New Creation 
 
 To some extent, Moltmann gives content to Christian hope through 
successive negations of death and decay. In the Coming of God he describes hope’s 
content through expanding circles, from the personal to the political, to the cosmic 
and divine. The personal aspect begins with resurrection as the negation of death.
54
 
Yet if this notion of resurrection is a matter of divine gift, there are profound 
implications for the human person, as Williams describes: 
 In the aftermath of the cross, the friends of Jesus are left stripped both of their 
inherited identities [...] and of the confused and embryonic new identities 
they had begun to learn in the company of Jesus. [...] Any identity, any reality 
they now have will have to be entirely gift, new creation; not generated from 
their effort or reflection or even their conscious desire.
55
 
 
Here then is the positive side of judgement. The human person is reconstituted 
purely by the grace of God, and thus by love. Firstly, this holds out the hope of 
communion with God, undistorted by the corruption of sin, a perspective that lies 
behind the hope of seeing God ‘face to face’.56 This existence is however not static; 
it suggests new life, new flourishing in the presence of God. For Moltmann, this is 
ultimately understood in terms of creation’s incorporation into divine perichoresis, 
though this raises numerous questions that take us beyond the scope of this chapter.
57
 
Even so, we may still speak of human flourishing in perfect relationship with God; 
‘[w]hatever life with God is, it is not something more abstract or more isolated than 
what we now know’.58 Renewed humanity can only be more real, more fully alive 
than that which we presently experience. Thus Thiselton argues that this also 
constitutes a new hope for human relationality, as self-interest is transposed by self-
giving love.
59
 This does not eclipse the self as an individual, but rather renews the 
human person as ‘being in relationship’. In this respect, the new creation of the self 
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is inextricably linked to the new creation of human society, the second dimension of 
hope described by Moltmann: 
 
With the raising of the crucified Christ from the dead, the future of the new 
creation of all things has already begun in the midst of this dying and 
transitory world. But this presupposes that with the raising of the Christ 
crucified by the powers of this world, the end of this world and its powers has 
already become manifest.
60
 
In the above manner, Moltmann invariably focuses on the implications of a renewed 
human society for contemporary politics. However, this does create the temptation to 
allow utopian idealism to shape the theology of new creation. The issue is not so 
much that utopian thinking is inherently wrong, but rather that, as Moltmann 
observes, history is littered with disastrous attempts to determine in advance what 
the perfect human society will look like.
61
 However, this failure does not negate the 
hope for human community, and I will argue that the vocation of the Church entails 
straining towards this hope. We may at least suggest that human relationships and 
thus politics may be renewed in the transformation of self-interest by love. 
Thirdly, Moltmann rightly points out that death and decay are not only 
human problems, but pervade the whole of our world. Thus for humans to be 
resurrected to an existence without death, they must rise into a cosmos that itself is 
freed from decay.
62
 Without a redeemed cosmos, hope slips back into its more 
Gnostic or platonic forms by becoming hope for redemption ‘from the world’, not ‘of 
the world’ (italics mine).63 Furthermore, Moltmann stresses that as creator, God is 
faithful to the whole of creation, and thus only a cosmic view of redemption does 
this justice. The fact that God is both creator and redeemer leads to two important 
conclusions. Firstly there is, as noted above, continuity. Moltmann discusses whether 
the world will be annihilated or transformed; the former stresses God’s transcendent 
freedom, the latter God’s faithfulness. In holding both these characteristics together, 
Moltmann argues that the world must be fundamentally changed, but that the new 
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creation is very much a new creation of this creation.
64
 Something may endure 
within present life and action, a point which is crucial to balancing the overemphasis 
on constant newness that Adam highlighted. Secondly, Moltmann concludes that 
salvation is universal, both in the sense that all of history is redeemed and that all 
things are saved, because God is faithful to all creation.
65
 Bauckham is uneasy about 
this, and points out that God may still create things for a temporary purpose, a point 
that is surely reinforced by Moltmann’s own desire to retain the absolute freedom of 
God.
66
 There is not space to address this issue here, but it is important to note that 
the scope of salvation is universal at least in the sense that the message of the gospel 
is potentially, so to speak, for everyone. At the very least, there are no humanly 
ordered boundaries that prohibit a person from believing in Christ. And if the 
promise of God in Christ cuts across pre-ordained boundaries, it also breaks open the 
closed systems of human existence; thus Christian hope is in principle open to 
anyone, and anyone may become hopeful by the grace of God. This point will be 
crucial to the argument that Christian hopefulness does not firstly arise from human 
circumstance.  
 Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the question of eternal time remains 
prominent in this field. Cullmann argued that whereas Barth had stressed a 
qualitative difference between time and eternity, the New Testament only works with 
linear time. ‘Eternal life’ is simply ‘the life of the age to come’ and is different only 
in that it follows a decisive moment in time.
67
 Moltmann preferred to make a 
qualitative distinction between past and future, but either way he perceived time as 
being bound up with decay. As such, time itself would have to be transformed at the 
eschaton so that eternity could exist free from death.
68
 What comes in the place of 
‘time’ is unclear; recently, Moltmann suggests that ‘in the restoration of all things, 
everything that happened in sequence in the progress of time will be present in the 
eternal moment’.69 This ‘eternal moment’ sounds close to Pannenberg, who stressed 
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the importance of the closure of history, such that the meaning of reality’s parts 
could emerge in the light of a definitive whole.
 70
 
 However, even Pannenberg worried that this view of eternity looks static, and 
thus dead. How can we speak of eternal life without some sense of progress and 
movement in time? Moltmann’s response is to argue for a cyclical eternity, which he 
likens to dance or music, but this fails to recognize that the cycles of music interact 
with changes over time. Without this, music becomes tedious. Furthermore, 
Moltmann had stated that love always requires hope, because ‘love looks to the as 
yet unrealized possibilities of the other’.71 Yet if there are no new possibilities 
because futurity itself collapses into eternity, what kind of love can be said to 
endure? Alternatively, Pannenberg argues that ‘God and not nothing is the end of 
time’.72 Thus eternity ‘will no longer have to be in antithesis to time but must be 
thought of as including time or leaving a place for what is distinct in time’.73 But this 
assertion strains the idea of the closure of history.  
 The purpose of this brief foray into the discussion of time and eternity is to 
argue that it does little to help the question of hope, because it is too difficult to 
conceive of life without some sense of movement, and movement that goes beyond 
endless circling. In this sense, Bauckham helpfully suggests that it is perhaps easier 
to say what eternity is not than what it is; that transience, death and decay are no 
more.
74
 As such, it is more helpful to speak of a transformation of time that negates 
death and decay but includes growth and flourishing.  
 
2.5. The Action of Hoping: Living with a perspective of promise 
   
 By focusing on the obscurity of Christian hope, and its dependence on the 
decisive action of God, it is clear why many have criticised this view as essentially 
passive. If the end is entirely in God’s hands, then all humankind can do is sit and 
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wait, a perspective that seems to be corroborated by many New Testament texts that 
speak of ‘patience’ or ‘endurance’.75 In this view, being hopeful might equate to 
subjective confidence, but with no purchase on present action. This issue remains 
controversial, particularly because there is still much scholarly dissent concerning 
New Testament eschatological expectations. However, Moltmann has consistently 
argued that future hope must encourage present action.  
 In terms of New Testament hope, Thiselton argues that while waiting is often 
construed as a passive state, we should understand it primarily as referring to active 
readiness. He draws on Wittgenstein’s example of waiting for a visitor, arguing that 
waiting has more to do with preparation.‘The crucial factor in “expecting a visitor 
for tea” is not primarily what is going on inside someone’s head, but the set of 
observable actions or behaviour to which the expectations give rise’.76 This leads 
Thiselton to argue that the ‘currency’ of the promised future: 
[...] during the present period of “waiting” is not psychological intensity, but 
living as those counted righteous in advance of the final public confirmation 
of this, at the Last Judgment, and living as those who belong to Christ as 
slaves to their Lord [Italics original].
77
 
To wait in hope is thus to re-envisage our entire understanding of reality, as people 
‘on the way’, and in this respect, hope must change our fundamental orientation 
towards present existence. The hopeful self lives with a perspective on reality that is 
radically shaped by divine promise; New Testament ‘waiting’ has more to do with 
‘waking’ than sitting back.78 As such, to be hopeful on the basis described so far is to 
face the future in a manner which shapes all that is done in the present. 
Secondly, despite his criticisms of Cullmann, Moltmann still basically 
follows Cullmann’s emphasis on living in the overlap of the ages, grounding present 
action in the anticipation of God’s ultimate future as a consummation of that which 
was inaugurated in Christ.
79
 Early in the Theology of Hope, Moltmann suggests that: 
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To believe means to cross in hope and anticipation the bounds that have been 
penetrated by the raising of the crucified. If we bear that in mind, then this 
faith can have nothing to do with fleeing the world, with resignation and 
escapism.
80
 
The resurrection of Jesus opens up a new future in Christ, filled with new 
possibilities derived from that contradiction of death itself. To live in ‘anticipation’ 
of the ultimate consummation of God’s promise is thus to locate ourselves in a new 
line of future history, to recognise that the contradiction of the present involved in 
God’s promise is a contradiction that we are called to inhabit.81 ‘Anticipation’ (like 
‘waiting’) is not living as though the promise has already been fulfilled, but it is 
living in character with the fulfilment as anticipated already in Christ. This is one 
reason why it is important to reflect on the ‘what’ of hope, recognizing that the 
promise of God sets present existence on a very different course. In this manner, 
being hopeful involves living with a degree of ‘incongruity’, because the one who 
hopes sees the world differently, and challenges all that dehumanizes just as the 
resurrection protests against death itself.
82
 Being hopeful is not a matter of natural 
optimism, but perspective. In view of this, Webster is right to suggest that hope is 
not strictly action as such, but rather a ‘quality’ of action.83 To be hopeful is firstly to 
face a certain way, to set out on a path described by the grounds and contents of 
Christian hope; hope may become the virtue which leads to the good as defined by 
the anticipation of divine promise. 
The stress on the active nature of hope in Moltmann, Thiselton, Bauckham 
and Hart is perhaps a reaction to the criticism that future hope leads to passivity, a 
criticism that will be noted in the second half of this chapter. It may also implicitly 
come from a desire to chasten the confidence of modernist optimism. Moltmann 
often describes this active hope in terms of living in ‘anticipation’, and while he 
stresses the active nature of anticipation (as Thiselton does with ‘waiting’) it is not 
clear that the term does all that Moltmann needs it to do. Firstly, in the next section it 
will be argued that hopeful action relates to a broader view of Christian theology, 
and thus anticipation seems to place too much emphasis on the future. Indeed, given 
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that Moltmann’s own argument maintains that the ultimate future has already been 
inaugurated in Christ, hopeful action might be more robust if grounded in this past, 
as well as in anticipation of the future. Secondly, the term anticipation probably 
makes too little of the sense of being called to hope; living hopefully may be a 
response to a vocation to live in a certain kind of reality, the inaugurated kingdom of 
God. To talk of hopeful action in terms of vocation helps to capture Moltmann’s 
point that the promise of God as recounted in scripture often involves a direct call to 
follow where the promise leads. Having said all this, it would be unwise to jettison 
the term anticipation altogether, lest the category of the future is eclipsed altogether; 
a balance is required. 
 Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this description of hopeful action as 
a vocation again raises the question of the relationship between disposition and 
action. As above, it may be that this focus on the active nature of hope is in reaction 
to pacifying theologies of the future, but the result is that hope might be seen to leave 
the character of the person untouched. Thus on the one hand, an overemphasis on 
hope as disposition runs the risk of implying that hope derives directly from the 
optimistic temperament of the individual. On the other hand, an overemphasis on 
hope as action runs the risk of ignoring the human person as such. This issue will be 
addressed more at the end of the next section, but it is important to note that the 
content of Christian hope includes hope for the human person. Given this, the action 
of hope must be able to include the idea of human growth, of being persons-in-
transformation. To have a hopeful disposition thus has less to do with prior 
temperament, and more to do with the gracious process of being encountered and 
shaped by God. As Hart argues: 
The power of the future to transform the present lies chiefly in the capacity of 
God’s Spirit to capture our imagination and to open up for us a new vision of 
God’s promise and the present which it illuminates, thereby stimulating 
alternative ways of being in the world in the present, living towards the 
future.
84
 
                                                          
84
 Trevor Hart, ‘Imagination for the Kingdom of God?’ in God Will be All in All: The Eschatology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, ed. Richard Bauckham (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999), 49-76, (75).  
88 
 
Two points follow from this; firstly, we must maintain that anyone can be hopeful; 
indeed the priority of divine promise suggests that circumstances that would prohibit 
natural optimism do not have the final word. God’s promise may break into any 
situation, and as such, anyone may be called in hope.  
 Secondly, to speak of the Spirit’s transformation is to suggest that even if 
hope is primarily manifest in action, this action does not arise from the mechanistic 
application of some or other vision. It derives from the gradual formation and 
transformation of the person in hope, and in this sense it is ultimately unhelpful to 
oppose disposition and action. Furthermore, to speak of this process in gradual terms 
is important because while ‘on the way’, no one can ever claim to hope perfectly. 
Indeed, the fact that Christian hope includes judgement prohibits such a possibility; 
action remains fallible, just as our grasp of the nature of hope remains shaky. Given 
this, to act in hope is also to persevere with openness to an ever-deepening 
apprehension of the grounds and contents of that hope. It is to follow creation as it 
‘cranes its neck’ towards God.85 
 
3.1 Hope in Black Liberation Theology 
  
 There are two reasons for turning to black liberation theology at this point in 
the discussion. Firstly, I will show that this tradition offers an important alternative 
perspective on the theology of hope, principally by locating the grounds of hope in 
creation, incarnation, and pneumatology, as well as in eschatology. The resulting 
theology of hope has similarities with the argument so far, but is more holistic 
because it more explicitly engages with the whole narrative of God that encompasses 
past, present and future. Secondly, these theologies almost entirely begin from the 
experience of oppression, and thus while we may still speak of the grounds, contents 
and action of hope, the whole discussion is framed entirely differently. It is for this 
reason that I have postponed this discussion until now.  
                                                          
85
 Thiselton’s paraphrase of Romans 8.19; Thiselton, Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 547.  
89 
 
One of the key figures in the emergence of Black liberation theology is James 
H. Cone, whose early work engages with Moltmann. Whereas Moltmann explicitly 
sets out to treat hope and eschatology as systematic subjects, Cone begins with the 
experience of oppression and in particular, the need to reflect theologically on the 
Black Power movement as a specific response to racial segregation and inequality. 
All discussion of hope or eschatology comes out of the practical question, and as 
such Cone is much more self-consciously a participant as a matter of theological 
method. George Clark Chapman argued that one of the main difficulties with the 
‘theologians of hope’ was that their work was too abstract to be of practical value to 
oppressed communities, and too ‘alien to black experience’.86 This is likely part of 
the reason that Cone was criticised for over-reliance on European theology, and 
when he responded to this issue in the Spirituals and the Blues, he noted that: 
The future about which they speak is too abstract and too unrelated to the 
history and culture of black people who have been and are being 
dehumanized and dehistoricized by white imperialists and colonists. As a 
black theologian I believe that authentic Christian hope must be defined by 
the oppressed’s vision of the expectant future and not by philosophical 
abstractions.
87
 
This does raise the issue of whether starting with experience then closes down space 
for self-criticism, an important question given the womanist criticism that this early 
writing failed to recognize gender issues, alongside Rowan Williams’ concern over 
projection. Furthermore, Alistair Kee asks whether Cone’s straight identification of 
Christianity with Black Power in Black Theology and Black Power fails to offer a 
theological critique of the movement.
88
 I will argue that Cone does at least partially 
address this concern in later work, but at this stage we should note one important 
aspect of this approach. Pannenberg argued that the content of divine promise had to 
be in some sense comprehensible to human beings for it to generate hope at all. In 
this respect, any talk of eschatology that remains overly abstract has nothing to do 
                                                          
86
 George Clark Chapman Jr., ‘Black Theology and Theology of Hope: What Have they to say to each 
other?’ in Black Theology: A Documentary History, ed. Gayraud S. Wilmore and James H. Cone, 2 
Vols (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979) 2:193-219, (199, 208).  
87
 James H. Cone, The Spirituals and the Blues: an Interpretation, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1991; orig. 
New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 96; See also James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 20
th
 
Anniversary edn., (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990), xix.  
88
 Alistair Kee, The Rise and Demise of Black Theology, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 57-62. 
90 
 
with hope as such, because it fails to interact with human experience. I would 
tentatively suggest that the more circumspect approach to making concrete 
statements about the future in European theology perhaps derives from an awareness 
of the failings and self-affirmation of the hopes of modernism. But for those who 
actually experience suffering as a matter of daily existence, such circumspection is 
neither logical nor possible. It seems to me that Cone, as with most Black 
theologians, begins with the fact of oppression and the very real desire for imminent 
freedom, and only then asks whether or not Christianity has anything to say to that 
experience. In this sense he begins with an almost pre-theoretic notion of the content 
and action of hope. From the start, the content of hope is liberation, freedom from 
oppression and the restoration of human dignity in the present. The action of hope is 
subjective confidence, energy for protest and the affirmation of dignity. The primary 
theological question is whether the gospel offers grounds for this hope, and only if 
this is so does theology then take a role in shaping the contents and action of hope. 
While my summary is slightly simplistic, it reflects the significance of asserting that 
God remains the God who hears the cries of the oppressed. In a sense, this discussion 
as before maintains the primacy of God as the grounds of Christian hope, but this 
section will proceed to describe those grounds through creation, the presence of God 
and only then eschatology. The question of the contents and action of hope will 
emerge as we proceed. Crucially, by locating a doctrine of hope within a broader 
framework than eschatology alone, we will gradually uncover a more robust account 
of how hopes for the present relate to God’s ultimate future.  
Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that Black theology is by no 
means a homogenous discipline. Firstly, Black theology tends (as it will in this 
context) to refer to Black liberation theology, but as a number of recent articles note, 
this is by no means the only, or even the most prominent form of theology among 
black Christians.
89
 Secondly, even within Black liberation theology there are many 
varying perspectives, partly based on context, and partly based on different analyses 
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within a given context.
90
 This variation at least partly derives from one of the main 
precepts of liberation theology in general, that it begins with the experience of the 
marginalised and with a focus on liberation praxis. As a result, Black theology 
begins with the experience of racial oppression in various contexts; Cone states that 
‘there is no truth for and about black people that does not emerge out of the context 
of their experience’.91 Specifically, much of Cone’s work (particularly in his earlier 
period) relates directly to the Black Power movement, and thus emerging discontent 
among many black Christians with the explicitly non-violent approach of Martin 
Luther King. As such, Cone described much of this work as an attempt to integrate 
‘Martin [King] and Malcolm [X]’.92 But inevitably experience is complicated, and in 
particular, it is important to note (as Cone himself does) that womanist theology 
powerfully highlights the blind spot over gender issues in Cone’s early work. This is 
an easy criticism to make, but of course it challenges white Europeans to realise that 
this criticism must apply even more to their own theological tradition, given that in 
fact the Western theological tradition is as much a product of its context as is Black 
theology.  
 The point of this preamble is to avoid implying that Cone represents all Black 
theology, and to avoid misrepresenting Cone by focusing on his early work. 
Nonetheless, I have chosen to focus on Cone’s earlier work – with some critical 
engagement – for two reasons. Firstly, from the perspective of a white European 
man, Cone’s work remains to me particularly challenging both theologically and 
practically, and is thus worthy of attention in its own right. It would be wrong to 
romanticize the shock factor in Cone’s early writing, but it strikes me that in the 
interests of recognizing the urgency and seriousness of the issues raised by Black 
liberation theologians, it is well worth hearing afresh the incisive challenge of his 
early work, without ignoring later developments.  
 The second reason for focusing on Cone derives directly from this. In the 
previous section it was argued that Christian hope may be a costly endeavour, 
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particularly for those who might wish to preserve the status quo. In God of the 
Oppressed, Cone argues that: 
While divine reconciliation, for oppressed blacks, is connected with the joy 
of liberation from the controlling power of white people, for whites divine 
reconciliation is connected with God’s wrathful destruction of white values. 
Everything that white oppressors hold dear is now placed under the judgment 
of the cross.
93
 
If seen as a rhetorical overstatement, this assertion is an easy target for critique. But 
it seems to demand the reader to consider the possibility that it is at least in some 
sense true. As a white European, what am I to make of this? Am I prepared to accept 
the possibility that my own values are indeed under judgement? While it may be 
argued that Cone needs to be more self-critical in this respect, the fact remains that a 
person of privilege must wrestle with the possibility that the content of Christian 
hope includes the judgement and destruction of dearly held values and privileges. 
We have begun to argue that this is in fact an important aspect of Christian hope, and 
in this section we will see that Cone very effectively brings this issue to the fore.  
 
3.2. The Grounds of Present Hope 1: Creation 
 
In asking whether Christianity has resources to speak to the human situation, 
Cone essentially answers affirmatively, but in beginning with the human situation he 
thus reorders the question of time. Whereas Moltmann prioritizes the future and then 
describes the present on that basis, Cone prioritizes the present and discusses the 
future only to the extent that it grounds present hope. Similarly, J. Deotis Roberts is 
critical of what he sees as an overemphasis on the future, stating that ‘only after we 
are aware of what God is doing in this world to make life more human for blacks, 
may we speak of God’s future breaking into our present and look forward to the new 
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age’.94 This does not mean that either writer has nothing to say about the future, but 
that their focus remains at all times on the present.  Much of the distrust for futurist 
eschatology among liberation theologians undoubtedly derives from the oft-quoted 
Marxist critique of religion as an opiate. Recently, Beckford has echoed the fairly 
common assertion that white Christian ministers taught slaves an entirely futurist 
eschatology as a deliberate tactic in pacifying them.
95
 As we shall see, Cone agrees 
with this assessment, but also argues that there is good evidence that the tactic failed, 
and so in fact the future does have currency for now.
96
 Nonetheless, he is fiercely 
critical of any eschatology that takes attention away from the present: 
Black theology refuses to embrace an interpretation of eschatology which 
would turn our eyes from injustice now. It will not be deceived by images of 
pearly gates and golden streets, because too many earthly streets are covered 
with black blood.
97
 
However, we should note that much of what Cone says about hope is not necessarily 
derived from realized eschatology, but from creation and incarnation.  
Black Theology and Black Power is essentially a sustained argument as to 
why black Christians identified with the Black Power movement, and why such 
identification was necessitated by the gospel. Similar to Moltmann’s use of 
‘contradiction’, but more concrete, Cone talks of the black person’s experience of 
‘absurdity’ as the ‘inconsistency between his view of himself as a man, and the 
society’s view of him as a thing’.98 Whereas Moltmann depicted the contradiction 
existing between the promised future and the present, Cone sees the contradiction 
between created nature and present experience. For Cone, one of the first things that 
Christianity does is to reinforce the humanity of oppressed black people, and to 
challenge their dehumanization by white society. Thus he describes Black Power as 
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hope ‘in the humanity of black people’.99 There is an eschatological side to this as 
well, but it is first and foremost a statement of present theological fact, such that 
Black people engage in the fight for justice with the knowledge that their dignity is 
‘grounded in God himself’.100 Hope is thus grounded in the reassertion of identity as 
a creature and child of God that stands in direct contradiction to the identity 
constructed by the oppressor; thus Cone states that even eschatological hope ‘is born 
of struggle here and now because black Christians refuse to allow oppressors to 
define who we are’.101 There is here both a sense of self-affirmation in terms of 
identity as well as the receipt of value as a gift from God, and it comes firstly from 
simply being human. But already we might recall Rowan Williams’ argument, that if 
there is hope in simply being human, and having identity apart from the 
identifications of other humans, then we must consider where inappropriate 
constructions of identity go unchallenged. In other words the assertion of the human 
identity of the oppressed is simultaneously a challenge to the oppressor’s identity as 
one who defines others. As Moltmann reflects, ‘the master has to die so that the 
brother can be born’.102 
God’s creation of humankind as grounds for hope comes through particularly 
strongly in the slave spirituals. In response to criticism for failing to draw on black 
voices in his work, Cone wrote a theological interpretation of spirituals in 1972. He 
asserts that in Christianity, slaves ‘encountered a new reality a new God not 
enshrined in white churches and religious gatherings. [...] They were “stretching out” 
on God’s Word, affirming a new-found experience that could not be destroyed by the 
masters’.103 This encounter was to affirm their ‘somebodiness’, and again became 
the grounds of hope and a strategy for survival and resistance in the present.
104
 
Howard Thurman had made a similar argument in his earlier interpretations of the 
spirituals, suggesting that black slave preachers were a source of hope because they 
‘were convinced that every human being was a child of God.’ As a result, their 
message became; ‘You are created in God’s image. You are not slaves, you are not 
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‘niggers’; you are God’s children’.105 In turn, this leads Thurman to stress that the 
inherent potentiality of each human person is itself a ground for hope in the present, 
and that as such, the action of this hope lies in recognizing and realising the potential 
within oneself.
106
  
It is important to note that as a ground of hope this assertion retains some 
focus on the future in terms of looking ahead, but it was drawn from the concept of 
creation as a present brute theological fact. While the other-worldly aspect of hope is 
acknowledged by both Thurman and Cone, they both recognize that this hope from 
being human was primarily engaged with the present and imminent future.  
 
3.3. The Grounds of Present Hope 2: The Presence of God 
 
 Following the theology of creation, Christian hope is also grounded in the 
continual presence of God, and particularly God’s presence with those who suffer. 
This is often recognized in the story of Christ’s suffering as solidarity with those 
who suffer, but also in the experience of God’s presence in the here and now. I noted 
that the concept of ‘encounter’ was important, and in turn this leads to God’s 
presence and action in contemporary life becoming grounds for hope. The nature of 
this encounter is rarely systematically explained, and so sometimes it is described in 
terms of an encounter with Jesus, and sometimes in terms of the Spirit or God.
107
 
The key point is that God is experienced as present in suffering, both identifying 
with the sufferers and actively involved in transforming the situation. As Jacquelyn 
Grant suggests, ‘the condition of Black people today reflects the cross of Jesus. Yet 
the resurrection brings the hope that liberation from oppression is immanent. The 
resurrected Black Christ signifies hope’.108 Both Cone and Thurman noted the 
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significance of the exodus narratives for the slaves, and it is perhaps thus 
unsurprising that Cone as a liberation theologian highlights this point.
109
 What is 
interesting in the case of the spirituals is that unlike other strands within liberation 
theology, the exodus is not adopted as a hermeneutic or theological foundation. 
Rather it is taken alongside other stories of God’s deliverance as a demonstration of 
God’s character. ‘The concept is that inasmuch as God is no respecter of persons, 
what He did for one race He would surely do for another’.110 To be sure this view 
creates its own problems, and Cone in particular recognizes that the lack of liberation 
did at times (though not always) cause doubts for slaves.
111
 Furthermore, it could 
also be said to encourage passivity, although neither writer suggests that there is 
much evidence for this.
112
 However, the point to emphasize here is that belief in God 
as liberator was both a result of derivation from scripture and of experience of God’s 
presence.  
Before his explicit turn to the spirituals, Cone had made a similar argument 
about the Black Power movement. He argues that just as God is seen to be involved 
in the exodus and the death and resurrection of Jesus, so God is presently involved in 
the liberation sought through Black Power. He argued that ‘Black rebellion is a 
manifestation of God himself actively involved in the present-day affairs of men for 
the purpose of liberating a people’.113 This kind of statement would make Cone 
controversial among both black and white theologians, and it would require serious 
scrutiny. Firstly it raises questions about violence and the ethics of rebellion, and 
secondly in retrospect, one must ask what the fruit of the movement turned out to be; 
could God be said to have been involved retrospectively? However, again we should 
be careful not to dismiss Cone’s assertion so easily. For one thing, far fewer thinkers 
would condemn slave rebellions as easily, and while the context is partly different, I 
would suggest that it is primarily historical distance that makes them less difficult. 
Cone’s words were, and remain, too close for comfort, but therein lies their 
significance. If God is in any sense at all actively involved in transforming the 
present world, then such change must necessarily cost some people more than others. 
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For anyone who wishes their situation to remain unchanged, God’s present 
involvement in the world must logically contain some element of threat.
114
 Chapman 
argued that neither Moltmann nor Cone was clear enough about just how God can be 
said to be involved, and thus they failed to offer criteria for discerning where God 
was and was not active.
115
 This is an astute criticism and thus we cannot uncritically 
accept that Cone is right about the equation of Christianity with Black Power. But 
equally we cannot simply dismiss his claim on the basis that it is disturbing. My 
argument at this stage is twofold. Firstly, that Cone among others draws hope from 
the fact that God is actively involved in history, and has shown himself to be 
involved in helping the poor and oppressed. To some extent this coheres with 
Moltmann’s work inasmuch as he argues that human trust in divine promise grows 
from God’s past faithfulness. Moltmann came quickly to argue that there is hope in 
God’s presence, primarily through God’s suffering with humanity in Christ.116 This 
represented a development from the Theology of Hope, and as such puts Moltmann 
closer to the kind of hope described here. The key difference comes through the fact 
that while both strands recognize that suffering is not always alleviated, Cone’s 
theology places a far greater emphasis on the sense of God’s ability to affect change 
in the here and now. Secondly, for Cone, hope is localised for the poor and 
oppressed, but it must necessarily affect others. Thus again, I would argue that 
Christian hope in God’s present action must also be costly hope for the powerful.   
 
3.4. The eschatological future as hope for the imminent future 
  
 Along with other kinds of liberation theology, Black theology has tended to 
operate with a different perspective on eschatology to Euro-American theology. 
Stereotypically, liberation theology tends to work with a more realized eschatology 
than has been evident in ‘mainstream’ theology, in the sense that the ‘now’ of the 
kingdom of God is emphasised over the ‘not yet’. However, this is only partially 
true; in Liberation and Reconciliation, J. Deotis Roberts argues that: 
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Eschatology for blacks must be both realized and unrealized. Whereas the 
evangelical-pietistic version of eschatology is preoccupied with the future, 
Black Theology must begin, I believe, with the present. In other words, for 
black Christians realized eschatology, the manifestation of the will of God in 
the present – abstractly as social justice and concretely as goods and services 
to “humanize” life – must be a first consideration for a doctrine pointing to 
the eventual consummation of God’s purposes in creation and history.117 
While the future remains important, its significance is almost entirely derived from 
its impact upon the present. More recently, and in a different context, Anthony 
Reddie has also argued that the main difference between black and white Christianity 
concerns eschatology, but interestingly he does not locate the difference in terms of 
degrees of realization, but on the content of what is hoped for. Reddie suggests that: 
The essential point of departure between black and white Christianity is our 
notions of eschatology. All black Christians, (irrespective of theological 
disposition), have a clear sense that the future reign of God will be radically 
different from the one we presently experience [italics original].
118
 
Reddie goes on to suggest that for white holders of power, the content of hope is an 
‘enhanced version’ of the present world. These are the two main issues for 
eschatology in black theology; firstly, eschatology must principally speak to present 
possibilities, and secondly it must describe something qualitatively different from the 
present world of injustice. 
Rubem Alves wrote on hope shortly after Moltmann’s Theology of Hope and 
criticised Moltmann for effectively negating the present; given this it is striking that 
Roberts criticised Alves for being ‘too futuristic’.119 If this builds up two layers of 
criticism concerning Moltmann’s interest in the future, then it is perhaps all the more 
surprising that Cone is fairly positive about Moltmann’s work in his first two books. 
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Despite stating that ‘the idea of heaven is irrelevant for Black Theology’ he 
nonetheless argues that the future is important if it can transform the present.
120
 
In this manner, God’s future reinforces the present dignity of the oppressed. 
Just as hope was grounded in an assertion of the humanity of black people on the 
basis of creation, so eschatology confirms this dignity. Like Cullmann, Cone argues 
that something has happened in Christ akin to a decisive battle. The war continues 
but eschatological freedom, which Cone relates closely to being fully human, is a 
present reality. As a result, ‘men of the new age know they are free’ even in the 
midst of oppression.
121
 Again, when Cone turns to the spirituals he discovers the 
power in the eschatological confirmation of human dignity; ‘For black slaves, who 
were condemned to carve out their existence in captivity, heaven meant that the 
eternal God had made a decision about their humanity that could not be destroyed by 
white masters’.122 Thurman had identified the same present significance in the 
eschatological perspective, noting in his well-known phrase that ‘if perchance the 
contradictions of life are not ultimate, then there is always the growing edge of hope 
in the midst of the most barren and most tragic circumstances’.123 Specifically this 
became a radical challenge of the finality of human mastery; the slaves did not in the 
final analysis belong to human masters, and eschatological hope could confirm this 
as a present experience. However, it is important to note that for Thurman, this 
denial of the finality of life’s ‘contradictions’ remains a hope within history, as 
opposed to a post-mortem future.
124
 While Luther Smith is right to stress this point, 
it remains the case that Thurman describes an eschatological future grounded in God, 
functioning as a ground for hope in the present. As such, while the contour of this 
eschatology is similar to Moltmann, the maintenance of possible realization within 
history may be judged to be a more effective ground for hope now. 
Crucially the knowledge of eschatological freedom (in whatever exact form) 
confirms the human dignity of each person and thus gives hope action in the struggle 
to realise that freedom in the present.
125
 Both Thurman and Cone argued that while a 
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purely ‘other-worldly’ eschatology may have been used to pacify slaves, there is 
much evidence to suggest that this tactic failed, in many cases though not all. In fact, 
the knowledge of eschatological human dignity gave fuel to protest in the present.
126
 
Cone argues that:  
Though the black preacher looked to the future and spoke of it in heavenly 
terms, it was because of his vision into the future that he could never 
reconcile himself to the present evil of slavery. To look toward the future is 
to grasp the truth of God, and to grasp the truth of God is to become 
intolerant of untruth. [...] Hope, then, as seen in the minds of the slave 
preachers, is not patience but impatience, not calmness but protest.
127
 
More recently, A. Elaine Brown Crawford has undertaken a detailed analysis of 
black women’s narratives which includes the slavery period. She agrees that for the 
slave women, ‘the eschaton functioned proleptically in their lives’.128 Thus, she 
argues that their reading of Christianity and the Bible, far from being an ‘opiate’ 
became a ‘fire that ignited passion for justice and full humanity’.129 It is important 
not to romanticize this period, nor assume that slave preachers were proto-liberation 
theologians, but this argument is borne out both in the songs themselves, the 
relationship between slave preachers and revolts, and among the writings of ex-
slaves, also analysed by Crawford. It is worth noting the suggestion that the future in 
eschatology was not only a part of the theology of the slaves, but that it was also 
potent, effective in the present.  
 This potency is often ignored in some recent liberation theologies, which, in 
reaction to the assumption that other-worldly eschatology still dominates, tend to 
avoid talking about the future at all. For example, Garth Baker-Fletcher proposes a 
realized eschatology where other-wordliness is ‘sinful’. Furthermore, he praises 
Cone for critiquing ‘the corrupting infestation of otherworldliness’.130 But while 
Cone vigorously challenges any eschatology that distracts from the present, he has 
also recognized the power of the ‘other-world’ to transform the present. While Cone 
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is criticised for drawing on Moltmann in his early work, the advantage of his doing 
so is that he does not attack an eschatological straw man by assuming that all 
European eschatology is solely concerned with an other-worldly future. As a result 
he is able to go further than Moltmann; whereas Moltmann argues that the future 
should logically affect the present, Cone, Thurman and Crawford offer concrete 
examples of this in action. This is not to deny that there is a danger with future-
oriented eschatologies. Robert Beckford has shown that such eschatology does often 
go hand-in-hand with political quietism.
131
 But he is surely right to maintain that the 
issue is not with the future per se, but with the failure to highlight its impact upon 
the present. Thus Beckford argues that ‘the promise of future transformation at the 
end of time must be grounded in the contemporary struggle for justice. [...] We are 
able to risk all because, as the Pentecostal church song says, ‘we have the 
victory’’.132 My argument is not that Black theology can actually affirm Moltmann 
after all, but rather that independently of Moltmann Black theology actually has a 
stronger argument for the potential power of future eschatology in the present.
133
 
 
3.5 The Ultimate Future as the Content of Present Hope 
 
Despite this, there remains a tension in Cone’s work concerning the future. 
On the one hand, he remains opposed to any view of the future that draws attention 
from present injustice, but equally he criticised Bultmann precisely for failing to take 
account of future possibilities.
134
 As a result, Cone’s view of the future at times 
looks like historical progressivism. This is tricky because in its historic form, 
progressivism tended to be a corollary of the modern period that is also associated 
with slavery and oppression. Thus Black theology and progressivism – even in 
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Marxism – rarely sit comfortably together.135 Cone’s earlier work is ambiguous in 
this respect because the possibility of progress within history is essential to his 
project.
136
 Nevertheless, the ultimate future as a literal dimension of hope’s content 
remains important for a number of interlocking reasons. Unsurprisingly the concept 
of heaven never gets a systematic treatment by Cone, and as such, we will use it here 
only as a shorthand term for anything associated with life after death. It has been 
noted that even when the spirituals talk of heaven, they may refer firstly to earthly 
hopes; the North, Canada or Africa. But even though this is often the case, the idea 
of heaven as at least connoting life after death remains important. Firstly, Thurman 
argues that in the slave spirituals the transcendent reality of heaven was itself 
necessary for grounding the assertion of human dignity, as noted above.
137
 But 
secondly, Cone suggests that the songs display a kind of surplus of hope, such that 
the concept of freedom ‘included but did not depend upon historical possibilities 
[italics original]’.138 
 The significance of heaven as a future hope derives from the extreme nature 
of oppression in the present. Firstly, hope remains even when the chances of 
liberation look slim. Thurman observed that in the spirituals, the ‘other-worldly hope 
looms large, and this of course is not strange; the other-worldly hope is always 
available when groups of people find themselves completely frustrated in the 
present’.139 Thus, even when death seemed inevitable, belief in God affirmed the 
hope that death was not the end.
140
 Secondly, hope in heaven affirms hope for those 
who have already died. This is a particularly important issue that as noted in the 
previous section, counts against historical progressivism. This need not deny the 
urgency of seeking progress now, but it prevents the achievement of progress from 
becoming a justifier of suffering.
141
 The relationship between the necessity of 
progress and the acknowledgement of its frustration is complex. Garth Baker-
Fletcher and Delores Williams argue that human salvation is primarily a matter of 
Jesus’ ‘vision’ for life than it is of transcendent salvation. Williams’ argument comes 
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by way of making a very serious point against the justification of surrogate violence 
through glorifying the cross, but as such it leaves open the question of what lies 
beyond death, and whether there is any decisive hope after this life.
142
 Whilst 
accepting the rightness of this point, Crawford suggests that in fact, the empty cross 
may remain an important symbol of hope for black women, because the empty cross 
shows that ‘trouble don’t last always’.143 Furthermore, Karen Baker-Fletcher notes 
that the first European settlers in America may have had some kind of realized 
utopian vision, and as such one should be cautious in assuming that it is possible to 
build perfect societies in history.
144
 More helpfully she draws on African spirituality 
and the concept of the presence of the ancestors to articulate a view of life after death 
that connects with the present. Her view seeks to affirm ‘both concrete and 
“otherworldly” concepts of the world of the Spirit’.145 Even so, she does at times 
seem to suggest a gradual movement towards a more harmonious earth within 
history.
146
 
 The reasons for focusing on this-worldly hopes and action are clear and 
justifiable, but it seems to me that in downplaying the importance of ‘heaven’ as a 
transcendent reality, we risk losing resources to deal with unpleasant and untimely 
death now. This is not just an issue with death in oppression; we understand to be 
unpleasant death is a necessary part of reaching equilibrium within our habitat. To be 
reconciled with this reality requires a change in our view of death so fundamental 
that it is as radical a conception as resurrection itself. Equally, we noted Wilkinson’s 
point that the earth does not have an indefinite life. Any view of ecological 
wholeness must reckon with this fact. What I believe Cone achieves is to show that it 
is possible to retain hope in the face of death in a way that enlivens socio-political 
activity, rather than dulling it, but does not require us to ignore the reality of our 
present physical existence.  
 However, the principal function of a transcendent heaven in Cone’s work, 
and his reading of the spirituals, is to foster courage and hope in the face of great 
difficulty. It has often been noted that those who do not fear death are the most 
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dangerous in society, not because of nihilism but because the final weapon of the 
oppressor does not stop them from continuing to protest.
147
  
For black slaves, Jesus is God breaking into their historical present and 
transforming it according to divine expectations. Because of the revelation of 
Christ, there is no need to worry about the reality of liberation. It is already at 
hand in Jesus’ own person and work, and it will be fully consummated in 
God’s own ordained future.148 
Chapman notes that this kind of vision must not lead to a joyous detachment from 
circumstance, a tendency that he observes in Moltmann.
149
 Indeed such a suggestion 
is highly dangerous not least because it would serve to sideline the reality and 
extremity of the historical suffering under slavery. Cone’s point is that the assurance 
of heaven in fact keeps political resistance going in spite of terrifying odds.
150
 In the 
end, this is not a separate point from the affirmation of eschatological dignity in the 
present. Rather, the reality of the heavenly destiny affirms human dignity as 
something that cannot be taken away, not even by death. For Thurman: 
The slave’s answer to the use of terms of personal designation that are 
degrading is to be found in his private knowledge that his name is known 
only to the God of the entire universe. In the judgment everybody will at last 
know who he is, a fact which he has known all along.
151
 
 
3.6. Judgement 
 
Thurman’s quotation leads us finally to the issue of judgement by reminding 
us that for those who suffer, judgment is often a hopeful thing. Earlier I raised the 
question of whether Cone’s view of judgement was too one-sided. Firstly, does 
judgement for white people only mean the destruction of their values? Secondly, 
does the focus on experience allow any space for the judgement and transformation 
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of the hopes of even the oppressed? To some extent, Cone’s own acknowledgement 
of the blind spot over sexism answers the second question, inasmuch as he 
recognized the need for a transformed vision called for by womanist theology. But 
he does address the issue more directly, particularly at a couple of points in God of 
the Oppressed. Directly after arguing that the vision of heaven can fuel the struggle 
for justice in the present, he argues that for black Christians: 
Their struggle for justice is directly related to the coming judgment of Jesus. 
His coming presence requires that we not make any historical struggle an end 
in itself. We struggle because it is a sign of Jesus’ presence with us and of his 
coming presence to redeem all humanity.
152
 
This represents a shift from his earlier books, and certainly looks closer to Roberts. 
While this point coheres well with the concern over simply baptizing our own hopes, 
it would be wrong to suggest that in the end, Cone agrees with the idea of being 
necessarily tentative about our description of the future. In the same book, God 
remains the judge of the white oppressor, and is intimately bound up in the struggle 
of the oppressed. Cone is able to state that Jesus ‘stands in judgement over all 
statements about truth’ whilst affirming that there is ‘no truth in Jesus Christ 
independent of the oppressed of the land – their history and culture’.153 There seems 
to be tension here; on the one hand, Jesus cannot be totally identified with any 
movement, lest he be identified with its shortcomings or failures. But at the same 
time, the urgency of liberation demands that Jesus must be present in historical 
struggles in some sense.  
 Cone is unclear on this point, but this tension may be best left unresolved. 
Detached speculation and uncertainty about the shape of God’s promised future is 
perhaps a luxury for those who do not suffer, but it will not suffice for those who do, 
nor does it do justice to the God of the Bible. It is perhaps enough to recognize that 
all human movements are susceptible to error, without having to diminish the vigour 
with which they necessarily proceed. Furthermore, as has been argued throughout, 
deferral of this issue can lead to the deferral of reckoning with judgement on the part 
of the privileged. However careful Cone is to allow space for self-criticism, we must 
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nonetheless try to hear the full force of his challenge. The conclusion of this chapter 
will thus focus on how Christian hope can cohere with the recognition that one’s 
own system of security is under judgement, not just in the future, but now.  
 
3.7. The Action of Hope 
 
 The fact that in this discussion of Black theology, hope is so clearly related to 
present-day action, suggests a degree of similarity to the previous section on 
European theology. Yet there are important differences. The sense of hope as 
subjective confidence seems more important in Black theology and this is perhaps 
unsurprising. The idea of confidence seems less prominent in Moltmann and others, 
perhaps because of an underlying need to chasten the confidence of modernist 
optimism. By contrast, Black liberation theologians have sought to inspire 
confidence in those who have known oppression and dehumanization. But even if 
being hopeful is closely related to being confident, it cannot be said to derive from 
the natural temperament of the individual. Indeed, Crawford argues that the hope of 
black women has mirrored their suffering by being ‘maldistributed, enormous and 
transgenerational’.154 In this sense, the discovery of hope is something surprising to 
be rejoiced in. But equally this expression of hope does not override the pain of 
suffering, and thus being hopeful is often a matter of persevering with ‘gritted teeth’; 
thus in Crawford’s work, hope is also closely related to courage.155 Whatever the 
strength of the subjective experience, the primary focus of being hopeful is 
resistance; to be hopeful is to persevere in fighting for one’s identity, with a degree 
of sustained refusal to relinquish that identity. 
 Once again we are faced with the complex relationship between disposition 
and action. Black theology raises the importance of psychological disposition, yet 
the necessity of hope for the downtrodden suggests that it is something that can be 
fostered and grown through human and divine activity. The question of divine 
activity is also complex. On the one hand, the role of God in meeting the oppressed 
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serves to undermine any claim made by the oppressor on the lives of others. But 
equally the emphasis on the innate dignity of the person as a child of God suggests 
that at times, the confidence of hope is also innate. However, if it is innate, this may 
simply be because the person remains a creature and child of God. In this respect, 
where hope is weak it can be argued that this weakness derives directly from the 
dehumanizing systems of oppression. Thus it was noted that Thurman argued that 
hope was grounded in the innate potential of the human person, and in this respect it 
becomes a possibility for any person able to recognize their own humanity. To foster 
hope in the face of suffering may thus be related to reawakening a facet of the 
created humanity of the person. As such, to be a hopeful self is again to live with a 
vision of reality shaped by divine creation and, in this case especially, by God’s 
presence both in suffering, and as one who can change the world. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have outlined two traditions of reflection on Christian hope, 
one broadly following Moltmann and one broadly following Cone. There is much 
debate within each tradition, and thus while I have attempted to highlight points of 
similarity between different perspectives it is impossible to harmonize the 
discussion. Of the several distinctions that arise, I will highlight three by way of 
conclusion. 
 Firstly, black liberation theology has tended to be more holistic in its doctrine 
of hope, by taking in creation, Christ, the Spirit and the future of God as grounds for 
Christian hope. This reflects the Trinitarian doctrine of hope outlined by John 
Webster,
156
 but does so through much more concrete engagement with the realities 
of human suffering, and thus keeps the focus on God as the one who hears the cries 
of humankind. While Cone focuses primarily on present liberation as the contents of 
Christian hope, he is able to maintain a perspective on the ultimate eschatological 
future. While a number of the writers discussed have downplayed eschatology, the 
more holistic approach that emerges in Cone and others seems important. The 
                                                          
156
 Webster, ‘Hope’, 294-5. 
108 
 
overemphasis on the future perceived in European theology risks undermining the 
fact that the imminent future is as much the realm of God as the transcendent future. 
In fact, Christian theology is able to contain imminent hopes alongside hopes for the 
eschaton. Conversely, the downplaying of unrealized eschatology in some 
liberationist writers risks the loss of the ability to say anything in the face of realities 
that stand outside human control. In my argument it remains an important facet of 
Christian hope that God is able to finally redeem the cosmos in a manner which is 
not dependent on human potentiality, and thus does not require past failures and 
evils to somehow become the ground on which God’s kingdom is built. Given these 
points, it can be seen that the contents of Christian hope may rightly include both 
hopes for the present and for the ultimate future, both of which involve human 
flourishing in communion with God and one another. Because both are grounded in 
God, imminent and ultimate hopes need not be understood to be separate or in 
opposition. The emphasis of Black theology provides a more robust perspective on 
the dialectic of creation and new creation, such that both remain firmly the realm of 
God’s hope. As such, hopeful action is open to God’s new world, whilst remaining 
steadfast to God’s faithful presence in creation.  
 Secondly judgement is crucial not only to eschatology, but to the content of 
hope. Judgement is a thing of hope for both the oppressed and the oppressor, but it 
looks different from each perspective. What unites humankind in judgement is the 
fact that humanity does not speak the final word over itself; the grace of God speaks 
the final word for all creation. The call to this hope will mean something different 
but coherent for the oppressed and the oppressor. For the oppressed, judgement 
means that human dignity is affirmed in contradiction of all that dehumanizes. But 
for the privileged, the hope of judgement means that human systems of security are 
destroyed and replaced only by grace. Given this it must be maintained that hope is 
not primarily an individualistic concept; it is only in this mode that we may speak of 
judgement as a hopeful thing for all. But the result of this is that hope is not 
necessarily without cost. Particularly for the privileged, acting in hope may involve 
great cost by anticipating changes to one’s life that include relinquishing power and 
security. But such cost remains hopeful to the extent that it points towards a more 
divine existence for all creation. In this vein, it will be argued that hopeful 
interpretation of the Bible does not equate to reading in a self-interested manner. 
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Rather, Christian hope includes the eclipse of self-interest by love, and so hopeful 
interpretation must take account of love for the other first and foremost. 
 Thirdly, in relation to the question of action and disposition, both strands of 
the discussion emphasised the importance of seeing hope as directly manifest in 
present day action. There are numerous indications that this emphasis serves to 
counter the idea that hope pacifies, and as such it would not do to describe hope as a 
matter of internal dispositions or feelings. Furthermore, the very fact that Christian 
hope is grounded in the gracious action of God underlines the argument that anyone 
may hope, regardless of prior circumstance or temperament. However, at times this 
active description risks collapsing hope into a somewhat mechanistic application of a 
particular perspective. Theologians such as Crawford highlight the importance of 
disposition, partly as it relates to the created dignity of the person, and partly in its 
utmost necessity for those who suffer. Subjective confidence is an invaluable gift to 
those who are oppressed and discouraged. As such, it is important to see the action 
of hope as an integration of action and disposition, as a faculty of the whole person. 
Hope becomes that disposition (or virtue) which leads to the good in terms of acting 
in accordance with a vision of reality shaped by divine promise and presence. While 
‘perseverance’ could imply a degree of passivity, I will use this term to capture the 
idea that hope is active through engaging the whole person.  
 By noting three points of distinction that display the relative strengths of the 
positions discussed, I have attempted to articulate some basic ‘contours’ to the 
grounds, contents and action of Christian hope. Clearly it will not do to suggest that 
the various perspectives can be harmonized without loss, and given this I will 
attempt to note distinctions between different views on hope throughout the thesis as 
required. However, by outlining these contours of Christian hope we are able to 
move forward to begin to examine how hope speaks to the hermeneutics of scripture, 
and thus what it means to become a hopeful reader. In summary, it has been argued 
that Christian hope is grounded in God’s promise and presence, across creation and 
new creation. As such, while the content of this hope includes the radical newness of 
future new creation, it also includes hopes for present change in line with God’s 
purpose for creation; in both cases this hope includes the renewal of human 
community with God. Being hopeful involves the whole person, and so hope may be 
manifest in confidence and action. By taking various forms, hope perseveres towards 
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the new, but does so in tension with faithfulness that flows from God’s own 
faithfulness. As such, hopeful action does not pursue newness for its own sake, but 
newness which derives from God’s justice and love through creation and new 
creation. 
Chapters three and four will follow the schema of grounds, contents and 
action to address the question of what it means to approach biblical reading in hope. 
Chapter three will examine how the grounds and contents of hope shape the 
hermeneutical situation in which scripture is read, in terms of the possibilities for 
understanding God and one another. Chapter four will turn to the action of hope in 
reading, where the characteristic actions of the hopeful reader will be outlined.  
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  Chapter Three 
The Grounds and Content of Christian Hope and 
the Questions of Theological Hermeneutics 
 
 In chapter two I examined a Christian theology of hope in terms of its 
grounds, contents and action. A range of perspectives were examined, but some 
common contours were outlined to generate a working theology of Christian hope. I 
argued that Christian hope is grounded in God’s eschatological promise (following 
Moltmann), but expanded this (following Cone and others) to include God’s 
faithfulness to creation and humanity, and God’s presence in the Spirit of Christ. 
Given this, Christians may legitimately hope for eschatological resurrection and new 
creation, but also for manifestations of God’s renewal of humanity in the present. 
Finally, it was argued that being hopeful on this basis does not entail passivity; 
rather, the action of hope consists in responding to a vocation to inhabit and work for 
this reality now. But because this hope is also a matter of human transformation, it 
also pertains to the disposition of the person. As such, to be hopeful is to persevere 
with openness and steadfastness to God, living with a view of reality shaped by the 
divine creation, promise and presence. 
 The aim of the remainder of this thesis is to discuss what it means to read the 
Bible hopefully following the contours described above. Chapter three will consider 
how the grounds and contents of Christian hope speak to questions of hermeneutics. 
Because the ground and contents of Christian hope depict reality as such, this vision 
of reality gives a decisive shape to the situation in which we come to scripture and to 
discussion of the texts with others. In dialogue with recent work on theological 
hermeneutics, I will argue that in God there are grounds for a specific kind of hope 
in the process of reading the Bible with others. Chapter four will then examine how 
the action of this hope relates to the activity of reading. It is worth noting that 
through both these chapters I will maintain that theological interpretation is not an 
end in itself. Strictly speaking then, hopeful reading does not primarily entail hope 
for getting at ‘the meaning’ of the text and so forth. Rather, it will be argued that 
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hopeful reading involves reading the Bible in the broader economy of divine hope as 
outlined above. This distinction is subtle but important, because it will be argued that 
the hopeful reader keeps the process of reading rooted in the whole life of hope. 
 
1. Introduction  
  
 The aim of this chapter then is to consider how the grounds and contents of 
Christian hope might shape the theological hermeneutics of reading. A number of 
possible approaches suggest themselves. For example it was noted that Pannenberg’s 
view of time and eternity has important implications for the question of how 
meaning emerges in relation to the parts and the whole of history. The possibilities 
for hermeneutics suggested by this eschatology have been explored by Anthony 
Thiselton, and with specific reference to the Bible by James McHann in an 
unpublished dissertation.
1
 Briefly, if meaning emerges through the interplay of parts 
and whole, then the decisive meaning of reality cannot be known until the closure of 
history when the whole as such is complete. Following Pannenberg, McHann argues 
that this total view of history is present proleptically in Christ, and this in turn leads 
him to argue for Christological interpretation of scripture.
2
 While this argument has 
much to commend it, I will pursue a different approach for two reasons. Firstly, the 
concept of meaning as such has been heavily debated, and particularly in the work of 
Stephen Fowl whose challenge of the term ties in with his interest in interpretive 
virtue. Without needing to rehabilitate meaning as a concept, the Christian hope for 
human relationality has important implications for that discussion. Secondly, the 
hermeneutics of McHann and Pannenberg are essentially eschatological, but a 
crucial aspect of chapter two was to show that Christian hope does not only derive 
from eschatology. Thus while eschatology will remain important, other aspects of 
Christian hope will need to be discussed. On this basis, this chapter will focus on the 
hermeneutical implications of the hope for human and divine-human relationships, 
                                                          
1
 James C. McHann, ‘The Three Horizons: A Study in Biblical Hermeneutics with special reference to 
Wolfhart Pannenberg’, (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1987). See also, 
Thiselton, Life After Death, 10-15; Thiselton, New Horizons, 337-8. 
2
 McHann, ‘Three Horizons’, 384. Note that in principle, this argument leads to a Christological 
interpretation of everything. 
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as grounded in God’s creation and new creation. The discussion will proceed in two 
main sections, taking into account questions raised from wider issues in theological 
hermeneutics.  
The first section will examine two interrelated areas of thought in biblical 
hermeneutics. Initially, I will discuss the question of textual meaning and plurality in 
Stephen Fowl and A.K.M. Adam, outlining in particular Fowl’s rejection of 
determinate textual meaning in favour of community-driven interpretive interests. I 
will then turn to the hermeneutics of suspicion, focusing on the suggestion that if 
textual meaning is a local phenomenon only, then universal claims about ‘meaning’ 
are in fact disguised power bids. It will be noted that this suggestion coheres with 
Fowl’s theological hermeneutics in the sense that selfish and self-interested reading 
is a problem that coheres with Christian theology and tradition. Through both these 
discussions, two questions will be raised which relate directly to the theology of 
hope described in chapter two. 1) Fowl’s emphasis on interpretive interest raises the 
question of whether and how the text retains a formative independence. Furthermore, 
if interpretive selfishness and oppressiveness is a problem, could the biblical text 
itself have any role in transforming the reader? 2) The focus on community-formed 
interests raises the question of how interpretive plurality is to be understood. Is 
fruitful dialogue between communities even possible without metacritical tools? 
Further, even if such dialogue were possible, could it be freed from plays for 
dominance of one community over another?  
The second main section will attempt to respond to these two questions from 
the perspective of Christian hope as described in chapter two. Firstly with regard to 
the biblical text, it will be argued that hope in God’s covenantal, relationship-
forming action provides grounds for the possibility of anyone being able to 
genuinely hear God in the text, giving it a potentially formative role that transcends 
individual communities. Furthermore, this action goes hand-in-hand with God’s 
transformation of the reader, such that their self-interest begins to be transposed into 
love. As such, ‘interpretive interest’ is itself a concept open to divine renewal. The 
biblical text may be thus encountered in hope; the possibility of interpretive 
selfishness remains, but there is hope for undistorted understanding of God through 
biblical reading. Secondly with regard to dialogue with others about the text, it will 
be argued that hope for the renewal of human relationality in general grounds hope 
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for the possibility of fruitful interpretive dialogue. This derives from the renewal of a 
human common life grounded in our creatureliness, and from the transposition of 
self-interest by love. However, this hope does not equate to a promise of agreement 
about ‘the’ meaning of the text, but is rather hope for a genuine coherence to 
interpretive plurality. As such, the hope for hearing God and for interpretive 
coherence is not grounded in a particular method, nor a particular concept of 
meaning, but simply in God’s gracious action. 
 
2.1. Meaning and Plurality in Stephen Fowl and A.K.M. Adam 
 
i)  The problematic nature of ‘meaning’ and the importance of interpretive interest 
 
 Much recent discussion around theological interpretation has been focused on 
the question of interpretive plurality, and thus in turn the nature of meaning as it 
relates to texts. Many scholars agree that the biblical texts may offer a range of 
meanings, but disagree as to exactly how readers should discern the boundaries of 
legitimate interpretation (if there are any at all).
3
 This question has featured 
prominently in the work of Stephen Fowl, who argues that the problem lies with 
confusion about the term ‘meaning’ itself. He observes that disputes about the 
meaning of a text ostensibly revolve around the application of methods, but in fact 
more often derive from differing views about what counts as the meaning of texts in 
the first place. These disputes run so deep that Fowl comes to view public agreement 
about meaning as an impractical pursuit. Instead, following Jeffrey Stout’s ‘What is 
the meaning of a text?’ he declares; ‘I would like to propose that we in Biblical 
studies give up discussions of meaning and adopt Stout’s position of dissolving 
                                                          
3
 For four close perspectives on this issue, see A.K.M. Adam and others, Reading Scripture with the 
Church: Toward a Hermeneutic for Theological Interpretation, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2006). 
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disputes about meaning by explicating these disputes in terms of interpretive 
interests’.4 
Fowl’s solution is to abandon any talk of pursuing meaning in favour of 
limited interpretive interests pursued by different reading communities. This would 
not solve any interpretive disputes outright, but would serve to clarify what is really 
at stake. It is worth noting that Fowl is not opposed to the use of meaning in its 
limited, everyday sense, but rather opposes the use of the term as a means of 
deciding between competing interpretations.
5
 Without it, it would be possible for a 
given community to retain their interest in, for example, authorial intention, provided 
that it was not assumed that this constitutes the meaning over and against the 
interpretive interest of some other group.
6
 Different interested communities could 
exist more happily alongside one another, pursuing their various aims without 
needing to denigrate the others’ interests.7 The perspective is further developed in his 
1998 book, Engaging Scripture, where he charts three ‘stories of interpretation’.8 As 
above, he argues against a ‘determinate’ view of meaning which assumes that there 
is one meaning of a text. He does this partly because of the intractable nature of 
theoretical debates about the meaning of texts, and partly because of the specific way 
in which pre-modern Christian tradition has found multiple layers of meaning within 
the Bible. Fowl’s target is thus a specifically modern belief that there is a single 
stable meaning in the text that may be found with the right methods.
9
 But equally he 
attacks the more iconoclastic ‘anti-determinate’ view of meaning he associates with 
Jacques Derrida, which finds expression in biblical studies in various forms of 
ideology criticism and hermeneutics of suspicion. In a crucial move, Fowl challenges 
this approach by arguing that one cannot unmask the ideology latent within a text 
because the text as such cannot ‘have’ an ideology (also ‘rights’ in the argument of 
                                                          
4
 Fowl, ‘Ethics of Interpretation’, 380, Citing: Jeffrey Stout, ‘What is the meaning of a Text’, NLH, 14 
(1982), 1-12; See more recently: A.K.M. Adam, Faithful Interpretation: Reading the Bible in a 
Postmodern World, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 1-11, 57. 
5
 Richard Briggs notes that meaning remains a useful concept in specific cases, but not as an abstract 
metacritical concept. This highlights the fact that Fowl’s argument does not lead to anarchistic 
meaninglessness. See Briggs, ‘How to Do Things with Meaning’,143-160. 
6
 See in particular, Fowl, ‘The Role of Authorial Intention’, 71-87. Fowl argues that authorial 
intention remains one possible interpretive interest, though he takes care to show that 
‘intention’ is not a straightforward concept. 
7
 Fowl, ‘Ethics of Interpretation’, 382. 
8
 Fowl, Engaging Scripture, 32-61.  
9
 Note that Treier argues that in this argument, Fowl takes a worst case view of ‘determinate’ meaning 
and treats it as normal. Treier, Introducing Theological Interpretation, 91.  
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A.K.M. Adam).
10
 This leads Fowl to describe the remaining option as 
‘underdetermined’ interpretation. The term derives from the argument that there is 
no universal determination of meaning, and so reading communities are allowed to 
determine their own ‘circumscribed’ interpretive interests. However, 
‘underdetermined’ implies that the text remains as a real and independent artefact, 
but that the process of ‘meaning-making’ occurs as the community approaches it 
with its specific set of interests.
11
 
 The question that follows this concerns which interpretive interests to pursue. 
Though not explicit, it seems to me that the pursuit of a specific interest derives from 
a combination of prior formation and choice, and that this relationship is important 
for Fowl. On the one hand, it can be seen that interpretive interests will emerge from 
an individual’s personal history, community and life. This is in essence another way 
of expressing the commonly recognized adage that interpretation ‘without 
presuppositions’ is impossible. But given this scenario, Fowl and Adam maintain 
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 Fowl, Engaging, 65-76; Adam, Faithful Interpretation, 58. Importantly, Fowl does not make this 
argument from first principles so to speak, but rather shows that texts can be employed for such a 
wide variety of ideological uses that the notion of a stable text becomes practically unsustainable.  
11
 A.K.M. Adam, ‘Poaching on Zion: Biblical Theology as Signifying Practice’ in Adam and others, 
Reading Scripture, 17-34, (28). Behind this perspective lies the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and 
Stanley Fish, both of whom are cited with approval by Fowl and Adam at various points. Briefly, 
Rorty has argued that there are no universally given criteria for discerning truth, and as such claims 
about truth and meaning are really only local means for ‘coping’ with life as we experience it. In the 
realm of textual interpretation, Stanley Fish similarly argues that communities create their own 
conventions for writing texts, such that the ‘meaning’ of the text is simply whatever the community 
takes it to mean. As a result, the text effectively disappears in the process of reading, and what 
remains are community specific interpretations. Fish does not see this as a problem – it is merely the 
way things are. While this might look like radical relativism, it is important to note that within this 
framework communities exercise a strong function in limiting interpretive possibilities. Describing 
exactly how this works is not straightforward. To oversimplify, it can be seen that the meaning of 
‘pain’ depends on the context and community of usage (French or English), and as such, the 
community in which the reader is formed will determine the range of interpretive options that they 
bring to the ‘text’. In this sense, it is the community that becomes the primary determining factor of 
meaning, though it can be seen that the text itself remains as a genuine artefact. However, the 
relationship between the formation and choice of interests is highly complex. To what extent is an 
interpretive interest chosen, and to what extent is it a product of prior formation? Without requiring a 
full account of free-will, it can be seen that one’s interpretive approach is influenced by personal 
formation, but it is clear that there remains the choice to transgress the boundaries of the community 
and interpret ‘against the grain’. Given this possibility of choice, it seems right to maintain that there 
are no theoretical limits to interpretive plurality. As such, the negation of ‘silly’ relativism (along 
with the choice to pursue any particular interpretive pathway), is best understood in terms of 
relationality rather than textuality. See especially Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 13, 171ff . 
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that there is thus no straightforward epistemological priority for any single view of 
meaning, and so no theoretical priority for one interpretive interest over another.
12
 
Their discomfort over the idea that texts have stable properties derives from this 
basic perspective, because no text or reader exists in a vacuum. On the other hand, an 
element of choice remains. Given this, it becomes important to reflect on why one 
should choose a particular interpretive interest, and because interpretation takes 
place within a community, this choice is both political and ethical.
13
 
 As one potential way forward, Fowl highlights Elisabeth Schüssler-
Fiorenza’s well known SBL address on the ethics of biblical scholarship.14 
Schüssler-Fiorenza had argued that biblical scholars should abandon claims to 
neutrality and recognize the public implications of their work. In this way, biblical 
interpretation should be publically accountable in terms of how well it contributes to 
the work of social justice. While Fowl has some sympathy with her aims, he does not 
think that there is a sufficiently universal notion of justice that would be needed for 
this to work. Like ‘meaning’, he views ‘justice’ as a community-relative concept, 
and thus a global vision of justice requires some kind of ‘supercommunity’ 
(borrowing Richard Rorty’s term). However, Fowl does not concede that such a 
supercommunity could exist, even if it is theoretically possible. He concludes that 
‘an interpreter’s responsibilities are relative to her or his communal allegiances’.15 
Adam agrees with this position, while commending the same address. He argues that 
however offensive it might seem, an oppressive New Testament interpretation from 
within a specific community cannot be said to be ‘methodologically illegitimate’ 
(italics mine), because even if the ethical criteria employed transcend the concerns of 
the group in scope, they remain particular to that specific group of readers’.16  
 Instead of searching for either a universal definition of meaning, or a 
transcendent concept of justice, Fowl has essentially carved out a space within which 
he can focus on the specific ‘circumscribed’ interests and ethics of the Church. Here 
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 Fowl, ‘Ethics of Interpretation’, 388-391; A.K.M. Adam, Making Sense of New Testament 
Theology: Modern Problems and Prospects, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1995), 175ff. 
13
 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, 17; Fowl, ‘Ethics of Interpretation’, 391. 
14
 Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, ‘The Ethics of Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship’, JBL, 
107 (1988), 3-17. 
15
 Fowl, ‘Ethics of Interpretation’, 393. 
16
 Adam, Making Sense, 177-178, 186. Adam’s point is not as negative as it might sound, and much 
of his work displays a concern for inclusion and responsibility at the widest level.  
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again, the relationship between prior formation and choice is important because Fowl 
rightly detects a conflict of interests within the Church. On the one hand, Fowl and 
Jones suggest that ‘Christian communities interpret Scripture [...] so that believers 
might live faithfully before God in the light of Jesus Christ’.17 While the Church has 
traditionally employed a range of approaches to this end, there is a kind of unifying 
theological ‘interest’ in view. On the other hand, Fowl rightly notes the tendency of 
Christians to interpret the biblical texts so as to support ‘sinful practices’.18 This 
tendency is however not merely a failure to apply the right methods; it is a moral 
failure, a result of the human condition of sin. In other words, the human condition 
leads readers to adopt unhealthy or selfish interpretive interests. Furthermore, Fowl 
and Jones suggest that some communities have become so wayward that readers are 
largely pre-formed with ethically questionable interpretive interests. I will return to 
this relationship between nature and nurture in due course, but for now the basic 
point is that even within the Church, readers’ interests will often be morally 
ambiguous. What is needed is the moral formation of ‘virtuous readers’, a process 
which itself involves an element of choice in the sense that readers choose to 
participate in the formative practices of Christian communities. The virtues of these 
readers lean towards the primary good for Christian theological interpretation, which 
as noted above is to hear the word of God in the text so as to ‘live faithfully before 
God’.19 Crucially, these virtues are themselves shaped by the content of scripture; 
they are thus ‘the prerequisite for, and result of wise readings of Scripture’.20 In other 
words, Fowl proposes a hermeneutical cycle of virtue between the text and the 
reading community. Given this picture, while theological interpretation remains a 
community-specific interest (specific to the Church), it is clear that the text itself has 
some role in shaping the interpretive interest of the community. If this is so, we will 
need to consider exactly how the text takes on this formative role, and in turn 
whether this formative role is a contingent choice of the Christian community, or a 
property of the text as such. This question will be outlined shortly. 
Before proceeding it is worth noting that Fowl retains the possibility of 
dialogue with other communities (inside and outside Churches) about the text, even 
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 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, 20. Also, Stephen E. Fowl, Theological Interpretation of 
Scripture: A Short Introduction, (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 2-7, 13.  
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 Fowl, Engaging Scripture, 61. 
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 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, 20.  
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 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, 36; Fowl, ‘Virtue’, 837-839. 
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if the interests of different reading communities come into conflict. He does so partly 
on the basis of Stout’s argument for translatability, where the very possibility of 
recognizing another’s language as language forms the basis for translation and hence 
dialogue.
21
 However, he also argues that Christian ethics and mission require an 
outgoing focus, where dialogue with others is sought however difficult it might be in 
practice. I will go on to support this argument on both counts, but even with this 
perspective Fowl seems to remain opposed to the suggestion that there is a means of 
adjudicating such dialogues. Similarly, Adam argues that there are in fact ‘no 
transcendent rules or criteria for judging interpretations’.22 Dialogue is thus possible, 
but without the guarantee of shared points of reference; in particular, the text itself 
does not constitute a shared point of reference for determining its own meaning. 
However this raises important questions, to which we now turn. 
 
ii) Questions arising from the concept of interpretive interest 
 
 My primary reason for focusing on Fowl’s work is that I wish to maintain the 
importance of the formative cycle that he proposes between the text and the 
community, as it relates to interpretive virtue. Furthermore, his concern over the 
problematic use of meaning in interpretive disputes seems well founded, though it 
remains more controversial. For example, Kevin Vanhoozer has argued for the 
enduring validity of authorial intention as the primary locus of textual meaning, by 
using theological foundations for the nature of communication.
23
 I broadly agree 
with Vanhoozer’s focus, but by prioritizing theology he still fails to generate a 
definition of meaning as such that will command assent in the public sphere. More 
recently, D. Christopher Spinks has argued for a ‘triadic’ view of meaning based on 
the triadic categories of speech act theory, in order to balance Fowl and Vanhoozer. 
In this vein, Spinks argues that meaning is best understood as residing in the 
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 Stephen E. Fowl, ‘Could Horace talk with the Hebrews? Translatability and Moral Disagreement in 
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interplay between authorial intention and community interest.
24
 Spinks’s argument 
has much to commend it, but again could only command widespread assent if the 
field of speech act theory itself was widely endorsed.
25
 In other words, both 
Vanhoozer and Spinks offer convincing accounts of textual meaning, but Fowl 
would simply point out that they are only convincing within a localised framework, 
and thus fail to revitalize a universal concept of meaning that could usefully mediate 
interpretive disputes. Given this, I will not attempt to reinstate a concept of meaning 
as such, but I will attempt to modify Fowl’s view of the virtuous cycle by raising two 
questions that relate to a theology of hope. In responding to these two questions I 
will argue that there is something more determinate in the reading process, even if it 
is not meaning per se.  
 Firstly, Spinks is correct to note that Fowl is not clear as to exactly how the 
biblical text takes on a formative role within the Christian community.
26
 In Reading 
in Communion, Fowl and Jones argue that ‘the Bible constitutes the authoritative 
Scripture of Christian communities, and this makes a decisive difference. The life of 
Christian communities is to be formed and regulated by the interpretation of 
Scripture’.27 In this way they draw on Bonhoeffer’s assertion that Christians should 
read scripture ‘over and against’ themselves.28 However, it is crucial to note that they 
only give scripture this regulative role within the Church as the community that has 
chosen to accept it in this way. In this respect, formation becomes a function of 
communal use and thus does not derive from any property of the text as such. But 
this creates a peculiarity within Reading in Communion. Two of the prominent 
examples of virtuous readers are not virtuous because of their communal formation, 
but in spite of it. Both the prophet Jeremiah and Beyers Naudé of the pro-apartheid 
DRC were in fact virtuous readers because they stood at odds with their 
communities.
29
 But we are thus required to ask how they came to be virtuous 
readers; indeed, Fowl and Jones speak of the ‘forming’ of Jeremiah, but without 
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detailing how this occurs in the absence of a ‘vigilant community’.30 This case is 
particularly suggestive because of course Jeremiah does not read the Bible but hears 
the word of God, and this suggests a decisive difference. In chapter two I argued that 
Christian hope is grounded in the belief that God can and has broken the seemingly 
closed boundaries of human existence to impart new life. As such, the formative role 
of the biblical text might not derive from its textuality, but from the possibility that 
God speaks. In turn, might not the voice and promise of God also have some 
decisive role, in distinction to the interpretive community, in shaping interpretive 
interests?  
 This area leads to a second question, concerning the nature of dialogue 
between communities in terms of the limits of interpretive pluralism and the 
possibility of public agreement. Against a monophonic view of determinate textual 
meaning, Adam argues that the Church should pursue a harmonious plurality of 
interpretive performance, and in turn look outwards to a ‘dissonant and disordered 
world’.31 Similarly, Fowl and Jones believe that the Church must seek dialogue with 
other communities towards mutual enrichment and challenge.
32
 I will argue that this 
is entirely right, but that a Christian theology of hope offers specific grounds for this 
dialogue, for a plurality of interpretations that might nonetheless find coherence. In 
this respect it should be noted that it has not been established that interpretive 
plurality is a problem as such. Rather, this question revolves around how interpretive 
plurality becomes either coherent or dissonant. This will be discussed in section 3.2, 
though it should be noted that both questions overlap in scope.  
 Behind both of these questions lies the question of God and the accessibility 
of the divine life. While I am not concerned by the loss of meaning as a conceptual 
tool, I wish to maintain that the gracious action of God as an extra-linguistic reality 
makes a determinate difference to the hermeneutical situation. However, determinate 
does not necessarily mean determinable, and as noted from the outset, my own 
apprehension of divine action is subject to frustration on its own terms. It is for this 
reason that I agree with the cycle proposed by Fowl and Jones. What I am arguing 
for is thus a dogmatic ‘wager’; if there is some truth in the picture of hope described 
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in chapter two, it must be allowed to shape the subsequent hermeneutical course, and 
I will argue that as such it modifies the reading situation as described in this chapter 
so far.  
 
2.2. Selfishness, Power and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
  
 So far I have raised two related questions, one that essentially concerns the 
hermeneutics of the biblical text, and one that concerns the hermeneutics of dialogue 
with others about the text. The task of the second main section will be to address 
these questions with regard to Christian hope, but firstly they will be raised again 
with respect to a second layer in theological hermeneutics; namely the specific issue 
of power, and the hermeneutics of suspicion that results. This area has received 
much attention in philosophical hermeneutics, and is perhaps most discussed in 
biblical studies within the world of liberation hermeneutics. It is argued that 
‘traditional’ studies from Euro-American contexts are not the value-neutral 
enterprises that they might claim to be, and thus they derive their success not from 
‘correctness’, but ‘dominance’.33 Theologically, this should not be surprising as 
Fowl was right to note that readers both deliberately and unwittingly read to support 
sinful practices. Given this possibility, dominant interpretations are subjected to 
suspicion.  
 
i) Manipulative self interest and the theology of suspicion 
 
 At the heart of the problem we are trying to address is a general rise in 
mistrust that is associated with the so-called postmodern shift away from the 
confidence of modernity. In its more general form, this takes the shape of a mistrust 
of traditional truth claims and systems of control. Thus Garrett Green rightly 
suggests that ‘the root of the hermeneutics of suspicion in all its forms is the fear of 
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being deceived, especially by oneself’.34 But beyond this, there is also the fear of 
manipulation and violence that derives from the political realities and fallout of the 
modern period. In other words, the problem we are facing relates both to the self as 
such, and the self as related to others, a problem that has been analysed in relation to 
theology and hermeneutics by Anthony Thiselton in Interpreting God and the 
Postmodern Self.  
 Whether postmodernism represents a phase of modernity or a new period 
altogether, Thiselton argues that the term ‘implies a shattering of the innocent 
confidence [of modernity] in the capacity of the self to control its own destiny [italics 
original]’.35 Following the classic ‘masters of suspicion’, Thiselton suggests that the 
self as understood within postmodernism has become ‘decentred’ in the sense that it 
is no longer autonomous but situated, and is thus subject to external forces and its 
own inner drives. Far from being in control, it may ‘fall victim to its own deceptive, 
self-protective and manipulative devices’.36 On the one hand, the result of this is that 
the self is already a victim of its own circumstances, but inasmuch as it is subject to 
its own desires, it also comes in effect to victimize others. As we shall see, Thiselton 
rightly argues that this picture actually fits Christian theology better than the 
confident modern self, but it should be noted that this perspective emerges in 
distinction to Christian tradition. This depiction of the self initially stands to disrupt 
traditional understandings about reality. 
 This is because the corollary of this problematized selfhood is its effect on 
others. If, as noted in the previous section of this chapter, the self and its 
interpretations are context dependent, then any claims to universal truth or meaning 
begin to look like disguised bids for power over others. As Thiselton puts it, ‘the 
postmodern self follows Nietzsche and Freud in viewing claims to truth largely as 
devices which serve to legitimate power-interests. Disguise covers everything [italics 
original]’.37 Obviously this critique has been levelled at Christianity as much as it 
makes claims to universal truths, but it can be seen that even within Christian 
tradition this problem might remain. As Fowl and Jones point out, it is very possible 
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for interpreters to read scripture ‘for’ themselves, in the sense that scripture is 
manipulated to support sin.
38
 But if universality is then claimed for these readings, 
the selfish interest of one group may then come to dominate another. The result of 
this manipulative process is the dehumanizing of the other, because as Thiselton puts 
it, ‘to be manipulated is to be treated as less than a personal self’.39 
 The result of this is a ‘culture of distrust and suspicion’ which leads to the 
need to unmask seemingly neutral claims for the power bids that they are. This may 
seem like an overstatement of the problem, particularly as the description of a 
‘culture of distrust and suspicion’ seems hardly value neutral in itself. We need to 
take care to recognize the range of views that emerge from the recognition that the 
self is inherently situated. Furthermore, because self deception is part of the problem, 
power bids may not be conscious moves but may operate unwittingly. Either way, 
Thiselton is right to highlight the prevalence of the basic insight that human beings 
do act selfishly in the guise of acting neutrally, and thus it is necessary to take the 
hermeneutics of suspicion seriously, particularly because as we shall see, a 
hermeneutics of hope begins by recognizing the problem of the human condition. At 
the heart of Thiselton’s argument is the idea that: 
Christian theology also coheres with Freud’s analysis of the self as falling 
victim to forces which it does not fully understand and which certainly it 
cannot fully control. The postmodern self at this point stands closer to 
biblical realism than to the innocent confidence of modernity.
40
 
The postmodern description of the ‘fallible’ self coheres well with the New 
Testament’s depiction of the human capacity for the ‘pursuit of self-interests’, which 
at its root is the problem of sin.
41
 Rather than conceiving of sin in terms of isolated 
acts of self interest, Thiselton argues that the problem is better explained as the 
human condition.
42
 This perspective is important for a number of reasons, but in this 
discussion it underlines the fact that acting in self interest is not necessarily a 
conscious decision, so much as an innate capacity. The problem of interpretation is 
not necessarily that readers deliberately manipulate the text to their own end (though 
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this does happen) but that the hold of sin preconditions us to act in this way. As 
Garrett Green points out, Christians thus have good reasons to be suspicious.
43
 
 Further to this, selfishness has inevitable social consequences; in this respect 
the condition of sin may also be described in terms of the damaging of human 
relationships with God and one another. The hermeneutical consequences of this are 
drawn out by Rowan Williams’s discussion of Wittgenstein and Bonhoeffer. 
Williams describes how both question the assumption that meaning is somehow 
always hidden beneath surface presentations. Writing from prison, Bonhoeffer had 
commented that ‘[a]nything clothed, veiled, pure, and chaste is presumed to be 
deceitful, disguised, and impure; people here simply show their own impurity’.44 
This comment has less to do with a formal hermeneutics of suspicion and more to do 
with general public perceptions, but Williams highlights two important points: 
 One is that the assumption of an equivalence between the ‘inner’ and the 
‘essential’ is controversial and historically conditioned; the other is that a 
large part of what conditions it is the development of cultures in which 
isolation has become an increasingly widespread experience.
45
 
Two points are worth making in response to this argument. Firstly, just as Gadamer 
challenged Schleiermacher’s idea that alienation was essentially given with 
individuality, so Williams suggests that such alienation is better understood as 
relating to isolation within communities.
46
 He is thus right that the kind of suspicion 
described by Bonhoeffer grows from a failure to question the givenness of the 
present climate. But secondly, Williams argues that suspicion derives from a lack of 
common life. The possibility of misunderstanding derives from the rise of mistrust, 
because of the uncertainty over what ‘people mean’.47 While Williams is right to 
highlight that this situation comes and goes in its intensity, I would argue that if the 
possibility of isolation, and hence alienation, is woven into the human problem of 
sin, then it is at least universally potential if not always actualized. Crucially 
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however, it will be argued that from a theological perspective, human selfishness and 
alienation do not have the last word. As well as the renewal of a common life, there 
is also hope for the renewal of the self; indeed the two depend upon one another. 
And if there is hope for the transcendence of self interest, there is also hope for 
fruitful inter-community reading.  
 
ii) Power, suspicion and the biblical text 
 
The hermeneutical perspective under discussion takes many forms within 
biblical studies, and to explore it I will continue my dialogue with Black liberation 
theology. It is worth noting that not all Black liberation hermeneutics operate 
explicitly within the framework of suspicion, but most writers do recognize the 
problematic interweaving of ‘traditional’ Christian theology with European power. 
Particularly helpful is the contribution of womanist hermeneutics in recognizing the 
multiple dimensions of oppression, and also the way in which it is possible to remain 
blind to some marginalised groups even within a liberation framework. Generally 
within liberation hermeneutics, suspicion operates with a blend of two perspectives. 
Firstly, ‘standard’ or ‘dominant’ interpretations and modes of interpretation are 
suspected of concealing the interests of the interpreter, and supporting their 
ideologies. But secondly, and particularly since Itumeleng Mosala’s landmark study, 
the biblical text itself has been suspected of enshrining power interests, and this 
creates particular problems for the status of the Bible. 
 Firstly, if all interpretation is grounded in its own context, then no 
interpretive practice is free from contextual influences. Recently Blount and others 
have argued that: 
 The Euro-American, scientific, systematic, exegetical, and philosophical 
community has no interpretive privilege or advantage. That community, too, 
provides readings influenced by the space it occupies. Its readings of the 
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biblical texts, then, are not more accurate interpretations of biblical texts; 
they are simply more privileged ones.
48
 
Similarly, in the British context, Reddie has argued against the ‘hierarchy of 
credibility’ that allows established procedures dominance in producing interpretive 
results, over minority perspectives.
49
 With respect to the subject of race, Reddie 
notes Beckford’s argument against the idea that ‘whiteness is able to function as an 
ethnically neutral category that can go unexplored and unchallenged as the standard 
for expectation and evaluation’.50 The result of this is that standard academic 
approaches to interpretation are exposed as deriving from the perspectives of 
predominantly white, male scholars, but because they have been accorded a degree 
of neutrality, so too the particular perspective is granted normative status. Thus 
Maxine Howell argues that even when ‘unconventional’ interpretations are 
produced, they still often derive from male, white perspectives.
51
 While Howell does 
not engage with such ‘unconventional’ approaches, there is a great deal of literature 
devoted to questioning the ways in which apparently technical interpretations of 
texts such as Galatians 3.28 might in fact eclipse minority perspectives.
52
 It is easier 
to assert this problem than to prove that it is always the case, but within this thesis it 
is enough to recognize that it is at least possible. The result of this is that much 
recent literature deliberately stands in contrast to Euro-American academic 
perspectives, by highlighting aspects of recent history, experience, and the 
perspectives of non-academic readers. 
 Rarely however, has this suspicion of ‘standard’ interpretation been wholly 
separated from a suspicion of the biblical text itself. A number of African-American 
writers have noted that long before the theoretical emergence of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, African slaves rejected both interpretations offered by masters or white 
preachers, and portions of the Bible itself. We will return to this early context 
shortly, but Norman Gottwald is probably correct to note that the most sustained 
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critiques of the text have come in the wake of Itumuleng Mosala’s work in the 
context of South Africa.
53
 Though Cone had recognized the problematic nature of 
certain texts, Mosala attacks both him and Allan Boesak for failing to question the 
status of the Bible as such. Early in his seminal book, Mosala argues that: 
The insistence on the Bible as the Word of God must be seen for what it is: 
an ideological maneuver [sic] whereby ruling-class interests evident in the 
Bible are converted into faith that transcends social, political, racial, sexual, 
and economic divisions.
54
 
The status of the text is problematic precisely because its authors have left 
ideological fingerprints. Mosala’s task is thus to unmask the ideological agenda 
within the text itself, allowing the marginalised voices of liberation to emerge. 
Significantly, one of Mosala’s test cases is the opening chapters of Luke, texts that 
have at other times been brought to prominence for their liberating potential.
55
 He 
argues that Luke’s primary aim was in fact to ingratiate Christianity to the imperial 
powers, and as such the stories are retold in a way that eclipses any kind of class 
critique. Here, the double aspect of suspicion is in operation. On the one hand, 
biblical writers are suspected of inscribing their own power interests within the text, 
but as a result, privileged interpreters are unable to do anything other than ‘collude’ 
with the ideology of the text: 
The dominant exegetical practices, however, seem incapable of penetrating 
the ideological practices of Luke to reach the radical story of Jesus and his 
followers, which Luke produces in such a way that it is “acceptable” to the 
rich and the powerful. In a frenzied attempt to defend the ruling-class 
interests of Luke as revolutionary – of course, “responsible revolutionary” – 
recent studies of political issues in Luke have colluded with the ideological 
interests of the texts at the expense of the oppressed and exploited people of 
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first-century Palestine, as well as their descendents in the contemporary 
world.
56
 
Mosala’s argument appears odd because of the importance given to Luke’s gospel by 
so many liberation theologians. The inclusion of the ‘Magnificat’ and the woes of 
Luke 6 make it hard to accept that Luke’s agenda was as bourgeois as Mosala 
describes. Having said this, ideological criticism has shown that minority voices are 
often co-opted by the powerful in a way which neutralizes the protest by making it 
respectable.
57
 Just as the Sex Pistols’ ‘God Save the Queen’ has become a nostalgic 
part of British musical heritage, it could be that Mary’s protest is recorded for its 
quaintness. However, because of the ambiguity of the evidence, it is not clear that 
Mosala’s suspicious reading is to be preferred over the less suspicious approach of, 
say, Gutierrez. Having said that, this ambiguity does nothing to undermine the basic 
possibility that underlies Mosala’s argument. 
 The second more serious issue with this book is that it begs the question of 
why one should continue to read the text for its own sake. The question is brought 
forward by the fact that Mosala’s basic framework is Marxist-materialist rather than 
Christian per se. He argues that ‘exploited black people must liberate the gospel so 
that the gospel may liberate them. An enslaved gospel enslaves, but a liberated 
gospel liberates’.58 But if there is a principle available by which the exploited might 
‘liberate’ the gospel, it would seem that the gospel thus becomes a particular 
expression of a more general metacritical principle. It may be that the gospel is a 
more effective tool for liberation than Marxism, but this point is never addressed, 
and so this in turn begs the question of whether the gospel has anything independent 
to contribute to the discussion. The point of this is to argue that a thoroughgoing 
suspicion seems to leave the text redundant. This does not invalidate thoroughgoing 
suspicion on its own terms; for example there may be aspects of the text that can still 
be usefully co-opted for some other purpose. Equally, there may be value in resisting 
and challenging a text that has been hugely influential. But if there is something in 
the text that is worth recovering, and that because it relates to truth about God or 
humanity, then we must consider whether the text in fact contains its own self-
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critical principles. If this is so then it would be possible to retain a necessary 
suspicion within a framework that retains the value of reading the text in its own 
right. I will argue that this is in fact the case. 
 
iii) Questions arising from the hermeneutics of suspicion 
  
It might appear that by highlighting these gaps in Mosala’s argument, I have 
set up a straw man to attack in the next section. There are indeed more nuanced 
approaches to biblical suspicion, and some of these will be highlighted as the 
following questions are addressed. But I have focused on Mosala because I wish to 
maintain the basic theological validity of the principle that stands behind his 
argument; human beings do inscribe selfish power-interests in their writing, and 
because the biblical writers are human, they are at least in theory as much open to 
this problem as any other person. So too, biblical interpreters are fallible and may 
both intentionally and unintentionally collude with power interests in the text, and 
impose their own ideological agendas upon interpretation. However, two important 
questions are raised by this situation. 
 Firstly, as noted above, it is unclear as to how (if at all) the biblical text 
retains some kind of formative independence with respect to the community. This is 
essentially a second angle on the question raised with respect to Fowl, and it is 
interesting to note that some liberation hermeneutics do tend towards pragmatic use 
of specific texts that aid the liberation struggle.
59
 In this case, the crucial question 
concerns at what point thoroughgoing suspicion renders the text completely inert. 
This is particularly important if some external metacritical principle is in operation; 
in this situation, would the text itself have any contribution to the formation of 
metacritical principles, and if not, would its significance become purely functional? 
To address this question, it is worth noting a particular oddity with Mosala’s Biblical 
Hermeneutics. He critiques Cone and Boesak for relying too heavily on white 
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European theologians, only to turn to Marx early in the book.
60
 I do not make this 
point as a cheap criticism, but because there seems to be an implicit trust of the 
Marxist-materialist perspective, which is quite understandably lacking towards the 
white theological perspective. But in distinction to Cone and Boesak, it is not clear 
that this trust is extended towards the text. Of course, there is no a priori reason why 
the text should be trusted, but if the text is to continue to be read theologically, and 
that because it speaks in some sense about the hope of God, then it is worth 
exploring whether this hope might restore trust for a genuine encounter with God 
through the text, in spite of inherent difficulties of that enterprise.  
 Secondly, and perhaps more straightforwardly, we must consider whether 
cross-contextual dialogue is possible in a way which avoids the problems of one 
group imposing their agenda on another. To some extent, Fowl and Adam have 
argued that the elimination of determinate meaning would lead to a more benign 
coexistence between reading communities. However, the conflict of interpretations 
itself has ethical and political implications, and for this reason alone it seems that 
dialogue is simultaneously necessary and difficult. I will argue that this remains the 
case, but that a Christian theology of hope offers specific grounds for hope that this 
dialogue can reach towards coherence while retaining some degree of plurality, and 
do so free from self interested power games. In chapter four it will be shown that the 
action of this hope entails actively seeking out dialogue partners on these grounds. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I will address the two questions raised in these two 
discussions so far; 1) concerning the status of the text and 2) concerning the 
possibilities for dialogue about the text.  
 
3.1. Christian Hope, the Biblical Text and the Interests of the Reader 
 
Fowl himself has noted that his earlier interest in philosophical hermeneutics 
as discussed above has given way to a prioritization of theology.
61
 I began with this 
aspect of Fowl’s work because it is crucial to his concept of interpretive virtue, but 
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following his turn to theological categories we will now consider how the specific 
theology of hope shapes a response to the two questions raised about the status of the 
biblical text. In this section I will hold together two important lines of thought that 
have been considered thus far. On the one hand, I agree with Fowl that interpretation 
is made complex by the human situation; sociologically, because humans are 
embedded in communities and traditions, and theologically because of the reality of 
sin.
62
 From this perspective, a theory of determinate textual meaning is unlikely to 
resolve interpretive disputes. Following Mosala we have raised theological reasons 
for caution with regard to the biblical text itself, because of the human propensity for 
inscribing self interested ideologies in writing.
63
 On the other hand, a Christian 
theology of hope is grounded in the claim that God speaks and promises, opening up 
the seemingly closed boundaries of existence. Furthermore, the hope grounded in 
God’s creation and new creation speaks to and transforms human nature, and thus 
also what it means to interpret. On this basis, I will modify the discussions so far by 
arguing that there remains hope for genuine communication with God through the 
biblical text. The problems of power and selfishness remain, and thus the virtuous 
cycle also remains crucial; however it will be argued that this cycle begins with God, 
and is hopeful in God.  
 
i) Hope in God and the Bible reading situation 
 
In chapter two it was argued that Christian hope is grounded in God, acting in 
creation, salvation and the promise of new creation, all of which might be linked by 
God’s covenant faithfulness. The content of this hope is broad, but at its heart lies 
hope for the human person in relationship with God. Cone and Thurman emphasized 
present hope drawn from the fact of being created by God, and from the presence of 
Christ and the Spirit to human existence. Thurman describes the conviction of slave 
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preachers that ‘every human being was a child of God’.64 This conviction derives 
from the belief that humanity was created ‘in the image’ of God, and serves the dual 
function of undermining oppressive human definitions, and reinforcing the dignity 
inherent in the relationship as a matter of simply being. In this view, to be human 
means to be created and loved by God.
65
 Similarly, Moltmann has argued that ‘when 
we say that God created the world ‘out of freedom’ we must immediately add ‘out of 
love’.66 What follows is that within human created nature there is the capacity for 
relationship with God, and thus genuine communication as an expression of that 
relationship. Thiselton picks this point up in Barth: 
In Barth’s view divine creation and creation in the image of God provide 
conditions for the possibility of intercourse between God and humankind. But 
divine grace and human response operate to actualize this in dynamic, 
eventful communication [italics original].
67
 
God creates us with the capacity for understanding God, prior to our experience of 
that relationship. In this context, the condition of sin might be understood as 
alienation, but crucially this alienation derives from the damaging of the image of 
God in the human creature. As such the very possibilities for communication are 
distorted, not by God becoming distant but by the damaging of that which makes 
communication as communion possible. Death itself becomes the ultimate negation 
of communication, and in this light part of the hope of the resurrection may be 
understood as God’s gracious speaking, and God’s restoration of humankind’s 
ability to hear. Thus the eschatological promise of new creation creates hope for the 
consummation of this divine-human existence, and the proleptic transformation of 
the human self in the Spirit grounds hope for genuinely hearing God in the present. 
Divine promise ‘lifts the self out of its pre-defined situatedness and beckons from 
‘beyond’ to a new future’.68 But crucially, even though this hope reflects a particular 
perspective of the Church, its scope is universal; though I will maintain that God’s 
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word elicits a human response (part of which becomes the cycle of hope), the chance 
of hearing God derives from the priority of God’s action and does thus not depend 
on, for example, being in the Church. As noted in chapter two, Christian hope is 
grounded in God’s ability to break open the seemingly closed boundaries of present 
existence, and especially present oppression.  
 To the extent that the Bible ‘is itself a servant of the triune king and a means 
of his covenantal self-communication’,69 a theology of hope suggests that these texts 
retain some formative independence, separate to the interests of the different reading 
communities, because they convey God’s promises to humankind through God’s use 
of the texts. The idea that the biblical canon is ‘annexed’ to God’s saving purposes is 
of course a particularly reformed perspective,
70
 but it is interesting to note that a 
widening range of scholars in this field have taken this kind of view as a starting 
point. Indeed Fowl recently speaks favourably of Aquinas’ assertion that scripture 
‘uniquely reveals the truth about God, the world, and God’s relationship to the 
world’.71 Similarly, it was noted in chapter one that Moltmann and Thiselton stress 
the promissory role of scripture, as a means by which God communicates his 
promise of new creation to human beings. It is my argument that any account of 
theological interpretation must go some way to working within this framework; if 
scripture is to be interpreted theologically, it is because in some way it 
communicates the truth and promise of God, and in this (broad) sense, God speaks to 
humankind through it. As such, good reading from the perspective of theological 
interpretation relates in some way to seeking the voice of God. However, it is 
precisely this perspective that Mosala disputes, because it is seen to give authority to 
human, ruling-class ideologies. Given this, is it possible to speak of the Bible as 
scripture in a way that avoids authorizing sinful ideology on the one hand, and 
avoids the loss of the independent grounds of hope on the other?  
 A potential way forward is suggested by writers such as Renita Weems and 
Clarice Martin. Womanist perspectives have been particularly helpful in highlighting 
the blind spots of earlier liberation theology, and the result of this is that they are 
able to point out where some paradigms of liberation have left certain groups of 
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people marginalised. Martin questions the use of the exodus narrative as the 
paradigm for liberation, because it pertains more to the question of slavery than to 
other inequalities, such as sexism. The result of this blind spot is that texts such as 
the haustafeln have been criticized more directly for their injunctions to slaves than 
for their marginalisation of women.
72
 Similarly Weems shows that the biblical texts 
are written almost entirely from a male perspective for male readers, and that even 
when the voices of the marginalised are included, they are reported in the voices of 
the dominant. Thus she argues that African American women have rightly learned to 
approach the Bible with ‘extreme caution’.73 In a manner similar to Mosala, the 
interpretive process she describes involves recovering the marginalised voices from 
within the text. The decisive difference is that Weems and Martin offer a stronger 
rationale for why readers should persevere with the text at all. 
 Alongside other writers, they note that long before the rise of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion as a theoretical concept, African slaves had found 
themselves able to critique not only the interpretations of slave masters and white 
preachers, but also the biblical text itself. This was partly because, as Weems notes, 
their initial encounter was primarily aural, and this more naturally led to a piecemeal 
appropriation of the text because the text as a written artefact was not primary.
74
 But 
more directly, there was a natural rejection of the use of various passages to support 
slavery, and in turn a rejection of the passages themselves. One of the most quoted 
passages of Howard Thurman’s writing refers to his grandmother’s decision never to 
read ‘that part of the Bible’ which commanded slaves to submit to their masters.75  
Thus in Weems’s analysis: 
[...] her aural contact with the Bible left her free to criticize and reject those 
portions and interpretations of the Bible that she felt insulted her innate sense 
of dignity as an African, a woman, and a human being, and free to cling to 
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those that she viewed as offering her inspiration as an enslaved woman and 
that portrayed, in her estimation, a God worth believing in. Her experience of 
reality became the norm for evaluating the contents of the Bible.
76
 
Weems highlights two aspects of a hermeneutics in which the exercise of suspicion 
finds its home. As with most liberation hermeneutics, experience was a vitally 
important framework for hearing the text. But alongside this, the affirmation of 
human dignity and God’s goodness found within scripture was allowed to cut against 
the more negative passages. In Clarice Martin’s terms, ‘it was believed that the slave 
regulation neither exemplified the whole gospel nor manifested its central thrust’.77 
Thus while Thiselton among others considers this kind of use of the text as equating 
to pragmatic affirmation, in my judgement there is a more subtle principle in 
operation.
78
  
 The piecemeal appropriation of scripture may work at a deeper level than 
simply choosing favourable passages and rejecting unfavourable ones. Weems and 
Martin argue that there is an internal conflict within scripture, but that the strand of 
thought concerning the fundamental dignity of all humanity is sufficiently strong to 
create a framework within which other aspects of the text might be critiqued. The 
central emphasis of the gospel becomes a hermeneutic lens for critiquing the text, 
and thus scripture in some sense can be seen to be self-critical. On this basis, even 
with a strong degree of suspicion, Weems is able to explain why the text might still 
be read: 
African American women have continued to read the Bible in most instances 
because of its vision and promise of a world where the humanity of everyone 
will be fully valued. They have accomplished this reading in spite of the 
voices from within and without that have tried to equivocate on that vision 
and promise.
79
 
Francis Watson forms a similar argument to Weems with respect to Euro-American 
feminism, and describes the process as a ‘hermeneutics of hope’.80 He argues that 
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even when texts imply gender equality they are often written from a patriarchal 
perspective, but it is nonetheless possible to trace a strand of equality between the 
horizons of creation and new creation. Thus the critical principle of gender equality 
is internal to the text rather than external, and as such the text has its own capacity 
for ‘self-criticism’.81 In this way, we may still speak of God speaking through 
scripture despite the potential problems created by its human conduits. 
 At this point we are very close to the kind of approach advocated in this 
thesis. The potential for God to speak, for the word of hope to be apprehended by 
human readers in spite of human distortions, provides grounds for hope in pursuing 
the voice of God through biblical reading. Chapter four will extend this perspective 
by addressing the question of what it means to be hopeful as an interpreter, how hope 
energises the pursuit of this interpretive good. While there are inevitable 
methodological implications, my argument will not be for a particular method, but 
for a particular kind of hope in the application of various methods. Ultimately a 
hermeneutics of hope is not grounded in a specific interpretive method but in God. 
On this basis, it has been argued that the idea of theological interpretation must draw 
on the assertion that human hope is grounded in God’s creation of humankind for 
relationship with God. If this is so, then biblical reading may occur in the hope that 
this divine-human relationship may be actualized by God so as to overrule human 
power play, and in turn it remains possible to speak of the text conveying the hope of 
God, whilst providing its own textual self criticism. Indeed, the discussions of 
slaves’ interpretations offered by Weems, Martin, Thurman and Cone all highlight 
the argument that slaves were able to hear a word of hope, protest and affirmation, in 
spite of the weight of oppressive use of the texts. Caution and critique remain 
appropriate, but a framework of hope maintains that such critiques may themselves 
create space to hear God through the texts.  
 So far it has been argued that the theology of hope suggests that the biblical 
texts may retain a formative role amid complications on the basis that God, in some 
sense, draws the text into the purpose of communicating his covenant promises and 
hope. Clearly, it could still be argued that this claim represents the pragmatic interest 
of a specific community, but the scope of the claim is broader; in other words, if it is 
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true at all, there remains the possibility of anyone hearing God in the text, regardless 
of their reading community or context. Having said that, this claim is of course itself 
textually mediated. The reformed perspective emphasizes the role of the Bible in 
communicating God’s covenant hope to the reader, yet I have argued that it is 
precisely this covenant hope that creates the possibility of understanding the text. 
Furthermore, because this hope points beyond our present to a final consummation, 
our potential for hearing and understanding God in the present remains provisional 
and partial. As such, my argument remains a ‘dogmatic wager’; God offers grounds 
for hope in reading, and not presumption.
82
 Again, it is important to note that this 
hope is not strictly the hope of understanding the text. A hermeneutics of hope does 
not view the biblical text as an end in itself, but as a means of communion with God 
which is the proper content of hope. Viewed in this way, we might resolve some of 
the tension between the idea that the Church is a ‘creature of the Word’, and that the 
human word of the Bible is a creature of the Church. The latter observation is not 
merely a recognition of the process of authorship and canonization, but a problem 
detected by some with regard to the pragmatic tradition, where the word is 
continually ‘created’ by the reading interests of specific communities. In view of the 
hope of covenant, we may retain the priority of God’s word in forming the Church, 
while maintaining the fact that there is a human response in the moment of 
communication. But given this, we must now consider this human response by 
addressing the significance of the transformation of the reader in depicting the 
reading situation. 
 
ii) The transformation of readers and their interpretive interests 
  
God’s communication with humans depends firstly on God’s gracious 
initiative in speaking, but also on the creation of human beings with the capacity for 
divine-human relationship. Returning to the terms discussed earlier, I would argue 
that God is the ultimate ‘interpretive interest’ for theological reading of scripture, but 
that this interest is not only a contingent choice of the Church because of its 
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particular constitution. Although the expression is a little awkward, it is the interest 
for which humankind is created, to the extent that ‘interest’ could describes divine-
human communication and relationship. To be sure, other interests may work with 
specific reference to the Bible for God is not monophonic, and the very newness of 
the eschatological consummation described in chapter two negates any suggestion of 
a return to single determinate ‘meaning’ as a concept; to some extent, interpretive 
plurality remains a function of created and eschatological diversity. What it does 
suggest is the eschatological possibility of determinate coherence, a notion that will 
be described in the next section. To anticipate, it will be argued that the concept of 
the reading community must be rethought in the light of the idea that human beings 
are united in creatureliness, and are to be eschatologically unified in a diverse but 
harmonious new creation.  
Thiselton has argued that the hermeneutical issues of selfish interest and 
power bids do actually cohere with the ‘first word’ of Christianity, but they are by no 
means the ‘last word’.83 A fundamental content of Christian hope is the renewal of 
the created self in the image of Christ, promised for the future and anticipated 
proleptically in the work of the Holy Spirit. And this renewal takes shape in the 
transposition of self interest by love.
84
 Here Thiselton outlines two aspects of this 
love that reshape our understanding of the self as described above: 
First, gift, which depends on nothing in return, constitutes the rejection of 
manipulative power or self-interest. Second, gift comes from beyond the 
horizons of the situatedness of the self [italics original].
85
 
The eschatological renewal of the self is thus a renewal and perfection of the created 
human capacity for loving relationships with God and other humans. It is my 
contention that this hope for the human self shapes the present hermeneutical 
situation in two interlocking ways. Firstly, grounded in God, there is hope for 
moments where this potential relationship will be actualized in divine-human 
communication in various ways but certainly through the act of reading the Bible. As 
such, there are grounds for being hopeful in pursuing such moments of 
communicative encounter because the interest with which we pursue it is being 
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transformed and renewed. But secondly, because these encounters will often 
constitute moments of hearing divine promise and hope, the human person may be 
presently transformed into a hopeful self, a self energised and oriented towards God 
and not selfish interest, a self whose perspective on reality is being shaped by divine 
promise and presence. The virtuous cycle described by Fowl is thus grounded in this 
transformation in hope, as it is hope which energises the pursuit of ‘ever-deepening 
communion with God’ in the here and now.86 On this basis, the actual situation of 
biblical interpretation takes on a dialectic character. 
Negatively, because human transformation awaits final consummation, all 
interpretations remain under judgement, and are thus provisional. This does not 
negate strong convictions, but being hopeful thus means being aware that no 
interpretation can be claimed to be final, as our capacity to hear awaits perfection. In 
a sense, the text and the community are gifts for precisely this situation, and thus the 
cycle of virtue and growth described by Fowl and Jones remains essential. Before 
proceeding, it is necessary to highlight that this negative pole of judgement raises 
one important issue with respect to the role of experience as described by Weems 
and others. For Weems, Thurman’s grandmother’s ‘experience of reality became the 
norm for evaluating the contents of the Bible’.87 Similarly, Cone argued that for the 
poor, ‘their fight against poverty and injustice is not only consistent with the gospel, 
but is the gospel of Jesus Christ [italics original]’.88 As a result, it is only the poor 
who are really able to hear the truth of the biblical message. In these specific 
instances, I have no wish to argue against Weems or Cone, in the sense that I agree 
that the gospel entails hope for the poor and the affirmation of the human dignity of 
the oppressed. But does not the message at times also entail judgement for the 
oppressor, which may at times be heard?
89
 Furthermore, much hermeneutical trouble 
has resulted from oppressors evaluating scripture in the light of their experience of 
reality. My concern here is to argue that a hermeneutics of hope must include 
judgement as a matter of necessity, lest the text simply be read as a matter of 
pragmatic use and affirmation. Having said this, such a perspective will mean very 
different things in different contexts, and I would argue that the word of judgement 
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in scripture is predominantly reserved for the powerful. Even so, an important 
contribution of womanist hermeneutics has been to show that even liberationist 
perspectives can remain blind to certain groups, and given this possibility the reader 
must be understood to remain open to challenge. 
 Positively, there is hope that the present reading of biblical texts will lead to 
genuine communion with God, and genuine hearing of divine promise in a way 
which transcends selfish interest. As well as hope grounded in God’s gracious 
speaking, there is hope for the transformation of selfish interest into love, and for the 
renewal of our capacity to hear. Awkward as it sounds, there is hope for being made 
more hopeful in the present. What this means is that there is hope that our 
perspective on reality will become more deeply shaped by God, through a deepening 
vision of God’s promises and a deepening awareness of God’s presence. To the 
extent that this changing perspective suffuses the whole person, the hopeful self is 
thus energised for the life of discipleship, and hence the pursuit of ever deepening 
comprehension of God’s promises and presence. While Weems, Martin and Watson 
have forged a kind of method that may be described in terms of hope, my focus here 
is to suggest the reader has grounds for being hopeful in the act of reading. In 
practice, I will argue in chapter four that the hopeful reader is likely to adopt an 
approach very similar to these writers, but that its fruition lies not in the application 
of method per se, but in the hopeful persistence of pursuing ‘ever-deepening 
communion’ with God.90 Crucially, I have argued in this section that the cycle of 
interpretive virtue is animated by God’s grace, and is at its core a hopeful cycle 
because God’s word of promise transcends and breaks into the contextually 
embedded nature of our existence. Engaging in this cycle becomes a matter of 
vocation. Thus in chapter four I will argue that the action of this hope involves 
perseverance in rereading. 
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3.2. Christian Hope, Interpretive Plurality, and the Possibilities for Dialogue 
 
 The second major question raised in section two revolves around the limits of 
interpretive plurality and the possibilities and problems of dialogue with others about 
the biblical text. At its root, this question emerges from the broadly undisputable fact 
that different persons and communities will interpret the same texts in different 
ways. The resulting question is how best to respond to this fact. As noted, many 
writers embrace this situation, Adam for example celebrating ‘semiotic abundance’ 
as a witness to God’s graciousness.91 In the same volume, Fowl notes that even when 
Aquinas talks of the ‘literal sense’ of scripture, that literal sense is ‘multivoiced’.92 
However, there are clearly times when interpretive plurality becomes a field for 
conflict. Even this may be positively harmonized, with both parties recognizing the 
validity in each others’ position, but particularly when ethical and political issues are 
in view, interpretive plurality may become a major problem. In this situation, it is 
essential to consider how such conflicts are to be addressed. In general, the pursuit of 
transcendent methods or interpretive criteria emerges as a response to this situation, 
but as noted above, methods and criteria are rarely value neutral, and the risk of one 
group dominating another in dialogue is great. As such, the situation of interpretive 
conflict is delicate.  
 In this context it is tempting to appeal to universalized theological criteria, 
but such an idea has been rendered problematic; firstly because such criteria would 
only have currency in the Church, but also because as argued already, the Church’s 
grasp of God is necessarily provisional. In this respect, Adam is right in his appraisal 
of Peter’s comments on reading Paul: 
The church’s criteria are not ultimate or final, not singular or uncontested; 
indeed, the very rhetoric of Peter’s judgement appeals to the only 
transcendent judge of interpretation and warns of the eschatological 
consequences of wrongheaded hermeneutics.
93
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Adam goes on to note that we do not have access to any final criteria, but that 
localised criteria suffice for our needs. However, if God is in some sense the final 
judge of all interpretation, and God’s eschatological judgement and hope shape 
present action, might there be some sense in which that announcement of judgement 
affects interpretive disputes? As noted above, this judgement is not something that 
can be grasped and employed to one’s own ends in interpretive disputes; rather, it 
means that my own interpretations must be humble and open to challenge. But in this 
section I will argue that God’s hope affects present interpretive disputes by offering 
hope for the renewal of human relationships. In other words, I will not argue that 
there is hope for the reinstatement of univocal meaning, and certainly not hope that 
the Church’s internal interpretive criteria will somehow prevail in wider debates. 
Criteria are not the issue; relationships are. The hope described here is for a network 
of relationships comprehensive and loving enough to render dialogue both possible 
and fruitful, and leading to coherence.  
 
i)  Community and Common Life 
 
 In section 2.2 it was noted that Rowan Williams highlights the problem of 
alienation and isolation as standing behind cultures where suspicion is widespread. 
Conversely, Fowl and Jones argue that the concept of meaning has most currency in 
reading communities who must, in some sense, share a kind of common life. The 
question that this raises is thus what kind of common life or community is possible?  
 In my judgement, Fowl is sometimes a little uncritical in his discussion of 
‘communities’. If meaning is a concept that is relative to specific communities, then 
it matters as to exactly what kind of community we are talking about. In Reading in 
Communion, the positive focus on Bonhoeffer’s formational community at 
Finkenwalde suggests that the kind of communities in view are relatively small, 
discrete units.
94
 At other times, Fowl and Jones speak of ‘the’ Church as opposed to 
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‘Christian communities’ though the former seems far less prevalent.95 Beyond this, 
with regard to John Searle, Richard Briggs makes the following observation: 
Searle would allow the idea that texts are understood against community 
assumptions, but would insist that for a significant proportion of cases the 
community is large enough to include anybody who speaks the language.
96
 
Adam notes this possibility, but argues that it hardly ever becomes significant in 
practice; ‘some audience specific criteria are specific to so vast an audience that they 
are virtually universal. The nearer the criteria approach to universality, however, the 
more trivial they are’.97 Whether or not this is borne out in practice, the point of 
these brief comments is to suggest that there is a vital link between the degree of 
commonality experienced and the coherence of interpretive interests.  
 On the strength of this point it seems uncontroversial to maintain that reading 
communities are most helpfully understood as being relatively small (if 
overlapping); the usefulness of the pragmatic approach is precisely in highlighting 
that even within large communities like ‘the’ Church, smaller groups operate to 
shape interpretive interests. But even so, it is worth considering in more detail 
exactly what is meant by community, particularly from a theological perspective. 
John Webster is right to argue that too much is taken for granted too often about 
‘communities’; he suggests that the working notion of Church in work like that of 
Fowl or Hauerwas amounts to an ‘ecclesial gloss’ on the ‘sociology of texts and their 
uses’.98 The specific role of the Church will become more important in chapter four, 
but as a distinctively eschatological community, the Church’s function in the present 
has much to do with the question of humanity as such, and specifically the hope for 
humankind before God. Thus I will take up Webster’s challenge, but primarily by 
considering the hope for humanity as a whole, in God.  
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ii)  Interpretive disputes and the hope for a common life 
  
In the first instance, we might suggest that the very fact of being created is 
common to all humankind, but this in itself provides a rather ‘thin’ concept of 
humanity, which amounts to no more than noting that all humanity exists. But the 
theology of creation must be far richer than this. Above, I recalled Thurman’s 
conviction that human dignity is grounded in being created in the image of God, and 
thus also in love. This fact of being created in love is not enough on its own to 
convince us that humans share enough of a common life to understand one another, 
but it does begin to describe the possibility of humankind as such being able to live 
in relation to God. In other words, humankind is in some sense unified by its nature 
as divine creation, and more specifically as creatures with the capacity for 
communion with God. As God’s creative action provides grounds for hope, this idea 
forms the seeds of hope for a common human life, but much more needs to be said. 
 While the concept of the image of God has a long and complex history, as 
well as opening up the possibility of relating to God, creation in God’s image has 
also become commonly associated with relationality in broader terms.
99
 This at least 
in part correlates with a recent resurgence of interest in Trinitarian perichoresis (not 
least in the work of Moltmann). Thiselton is right to caution against asserting a 
perichoretic view of the Trinity solely to underpin a view of human relationality or 
equality, but is nonetheless content that if we understand the Trinity in these terms, 
then it follows that relationality flows from being made in the image of God.
100
 In 
particular, this created relationality must in some sense be understood in terms of self 
giving love for the other. This view is slightly problematic however, because we are 
able to recognize relationality in non-human animals. Furthermore, pace Watson, 
humans are able to describe understanding between human beings and animals, as 
any dog-owner will testify.
101
 In this respect, is relationality only a feature of the 
image of God? Or, if Watson remains correct that such relationality is grounded in 
likeness, might we speak of the whole of creation as sharing some kind of common 
existence, grounded in God’s self giving love, and allowing for mutual 
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understanding?  This begins to take us beyond the scope of our study, and it need not 
be denied that human beings, in the account of creation, do share some specific 
relation to God. If God’s Trinitarian nature is in some sense reflected in humankind 
then this only reinforces the created ability to relate meaningfully to others. My point 
here is to stress that such relations are grounded in sharing the common life of being 
created in love by God, and in turn, sharing a God-given capacity for loving 
relationships. 
All of this is to suggest an initial hypothesis that being created by God 
provides the basis for a common life for all creation, and thus the possibility of being 
able to genuinely hear and understand something from the other without 
manipulation. In this there are grounds for hope for fruitful dialogue between 
different localised communities. In turn, it may be possible to speak of humankind 
thus sharing a common sense of interest as a matter of human nature; for those who 
experience alienation, this argument may itself be a source of hope, suggesting that 
there are possibilities for common life and understanding as a result of simply being 
human. However, two objections present themselves. Firstly, this depiction appears 
all too idealistic, and in part this concern derives from the alienation and isolation as 
a result of sin. But secondly, and in a sense more seriously, this argument runs the 
risk of suggesting that we are in fact all the same. This is particularly problematic for 
Black theology as described in chapter two, and warrants close attention.  
If the idea of sharing something in common with all humankind is hopeful 
for some, the opposite may be true for others. J. Deotis Roberts noted the need for a 
balance between focusing on the particularity of black experience, and the common 
experience of all humankind.
102
 While Cone was reluctant to take a more 
integrationist view in his early work, we do find references to the common humanity 
of all people.
103
 Even so, it remains problematic to prematurely harmonize human 
perspectives, and thus it should be noted that the hope derived from being created 
might not derive from the possibility of common experience, but rather from the 
disruption of generalizations, and the assertion of one’s unique relation to God. The 
dignity discovered by Cone and Thurman in the spirituals was drawn from the fact 
that the God-given identity as a beloved child destroyed the human-given identity of 
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being a slave. Discovering one’s created dignity actually related to the assertion of 
created distinctiveness, of a unique identity that could not be taken away and that 
would resist human assimilation. Hope was thus drawn in the context of refusing the 
slave master’s definition, and thus creating and hermeneutic strangeness between 
master and slave. In this context, it becomes easier to understand why Cone had been 
so against white involvement in black liberation. It was essential for Cone that if 
reconciliation did occur, it would be on black terms refusing any terms that would 
perpetuate inequality.
104
 Thus in the context of black separation, the hermeneutics of 
hope-in-creation actually begins with separation and not sameness.  
The crucial point at this stage is that the dignity of distinctiveness is also part 
of creation. Adam emphasizes this in relation to biblical hermeneutics. He argues 
against views of interpretation that equate plurality with sin, suggesting that just as 
creation is diverse, so too must biblical interpretation be if it is to be faithful to our 
created nature.
105
 If creation is diverse, then it follows that God’s interactions with 
creation must also be equally diverse, and in turn the need for hermeneutic openness 
to the other is itself a part of God’s good creation. As such, Adam’s (and Fowl’s) 
argument that interpretation is rightly pluriform stands, and this point is particularly 
important with respect to the question of power. In this respect, Fowl strikes the right 
balance in the following comment on translation: 
Maclntyre rightly warns us speakers of internationalized languages of 
modernity that the strangers and outsiders we encounter are not simply us in 
disguise. We also, however, need to remember that such outsiders are not 
completely alien.
106
 
Watson describes this relationship between unity and diversity in terms of 
‘wholeness’: 
At the end of the working week, however, the divine creator surveys the 
entire field of his labours and discovers that it not only contains a diversity of 
entities that in each case correspond to the maker’s intentions (he already 
knew that) but also that the diversity is not mere heterogeneity but an 
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interrelated whole which may itself be pronounced ‘very good’ (v. 31), 
corresponding to an intention which has not been directly expressed.
107
 
Following this, we might re-describe our initial question in the following manner; to 
what extent is corporate interpretive ‘wholeness’ a possibility in the present? On the 
one hand, as God’s creatures, human beings share the grounds for the possibility of 
common understanding and dialogue which transcends particularity. But in the 
present our creatureliness itself is damaged, and hence dialogue is rendered 
problematic because the very thing that creates the possibility for understanding has 
been fractured. Thus, while some interpretive plurality is rightly understood as an 
aspect of creatureliness, the fragmentation of that creation means that some plurality 
and conflict remains problematic. Indeed, the theology of hope outlined in chapter 
two suggests it will remain a problem throughout present existence until the 
eschaton. 
 However, as has been maintained throughout, the eschatological prospect for 
creation is important for depicting the present. The eschatological promise of God 
entails the restoration of the divine image and the renewal of both human 
relationships and the relationship between humankind and God. As a result, it also 
entails the restoration of the possibility of genuine encounter and mutual 
understanding, which will not undo the diversity-unity wholeness of creation, but 
perfect in it new creation; Thurman was right to argue that ‘personal identity was not 
lost but heightened’.108 Christian hope does not involve assimilation of one into the 
other, but perfected, loving relationship (on which, more below). Watson describes 
this as ‘the eschatological vision of universally undistorted communication which 
lies at the heart of [the Church’s] gospel of the kingdom of God’.109 With this vision 
in mind, Adam argues for ‘patience in the shared hope that when all things are 
revealed, the Revealer will also display the manner in which our diverse 
interpretations form a comprehensive concord in ways that now elude our 
comprehension’.110 
                                                          
107
 Watson, Text, Church and World, 146. 
108
 Thurman, Negro Spiritual, 50. 
109
 Watson, Text, Church and World, 114. 
110
 Adam, Faithful Interpretation, 103. 
149 
 
This is correct, but it is worth emphasizing the way in which eschatological 
hope still shapes the present. In spite of the reality of human fragmentation, there is 
hope for present experiences of human communion which transcend pre-ordained 
boundaries. As such, there is hope for genuine present coherence within the field of 
interpretive plurality, where diverse communities experience mutual enrichment 
through their discussions of the text, and in turn a mutually affirming apprehension 
of the promise and hope of God. As we shall see, this remains fraught with 
difficulty, but it is also a real possibility in God; from these grounds, I will argue in 
chapter four that the Church has a specific vocation to pursue this kind of common 
life, which necessitates engaging with as wide a dialogue as possible. Part of the 
action of this hope is to listen to others seeking fruitful and respectful interactions 
grounded in a common life before God, pointing towards the final consummation of 
God’s promised renewal. However, at the moment it has only been argued that this 
kind of common life is proleptically possible; its actualization depends on being 
transformed in love.  
 
iii) Interpretive disputes and the hope of being transformed in love 
  
In the above discussion of the biblical texts, I highlighted Thiselton’s 
argument that grounded in God, the content of Christian hope includes the 
transformation of the self such that selfishness is transformed into love for others. 
This very clearly has implications for human relationships, and thus also for 
interpretive dialogue. Thiselton argues that ‘love in which a self genuinely gives 
itself to the Other in the interests of the Other dissolves the acids of suspicion and 
deception [italics original]’.111 To the extent that human beings would be able to act 
not in self interest but in love, the problems of interpretive domination and the 
suspicion of ideological agendas would be weakened. Furthermore, Thiselton argues 
that this love finds its substance in divine gift, and that this ‘gift comes from beyond 
the horizons of the situatedness of the self’.112 On this basis, the finitude – 
creatureliness – of the self ceases to become a problem. Indeed, Garrett Green argues 
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that finitude is part of human nature as created, precisely because humankind owes 
its existence to the eternal grace of God.
113
 The idea of eschatological finitude is 
tricky, because it strains description, but the force behind this argument is that 
finitude does not connote lack; rather it entails the enduring sense of finding one’s 
being in another, an existence defined by love. Christian hope is for undistorted 
communion; to borrow an analogy from Reddie, hope lies not in everyone eating a 
‘standard meal’ but in everyone unselfishly sharing their ‘favourite meal’.114 The 
point of this argument is that love prevents a person from assimilating another into 
their own framework, and this has important implications for how the hope of 
renewal in love shapes the present hermeneutics of dialogue. Again, this situation 
may be described as taking a dialectic shape. 
 Negatively, the transformation of human persons in love will not be 
completed short of the eschaton. As a result, the hope of love in some respects 
makes the hermeneutical situation more risky, because ‘love’ can be used 
manipulatively in support of dominant and oppressive interpretations.
115
 
Intentionally or unintentionally, appeals to love in interpretive disputes may serve as 
a smokescreen for specific agendas. But if this is so, can the grounds and content of 
Christian hope really change the situation in which different groups debate scripture? 
In the light of this question, a more pragmatic approach to hermeneutics has a clear 
advantage because it creates a certain degree of hermeneutical ‘safety’ for small or 
marginalised groups, and if this is so, Christian hope looks too fragile to make any 
difference to interpretive dialogue. A crucial difference is made, however, by 
recognizing that the hermeneutics of suspicion itself almost always operates within a 
framework of hope. This can be seen in the work of Mosala, Weems and Martin, 
whose suspicion of the texts is directed towards the hope of liberation. Bearing this 
in mind, it is important to remember that Christian hope includes judgement, and as 
such all power bids, including manipulative appeals to love, are under judgement. 
Christian hope thus contains Christian suspicion, but this is a suspicion that operates 
in the hope that when manipulation is shown up for what it is and self-interest is 
unmasked, there may yet be hearing, understanding and interpretive coherence. This 
has some affinities with hermeneutics described in terms of trust. Here, trust is 
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argued to be a default position, with suspicion operating only in the cases where trust 
is no longer sustainable.
116
 The difference in my argument is that suspicion is not a 
suspension of trust, but is itself part of the situation of hope, because both trust and 
suspicion are grounded in the possibility of arriving at understanding and coming to 
know the truth of ourselves. Ironically but importantly, the exercise of suspicion on 
the part of oppressed groups is part of the action of this hope, a point which will be 
considered further in chapter four. Crucially, the action of suspecting dominant 
readers is grounded in the hope that the powerful may yet repent and genuinely 
listen, and in the hope of being genuinely heard. Clearly by contrast, the action of 
hope on the part of the powerful will be to repent and listen to others; hopeful 
interpretation may thus be costly for some readers, but again this will be explored as 
we proceed.
117
 But in this slightly oversimplified description we can begin to see 
what interpretive coherence might look like; reading one text might ‘mean’ different 
things to different groups of readers by entailing different kinds of action, but there 
is hope that these different readings may cohere in drawing these groups together, 
mutually enriching each others’ appreciation of divine promise and of God. 
 Positively then, there is hope that dialogue between diverse groups may lead, 
if not to agreement, then to mutually coherent readings of specific texts. Exactly 
what this coherence will consist of cannot easily be predetermined, precisely because 
I am not arguing for a method but rather that there simply is hope for such proleptic 
moments of coherence; the fact that no method is in view reinforces the point that 
love cannot be claimed in support of an argument. However, because interpretive 
coherence consists in the transformation of humankind, we may speak of a kind of 
coalescence of interpretive interest around love of God and love of neighbour, as the 
twin ends of human existence before God. Again, it must be stressed that this does 
not collapse human activity into one homogenous unit, but it does suggest that if the 
interpretive interest of fostering love unites humankind eschatologically, then 
interpretive coherence will occur where such love is mutually sought. This 
interpretive end is of course the Augustinian view discussed in chapter one in 
relation to Fowl, Jacobs and others, but my argument is that this interpretive end 
represents the telos of humanity itself, and as such there is hope that human 
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interpretation may come together towards this telos. But because the present is also 
transformed in terms of hope that orients us to this end, human interpretive action 
may also seek coherence as the mutual fostering of hope among diverse 
communities. Again, we are in the slightly awkward territory of talking about hope 
for hope; the present argument is that grounded in God’s inaugurated kingdom, the 
reader may act in hope to deepen not only their own appreciation of God’s promise 
and presence (i.e. the grounds and contents of that hope), but must do so 
communally in a way which anticipates the renewed wholeness of humanity. In the 
next chapter, it will be argued that this defines the interpretive vocation of the 
Church as such.  
 
4. Conclusion 
  
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that the grounds and contents of 
Christian hope significantly shape the situation in which we come to scripture as 
readers, and in which we come to dialogue with others about scripture. Difficulties 
with biblical interpretation and dialogue were discussed with regard to the contextual 
formation of interpretive interest, and the problem of self interested power dynamics. 
It was argued that both these perspectives accurately capture the situation in which 
the Bible is read as scripture, but that Christian hope decisively alters this depiction. 
Firstly, Christian hope is grounded in God’s gracious, in-breaking activity and 
promise; as such, there remains hope for genuinely hearing God through the biblical 
texts, at times in spite of the difficulties therein, because God’s self-communication 
breaks through contextual boundaries. 
 Secondly, this divine grace engages persons in a process of transformation 
and growth. This aspect of personal transformation has two implications for 
hermeneutics that lead to two dimensions of the argument in chapter four. Firstly, as 
self interest is transposed by love, the capacity to hear God is restored. The reader’s 
perspective on reality is shaped by God, especially in terms of divine promise and 
presence. In this chapter, it was argued that this creates grounds for hope in the task 
of reading scripture, because the reader’s perspective becomes more attuned to the 
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reality of God. In chapter four, it will be argued that this transformation necessarily 
shapes the manner in which the texts are read, and as such, the hopeful reader is 
aided in pursuing the interpretive good of discerning the promise and presence of 
God as attested in the biblical texts. This pursuit occurs in the tension described here 
between openness to God as a requirement of judgement, and a steadfast 
perseverance with one’s grasp of hope. Secondly, the transposition of self interest 
has inevitable implications for dialogue with others concerning the texts. In this 
chapter, it was argued that this transposition creates grounds for hope that such 
dialogue may be genuinely open and undistorted by power interests. In the next 
chapter, it will be argued that the exercise of this love constitutes a major part of the 
vocation of the Church. As such, dialogue with near and distant others is not only 
possible, but necessary.  
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Chapter Four 
Characteristic Actions of the Hopeful Reader of 
Scripture 
1. Introduction 
 
In chapter two it was argued that the ground of Christian hope is God, and 
that what Christians hope for derives from every aspect of God’s dealing with 
humankind, particularly in creation and new creation. On this basis, being hopeful 
entails being on a path towards God, with God, and inaugurated by God in Christ. 
Being hopeful by no means equates to passivity, but neither is hopeful action simply 
a matter of ‘applying’ a particular perspective. This is primarily because Christian 
hope includes hope for the transformation of the person, and as such present action is 
necessarily related to such transformation. Thus, hope is that disposition which helps 
the person to pursue the good as understood through these grounds and contents of 
hope. Hope thus entails action in accordance with a particular vision of reality that is 
radically shaped and animated by divine promise and presence.  
In chapter three it was argued that the grounds and contents of Christian hope 
make a decisive difference to the possibilities for biblical reading, because they 
relate directly to the hermeneutical context in which scripture is read. Christian 
theology portrays a view of reality that holds out hope for genuinely hearing God in 
the act of reading scripture, and for open, unselfish dialogue with others concerning 
the biblical texts. These possibilities are, in a sense, penultimate because they derive 
from the bigger picture of hope in creation and new creation, but as such, they 
describe the kinds of interpretive good whose pursuit will be aided by being hopeful.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the characteristic actions of this 
hope, how being hopeful shapes the actual task of biblical reading. In the terms with 
which this thesis began, I will describe the interpretive virtue of hope as it might 
look in practice. The action of this hope will be outlined in three sections. Firstly, the 
hopeful reader perseveres in the very task of reading scripture, because hope itself 
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animates the process of pursuing the voice of God and thence personal growth. There 
is hope for hearing God in the text and for growing in our capacity to hear, but that 
capacity remains partially frustrated. As such, the hopeful reader perseveres in 
rereading with openness. Secondly, this openness is held in tension with a 
perseverant steadfastness, in the sense that being hopeful involves holding on to a 
vision of reality that stands in tension with various competing perspectives, all of 
which would shape the process of interpretation in different ways. In other words, 
the hopeful reader is steadfast in pursuing possibilities for theological interpretation 
that cohere with their grasp of the promise and presence of God, in pursuing deeper 
appreciation of the grounds and contents of hope as an interpretive good. Again, we 
are close to De Lubac’s recognition that the anagogic sense of scripture holds a 
tension between the concrete apprehension of hope, and the fact that such 
apprehension can never attain to completion.
1
 In order to clarify this, I will draw on 
the relationship between hope and imagination noted in chapter two, and following 
Garrett Green, I will argue that this kind of steadfastness equates to employing the 
imagination to construe hopeful possibilities from each text, whilst remaining fully 
conscious of alternatives. Thirdly, it will be argued that inasmuch as hope constitutes 
a vocation to look for a renewed humanity, the hopeful reader necessarily reads in 
dialogue with near and distant others. Indeed, it will be argued that it is only in this 
way that truly hopeful readings may be discerned.  
Before proceeding, I will return to the relationship between hope and 
imagination, in order to provide some conceptual tools for the rest of the discussion. 
It has been suggested that hope entails a particular perspective on reality, and several 
writers have discussed this in relation to the exercise of the imagination. If hoping 
entails living with a vision or perspective on reality shaped by divine promise and 
presence, then it can be seen that this perspective will stand at odds with some 
alternatives. In this context, it will be shown that a careful description of the 
imagination will clarify how the reader maintains a hopeful perspective in the midst 
of alternative construals. Furthermore, there has been some recent discussion 
concerning the exercise of the imagination in the reading of scripture, and given this, 
some helpful parallels will emerge with regard to the aims of this overall chapter.  
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2. Hope, Imagination and Scripture 
 
i) Future possibilities and the imagination 
 As noted in chapter two, Bauckham and Hart argue that hope depends on the 
ability to imagine a different world; ‘Hope transfigures the present precisely by 
enabling us to transcend it imaginatively and, upon our return, to perceive all too 
clearly its lacks and needs’.2 Here, they echo the thought of Paul Ricoeur in arguing 
that any expression of hope requires the imagination in order to grasp the content of 
what might be hoped for. For Ricoeur, both imagination and hope relate to 
possibility and so he resists the idea that imagination relates only to the unreal, or to 
recalling the absent past.
3
 Rather, the imagination is able to produce images of what 
may yet be, of ‘new worlds’ which in turn shape present existence in conformity 
with those images.
4
 Given Ricoeur’s interest in theological hope and resurrection, it 
is unsurprising that this idea of the imagination of possible worlds conceptually 
resembles the relationship between God’s promised new world and the present, as 
described in chapter two. However, for the most part, Ricoeur’s description of the 
imagination is applied to hope in a broader, philosophical sense by focussing on 
possibility; put simply, acting in hope depends on the ability to imagine new 
possibilities. 
 In addition to this, Bauckham and Hart argue that imagination is essential to 
the articulation of God’s promised future, specifically because that future entails 
something which lies outside present possibilities. As something qualitatively new, 
God’s future can only be expressed through the use of imaginative analogy and 
cannot be fully articulated through ordinary representative language. Despite the 
difficulty this might present, Bauckham and Hart nonetheless argue that ‘of God and 
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his promised future, speak we must unless we would be content with agnostic 
silence’.5 Similarly, Vanhoozer suggests that: 
If the creative imagination provides the means to think what is beyond the 
bounds of objective knowledge, its product, figurative language, provides the 
means to speak what is beyond the bounds of descriptive language.
6
 
Already then, it can be seen that the imagination might be related to hope in two 
interlocking but distinct ways; the imagination may be captured by a possible future, 
and it may be employed to articulate a qualitatively new future. In the first case, the 
imagination is simply the faculty through which the contents of hope are grasped. 
Ricoeur, Hart and Bauckham all recognize that divine promise is directed to the 
imagination in this respect, such that ‘through the captivity of our imagination, 
God’s Spirit draws us forward into the reality of his own future’.7 But secondly, if 
Christians have a missionary vocation to articulate the contents of their hope, then 
the imagination must be actively employed for this task; new images and figurations 
of language must creatively respond to the need to speak of God’s promised future. 
In this latter sense, while it is the contents of hope that are being described through 
the imagination, it can be seen that the exercise of the imagination is also an action 
of hope to the extent that Christian hope carries in itself the need to be proclaimed 
and passed on. The use of the imagination becomes part of the vocation of hope. 
However, it is worth noting that John Webster’s main objection to the 
imagination derives precisely from the idea that the exercise of the imagination is a 
‘task’. In his view, imagination: 
[...] suggests something too projective or poetic, too little oriented to what 
has been accomplished. [...] A natural counterpart of a strongly futurist 
eschatology, imagination is oriented more to possibility than to actuality; and 
it can make hope’s envisaging of the future into a task to be undertaken, 
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rather than the hearing of an authoritative divine judgement which has 
already been announced.
8
 
Webster’s comment ignores the fact that Christian vocation does involve ‘tasks’, 
classically, preaching the gospel. Given that persons may be given tasks by God, it is 
not clear why the imagination could not serve as a tool. However, his critique may 
emerge from the worry that employing the imagination will lead to persons 
projecting their own desires on to the content of Christian hope, a problem that as 
noted relates to the prospect of ‘divine judgement’. This problem was addressed in 
chapter two, but if we are to retain the concept of the imagination within the 
depiction of hopeful reading, the question of an ethics of imagination cannot be 
ignored. What must be noted at this stage is Webster’s suggestion that imagination 
relates to possibility rather than actuality, and thus it seems confined to hope that is 
based on a primarily futurist eschatology. However, in chapter two it was argued that 
Christian hope relates not only to eschatology, but to a holistic set of doctrines taking 
account of the whole history of God’s faithful love. In this light, it might seem that 
the imagination becomes less important to the expression of hope. However, Garrett 
Green argues that the imagination is fundamental to the comprehension not only of 
possibility, but of actuality as well. If this is so, then the imagination may remain 
crucial to the expression and action of hope, but in a manner which does more 
(though not less) than depict the future. 
 
ii) Imagination, Possibility and Reality 
 
 In distinction to Webster, Green does not confine the imagination to the 
production of future possibilities. Rather, the imagination is the very faculty through 
which we come to know God and think about God in the present; it is the ‘organ of 
faith’.9 Crucial to Green’s depiction of the imagination is his distinction between the 
terms ‘is’, ‘as if’ and ‘as’: 
                                                          
8
 Webster, ‘Hope’, 302. 
9
 Garrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998), 144-5. 
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The paradigmatic action – the “as” faculty – can bring conceptual precision 
to Ricoeur’s suggestive distinction between a “first” and a “second naïveté.” 
The first inhabits the world of “is,” blissfully unaware of other possibilities. 
The second lives in a world of “as,” construing reality according to a 
particular vision in full awareness of other options.
10
 
Seeing the world ‘as’ something distinguishes itself from simply stating that such 
and such ‘is’ the case, because it recognizes that there are other ways of seeing the 
world. However, seeing ‘as’ is not the same as seeing ‘as if’; seeing ‘as if’ is an 
imaginative act which makes no claims about actual states of affairs, whereas seeing 
‘as’ has to do with construals of reality itself. To explain this, Green suggests that 
when a person looks across the room at a lamp, they are unable to see its far side but 
nevertheless see it ‘as’ a whole. To see the lamp as if it were a whole is to avoid 
considering its actual nature. To see it as a whole is to employ the imagination to 
make a judgement about its reality.
11
 Following this, Brueggemann suggests that to 
live ‘as if’ one were free is to concede that one is in fact not free, but ‘the injunction 
to live “as free persons” means to accept one’s status as free and to live that way, no 
matter how much some dominant social definition may cast one as a slave’.12 Here, 
we are reminded of the argument made by Cone and Thurman concerning the 
affirmation of human dignity discovered by slave preachers in scripture. For persons 
to see themselves as dignified humans is to make a claim about reality in distinction 
to the master’s claim to see them as slaves. As Thurman argued: 
The slave’s answer to the use of terms of personal designation that are 
degrading is to be found in his private knowledge that his name is known 
only to the God of the entire universe. In the judgment everybody will at last 
know who he is, a fact which he has known all along.
13
 
For Green, this is an act of the imagination, but it is emphatically not imaginary; 
rather the imagination is used to apprehend reality through an alternative vision. The 
reason for labouring this point is to show, responding to Webster’s critique, that the 
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imagination may not only pertain to possibility but to actuality, and in particular that 
the imagination is crucial to perceiving the world in hope amid a range of 
alternative claims.
14
 Thus if as suggested, to hope is to live with a vision of reality 
shaped by divine promise and presence, it can be seen that the exercise of the 
imagination is ingredient to the action of hope. This focus on the imagination as a 
faculty for construing the world will be particularly important as we proceed; what 
begins to be clear is that if we follow Green’s depiction of the imagination, then it 
becomes crucial to articulating Christian hope in distinction to perspectives which 
deny hope. In this sense, to be a hopeful reader is to live within a distinctive 
construal of reality (including, but not limited to, the future), which in turn shapes 
the character of one’s engagement with the text. This idea stands behind some of 
Brueggemann’s work on the prophetic imagination and scripture, to which we now 
turn.  
 
iii) Imagination and Scripture: Walter Brueggemann 
 
 Walter Brueggemann argues that the use of the imagination is fundamental to 
the task of ‘prophetic’ preaching. For Brueggemann, the role of the prophetic voice 
is to nurture an ‘alternative consciousness’ in the community, a view of the world 
that differs from the dominant view which precipitates a new way of living.
15
 The 
alternative consciousness resembles Ricoeur’s new ‘vision’, and both terms suggest 
a sustained perspective, as opposed to isolated moments of imaginative fantasy.
16
 By 
describing an alternative consciousness, Brueggemann follows Green’s argument 
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that all views of reality are imaginative construals. Indeed, Brueggemann has 
defined the imagination as ‘the human capacity to picture, portray, receive, and 
practice the world in ways other than it appears to be at first glance when seen 
through the dominant, habitual, unexamined lens’.17 Because the ‘dominant lens’ is 
also an imaginative construal of the world, Brueggemann often refers specifically to 
a ‘counterimagination’. In turn, he suggests that: 
The core of our new awareness is that the world we have taken for granted in 
economics, politics, and everywhere else is an imaginative construal. And if 
it is a construal, then from any other perspective, the world can yet be 
construed differently. It is the claim of our faith, and the warrant for our 
ministry, to insist that our peculiar memory in faith provides the materials out 
of which an alternatively construed world can be properly imagined.
18
 
One fundamentally important source of these ‘materials’ is scripture, whose task is 
‘to fund – to provide the pieces, materials, and resources out of which a new world 
can be imagined’.19 In particular, ‘[t]he doxological tradition of Israel that issues in 
praise and thanks offers an inventory of “miracles”, that is, of narrative memories of 
the exhibits of God’s power for the impossible’.20 The phrase ‘power for the 
impossible’ echoes Kierkegaard’s ‘passion for the possible’ as a definition of hope. 
By talking of the ‘impossible’, Brueggemann’s proposal fits well with the task of 
proclamation as described by Bauckham and Hart, because it includes the 
articulation of something that is qualitatively new. However, Brueggemann places 
greater emphasis on the present, on using scripture to re-imagine the world as it is. 
As such, he offers a way of relating imagination and scripture to the broader view of 
hope taken in this thesis. However, while this represents an important step in our 
argument, there are two issues within Brueggemann’s writing that need clarifying. 
 Firstly, the purpose of Brueggemann’s scriptural ‘counterimagination’ is to 
give expression to a ‘counterworld’21 but it is not always clear as to what this 
‘counterworld’ consists in. On the one hand, he seems to suggest that the shift to 
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postmodernism has created space within which Christians might imagine a world 
which runs counter to the hegemonic view of western modernism.
22
 On the other 
hand, his writing often implies that the postmodern situation is not the context for a 
counterworld, but rather is the counterworld. The role of the contemporary prophetic 
voice is thus to encourage hearers to relinquish the old world of modernism, and 
receive the new world coming in its place.
23
 Because this ‘new world’ stands in 
contrast to hegemonic modernism, and because it is characterised in terms of the 
openness and decentralisation associated with much postmodern thought, it appears 
at times that the counterworld is the world of postmodernity. In this view, the 
imagination becomes the means by which this socio-historical shift is construed as 
occasioned by God. 
On balance, Brueggemann’s aim is probably to argue that in a more 
fragmented postmodern environment, the Church has an opportunity to become a 
specific, discrete community that lives more faithfully to God in the present. To this 
extent, I sympathize with his proposal. However, this interest in postmodernism only 
confuses the issue. On the one hand, the concept of a counterimagination makes less 
sense in the diverse, postmodern environment than in a more obviously ‘hegemonic’ 
context, where there is a clearly dominant view to counteract. On the other hand, it is 
never made clear as to why the postmodern world should have any kind of 
eschatological significance, even in a strictly penultimate sense. From both angles, 
Brueggemann’s argument would be clarified by simply jettisoning the relation to 
postmodernism. In doing so, we may retain the basic proposal that in any situation, 
the imaginative reading of the Bible allows persons to construe reality differently to, 
but conscious of, other construals.
24
  
 Secondly, because Brueggemann describes the Bible as a ‘fund’ for the 
imagination, we must consider whether or not the imagination is thereby 
unrestrained, and whether or not it should be so. Recently, Brueggemann has drawn 
on Levinas to argue that: 
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What interests us [...] is our capacity to locate prophetic preaching under the 
rubric of “infinity,” of open possibility that defies containment. [...] For it is 
the unthinkable and the unsayable that bear witness to divine impossibility 
[italics original].
25
 
This comment echoes Ricoeur’s suggestion that the open-ended form of the parables 
leaves the hearer open to ‘indefinite possibilities’ through the story.26 Furthermore, 
Brueggemann argues that while the imagination may be shaped by one’s context, 
‘the personal zone of imagination is a protected place of intimacy and interiority [...] 
and no one else has access to it’.27 Preachers may offer texts and interpretations to 
congregations, but they have no control over what occurs in the imagination of their 
hearers. This assertion rightly attempts to safeguard individuals from the often 
negative influences of those in authority. But this concern surely reflects the fact that 
the imaginations of those in authority are themselves susceptible to sinful fantasy 
and misjudgement; thus the question remains as to whether the imagination may be 
transformed or constrained by God. Having said this, Brueggemann (along with 
Ricoeur) does sometimes talk of constraints and transformations. He comments that 
the title of The Prophetic Imagination was a happy accident, but that the term 
‘prophetic’ had the advantage of moving the discussion of ‘imagination’ away from 
‘sheer fantasy’, and towards the expression of a covenant relationship with 
YHWH.
28
 As such, the imagination is not strictly constrained, but all imaginative, 
prophetic speaking and hearing occurs in a context where God is the ‘compelling 
partner’ of all involved. In other contexts, Brueggemann speaks of the ‘imagination 
led by God’s spirit’29 and of the fact that the prophets are ‘rearticulating the old 
story’, drawing imaginatively on a corporate memory of God’s faithfulness in order 
to inspire hope.
30
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iv) Clarifying the relationship between imagination and hope 
 
 As noted above, Brueggemann’s concept of reading scripture to nourish an 
alternative way of seeing and living will have close affinities with the present 
depiction of the hopeful reader. The reason for labouring over the lack of clarity at 
certain points is to argue that the problems derive directly from the concept of the 
imagination, if the imagination is not firmly grounded within a theological 
framework of hope. Webster was right to worry that the imagination can be 
unhealthily projective, but this possibility is not enough to rule out the imagination if 
the potential difficulties can be dealt with theologically. This was precisely the task 
undertaken by Garrett Green (and also by Hart).
31
 While Brueggemann draws 
positively on Green, some confusion results from the places where he seems to 
depart from Green, especially where he states that ‘there is no final arbiter who will 
finally adjudicate rival claims’.32 Although I am not convinced that this assertion is 
followed through by Brueggemann, it raises a crucial dimension of Christian hope to 
the fore. In chapter three it was argued that while Christians may not claim finality 
for their perspective on reality, they need not relinquish belief that in judgement, 
God will finally render human existence coherent. As such, the promise of 
judgement must be understood by Christians to feed back into the present exercise of 
the imagination. It is this point that Green seems to clarify in arguing that the 
Christian imagination is judged and transformed in Christ, who alone embodies a 
perfected imagination as a facet of being the perfect human image of God.
33
 This in 
effect locates the imagination within a framework of sin, redemption and hope, and 
thus also grounds hope for the imagination itself. Specifically, Green does not view 
the imagination primarily in terms of projecting a world (or counterworld), but in 
terms of grasping a particular construal of the world and its future.
34
 In turn, he 
argues that: 
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Scripture is the means by which individual and group identity is formed and 
reformed, and it is the means by which the community of believers seeks to 
transform the world around it by converting the world’s imagination to 
conformity with the Word of God.
35
 
In this sense, the Christian imagination takes on the specific end of grasping the 
world and looking forward in a manner that flows from God’s promise and presence. 
It is worth noting that to speak of limiting the imagination, or as Green does of 
transforming the imagination to be in ‘conformity’ with God, seems counterintuitive 
in a context where the freedom of the imagination is highly prized. Indeed 
Brueggemann at times emphasizes the limitless possibilities of God’s freedom, 
suggesting that the human imagination is accordingly and rightly limitless.
36
 
However, Barth was surely right to stress that the freedom of God’s speaking has 
less to do with an ‘automatically working force of nature’ and more to do with free 
choice to act in self-limitation.
37
 This means that the potential for God to do 
something new does not equate to limitless possibilities for the present, but to 
possibilities in keeping with God’s covenant faithfulness. It would be entirely wrong 
to suggest that God is thus limited, but in concrete terms, my argument is that 
Christian hope derives not from the possibility that God can do the impossible per 
se, but from the fact that God has promised to do specific impossibilities, principally 
to redeem creation and humanity in Christ. As such, I wish to suggest that the 
imagination is best understood in relation to biblical reading within a framework of 
Christian hope derived from divine presence and promise. The imagination’s role is 
best understood in Green’s terms as a means of grasping the reality and promise of 
God, and in particular, the reality and promise of God as the ground of Christian 
hope. This does not reduce the imagination to a non-active role; rather, if being 
hopeful entails living with a specific vision of reality, the imagination becomes the 
faculty through which that reality is grasped and articulated. 
The imagination is thus first and foremost addressed by God. Particularly in 
Christ’s resurrection, the world is reconstrued. In the story of creation and the 
promise of renewal, persons come to see the world as on a hitherto unimagined 
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course. To be hopeful is to be on this way, is to see the world with fresh eyes 
enlightened by God. In this respect, Ricoeur’s ‘vision’, Green’s paradigmatic ‘as’, 
and Brueggemann’s ‘alternative consciousness’ all depict aspects of what it means to 
be hopeful. However, I wish to locate the concept of imagination within a framework 
of hope, because as Thiselton argues, ‘a view of the future [...] does not depend on 
[...] the speculative use of our imagination. It depends on appropriating the promises 
of God, and trusting him’.38 Hope begins with God truthfully redescribing the world 
to human persons. Only then is the imagination employed in the expression of our 
grasp of that redescription.  
 
3.1. The Hopeful Reader 1: Perseverance and Openness in Rereading 
 
i)  Perseverance and the circle of hope: Hope leads to rereading 
 
 It was suggested above that to hope is to live with a vision of reality shaped 
by God, but that that vision of reality and the grasp of hope’s grounds and contents 
are necessarily provisional. There is hope for genuinely hearing God in the act of 
biblical reading, yet only in the knowledge that one’s hearing is never final. As such, 
the first action of the hopeful reader is to persevere in the rereading of the texts, in 
the hope that doing so will deepen and sharpen their grasp of God’s promise and 
presence as attested in the scriptures, and lead to growth in their capacity to hear. 
Margaret Adam indirectly raises this notion of perseverance in relation to her 
account of ‘Moltmannian hope’, arguing that the Moltmannian focus on constant 
newness has influenced an ad hoc hermeneutics that tends towards ignoring passages 
that seem irrelevant. By contrast, she argues: 
A passage that seems inappropriate today might seem a welcome resource in 
radically changed circumstances. God’s constant presence continues to 
provide hope regardless of the limits of human perception and imagination.
39
 
                                                          
38
 Thiselton, Life After Death, 45. 
39
 Adam, Our Only Hope, 86. 
167 
 
Again, this highlights why it was necessary to recognize that Christian hope is 
grounded across time, through creation to new creation. To read does not simply 
entail a quest for novel perspectives, but instead a tension between openness and 
steadfastness. The texts must continually be read, though it will be shown that this 
does not equate to an inherent conservatism. The aim of this section is to clarify this 
perseverance means in practice, in two moves. Firstly it will be necessary to clarify 
the nature of the circularity involved in this description. This question was raised in 
chapter one, where it was noted that it is the texts themselves that mediate the 
grounds for being hopeful in their interpretation. After commenting on this circle, the 
question of what is meant by perseverance as such will be addressed. 
 The concept of circularity is widespread within discussion of hermeneutics, 
though its articulation varies; in Schleiermacher and Dilthey the circle moves 
between the whole and the parts of the text; in reception theory it moves between the 
text and the horizons of expectation of the reader. There are numerous other 
discussions of hermeneutical circles, but it is thus not surprising that the literature 
concerning interpretive virtue almost always consciously describes a circle between 
the virtues of the reader and the depiction of those virtues in the text. In principle, 
this movement could occur in the reading of any text that somehow speaks to the 
question of human character, and thus Briggs is right to note that there is a difference 
between recognizing that the Bible describes love, for example, in a certain manner, 
and deciding to pursue the virtue of love as described.
40
 However, because most of 
the writers discussed in chapter one do acknowledge the peculiar status of the Bible 
for Christians, it is generally assumed that while the interpretive virtues may pertain 
to the reading of any text, the circle of interpretive virtue is of most significance in 
the reading of the Bible as scripture. Even then it is clear that specific biblical texts 
display vices as well as virtues, and in this respect the whole-parts circle is also 
important because of the complexity of the canonical description of the ideal human 
character (if indeed it can be spoken of at all). Despite this complexity, the basic 
argument remains that the biblical texts depict the kind of character to be desired by 
its readers; thus growth in love will aid deeper understanding of the text, while 
deeper understanding of the text will aid growth in love. 
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 In broad terms, my argument is that Christian hope operates in a similar way, 
but with a subtle difference. With regard to other interpretive virtues, such as love, 
discussion of the nature of the ‘loving interpreter’ naturally draws on texts which 
describe the operation of love in practice.
41
 Unsurprisingly, writers such as Fowl and 
Jacobs draw on accounts of Jesus to depict a loving character, and this leads them to 
describe how this specific way of being relates to interpretation. Briggs focuses on 
the narratives of Ruth and Elisha, but the principle remains the same; the aim is to 
describe what love ‘looks like’.42 However, the case of hope is slightly different 
because generally fewer texts address the specific question of what hope looks like 
in practice or what it means to be a hopeful person; rather, far more attention is given 
to the grounds of hope, and to picturing that which readers may hope for. It is for this 
reason that hope was treated through these parameters in chapter two. Though some 
texts offers clues as to what hope looks like in the life of a person, more texts offer 
specific reasons for being hopeful. Thus unlike other treatments of interpretive 
virtue, the virtuous cycle for which I am arguing here has less to do with a 
movement between the character of the reader and character as described in the 
biblical texts, though this dimension remains. Rather, it has more to do with a cycle 
between the hopeful character of the reader (in the sense of hope’s action) on the one 
hand, and the textual basis for being hopeful (broadly, the grounds and contents) on 
the other. The biblical texts convey reasons for hope to the reader, but as argued in 
chapter three, this hope comes with the recognition that it may only be grasped in 
partial ways; thus, one of the actions resulting from the apprehension of this hope 
will be to return to the source, in order to deepen the appreciation of its grounds and 
contents. The texts themselves shape the imagination of the reader in the sense of 
shaping their perspective of reality, and in turn, to live with this perspective as 
described in chapters two and three is to return to the texts which captured the 
imagination to begin with. As noted in chapter one, it is necessary to maintain that 
this circle is not closed because our account of Christian hope begins with the in-
breaking communication of God. But because such communication is textually 
mediated, the hope that this hermeneutical circle is virtuous and not vicious remains 
a ‘wager’. As such, it remains necessary to state that this circle is undertaken in hope 
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and not in presumption; the hopeful reader reads in the hope of hearing God, and 
never with the presumption of hearing God.
43
  
 
ii) Perseverance in openness to the text 
 
Perseverance in reading may result from any number of concerns, and so the 
aim of this section is to consider how the nature of Christian hope gives specific 
shape to the reader’s perseverance with the text. It is worth noting that several 
writers on interpretive virtue speak in some way of perseverance as a mark of the 
virtuous reader, although mostly indirectly. This in part surely derives from the fact 
that perseverance is inherently required in the pursuit of the virtues, and as has been 
argued already, hope thus necessarily binds the whole process of growing as a 
reader. More specifically, discussion of perseverance comes through conceptually in 
Vanhoozer’s argument for ‘attention’, and in Jacobs’s and Briggs’s discussion of 
love.
44
 Jacobs in particular argues that love and hope are necessarily intertwined. He 
argues that ‘hope is the virtue by means of which suspicion can be overcome’, in the 
sense that perseverant, loving attention to another (in Jacob’s context, the text of 
another) is possible in the hope that such loving perseverance will bear fruit. It was 
argued in chapter three that a kind of hermeneutics of suspicion may operate within 
the rubric of hope, and Jacobs is fully aware that readers will at times need to depart 
from the views they find in a text. Thus even in this case, the operation of suspicion 
occurs in the hope that when problems are uncovered, some fruit may still be borne 
in love. Jacobs’ argument, like Vanhoozer, relates to the Christian reading of any 
text, but the specific focus on reading as an expression of communion with another 
fits well with the depiction of hope in the final section of chapter three; to read in 
hope is to persevere with another for the sake of a fruitful ‘relationship’ through the 
text. This formulation certainly pertains to the biblical text, in the sense that the 
hopeful reader perseveres with the text in the hope of relating more closely to God, 
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and in a sense in terms of the communion between the reader and the human authors 
of scripture. While the question of God is foremost in this argument, the latter 
question concerning the human authors will become important in considering when 
perseverant attention to the text nonetheless leads the reader to dissent. 
 Primarily then, the hopeful reader perseveres with the text in the hope of 
hearing God, or in terms of the discussion so far, in the hope of having their 
imagination addressed and transformed by God. Describing the hope of the reader in 
this way clarifies why it was necessary to attend to the relationship between the 
imagination and hope, and why it was necessary to challenge Brueggemann’s 
argument that the Bible constitutes a ‘fund’ for the imagination. Rather than seeing 
the text as at the disposal of the human imagination, the imagination is firstly at the 
disposal of the text. To read in love may be described as allowing the other to speak 
to one’s imaginative construal of reality, to listen to the offer of a new perspective or 
a fresh vision on the world. To read in hope is to persevere in attention the other’s 
vision in the hope that doing so will expand the reader’s perspective, allowing them 
to imagine or construe the world more truthfully. Clearly this suggestion may again 
relate to the reading of any text, but is particularly germane to reading the Bible as 
Christian scripture. As Green argues, ‘Christians acknowledge the authority of the 
scriptures of Old and New Testaments because only they render Christ, the image of 
God, fully and coherently to the imagination’.45 Thus the hopeful reader reads the 
Bible with perseverance in the pursuit of the transformation of the imagination such 
that they might perceive the world in truth, and in particular this will include seeing 
the possibilities for the world in hope. Hopeful perseverance may thus be described 
as sustained attention to the voice of God through the texts, as readiness to be 
addressed.  
 Strictly then, this sense of readiness to be spoken to is first opened by God in 
grace; as such, the reader’s openness is not a precondition for being addressed. But 
as the reader’s imagination is captured by God, so they are called to pursue the voice 
of God as a matter of vocation, as a characteristic action of hope. It is for this reason 
that the writer to the Hebrews is able to challenge the audience thus: 
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 Exhort one another every day, as long as it is called ‘today’, so that none of 
you may be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin. For we have become 
partners of Christ, if only we hold fast our first confidence firm to the end.
46
  
The writer draws on Psalm 95 to exhort the Hebrews not to allow their hearts to 
grow hard to the voice of God, as their ‘ancestors’ had done in the wilderness. In 
both textual scenarios the promise and call of God is primary, but it draws forth a 
response that requires the action and sustained attention of the follower. As such the 
hopeful person, and thus the hopeful reader, seeks to remain open to the God of 
promise on the way, and hence open to the promises of God in the biblical text. This 
openness should not be surprising given the emphasis in chapters two and three on 
judgement. Such openness will be particularly important in the context of familiar 
texts, where the reader must persevere in seeking deeper appreciation of seemingly 
mundane readings, alongside remaining open to unfamiliar interpretations of familiar 
texts.  
Having said this, the value of openness (to the other) has the character of a 
truism in recent hermeneutical thinking, and is itself proposed by Vanhoozer as an 
interpretive virtue.
47
 Similarly, the virtue of ‘receptivity’ described by Jones and 
Briggs has close affinities with the idea of openness.
48
 But concerns with openness 
as a matter of course were implicit in the discussion of suspicion, given that many 
texts seem to dehumanize the reader. In this scenario, openness becomes highly 
problematic. In addition to this, the very nature of hope stands at odds with the idea 
of an a priori openness; in the quotation from Hebrews above, the audience are 
exhorted to ‘hold fast’, an idea which stands in tension with outright openness. 
Given this, section 3.2 will examine the other side of this circle of hope, that the 
hopeful reader exhibits a certain steadfastness and even ‘closedness’, that in the face 
of competing construals of reality they remain able to read the text in a way which 
witnesses to hope in God and thus bears fruit in the action of hope in their life and 
the lives of others. For now, it is necessary to consider whether openness as such 
may still be fruitful in the reading of problematic texts. 
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iii) Perseverance, openness and problematic texts 
  
As noted, the idea of perseverant openness is most difficult in relation to 
problematic texts. The very thing that renders a biblical text problematic is a clash of 
perspectives, though not necessarily between the text and the reader. This of course 
will happen, but it might be said that the very value of reading lies with the potential 
influence on one’s perspective on the world. The main difficulty with the Bible is 
actually, as Allen Dwight Callahan noted for slaves, that ‘letter of Holy Writ was 
sometimes at war with its spirit’.49 In other words, pace Green, the Bible does not 
always seem to render God ‘coherently to the imagination’ (emphasis mine). Given 
the prevalence of this experience, the resulting question concerns how the reader 
should respond, and in this context, what it means for the hopeful reader to 
persevere, open to a problematic text. One option would simply be to reject the 
problematic text outright, the option classically taken by Thurman’s grandmother.50 
However, in her context I find it impossible to suggest that this decision constituted 
a lack of hope; the very decision to persist with portions of the Bible at all appears as 
a massive triumph of hope in such circumstances. Even so, as long as the canon 
maintains its status the question of how to read difficult texts endures. Thus I intend 
to show that the hopeful reader may persist with difficult texts, open to the voice of 
God in spite of the complications. 
This proposal is well illustrated in the way in which certain African 
American writers have persisted in reading Philemon. Philemon has of course a 
particularly problematic history with regard to slavery, and thus it brings the idea of 
openness to problematic texts into focus. On the one hand one may cite good reasons 
for rejecting the text of Philemon outright, if its history of interpretation is too 
problematic to set aside. On the other hand, by remaining alert to these problems the 
text could be read with the explicit aim of generating a critique of its dominant voice. 
However, both these options might seem to preclude the possibility of openness. But 
while writers such as Lloyd A. Lewis and Allen Dwight Callahan remain fully aware 
of potential problems, I wish to show that they have sought to recover the liberating 
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potential of Philemon in a manner which retains a sense of genuine openness to the 
text on its own terms.  
Lewis argues that in the letter to Philemon, ‘[w]e see Paul addressing a case 
in which freedom and slavery and environment and the gospel collide’.51 Implicit 
within Lewis’s description is the fact that the result of this collision is the 
fundamental ambiguity of Paul’s position on slavery. There is much debate as to 
whether Paul asks Philemon to release Onesimus, and clearly this question is of 
crucial importance against the backdrop of modern slavery.
52
 In an earlier article, 
Lewis offers a close reading of the text, paying particular attention to Paul’s use of 
kinship language as it pertains to status.
53
 In this light he argues in particular that 
Onesimus’ ‘usefulness’ (Philemon 11) does not derive from his status as a slave, but 
rather the opposite, from his status as a ‘brother’, as one ‘on a par with both Paul and 
his former master’.54 Despite this focus, Lewis does not concede that Paul requires 
Philemon to manumit Onesimus, and hence the ambiguity remains intact. What he 
does suggest is that within the text there are hints of Paul working out the 
implications of the gospel in process. Thus Onesimus’ escape constitutes a ‘rupture 
of social codes’, but in this moment, ‘Paul could accept that rupture as yielding some 
fundamental truth about living in the family of God’.55 However, the final move in 
the drama is left to Philemon.   
 By contrast, Callahan notes the actual lack of textual evidence behind the 
assumption that Onesimus was a slave at all. He traces this argument back to 
Nineteenth Century abolitionists, noting with Blount that the text was a battle ground 
for the issue of slavery.
56
 Like Lewis he focuses on Paul’s use of kinship language, 
but argues instead that Onesimus and Philemon were brothers as blood relatives, as 
well as ‘in the Lord’. As such, the slave-brother relation of verse 16 represents the 
state of their relationship; ‘slavery’ conceptually describes the breakdown of human 
relatedness, ‘brotherhood’ its restoration. Thus, ‘[t]he problem that Paul engaged in 
                                                          
51
 Lloyd A. Lewis, ‘Philemon’ in True to Our Native Land, ed. Blount, 437-443, (438). 
52
 Briefly, with references, J.D.G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text, (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996) 334-335. 
53
 Lloyd A. Lewis, ‘An African American Appraisal of the Philemon-Paul Onesimus Triangle’ in 
Stony the Road, ed. Felder, 232-246 (234-6, 243).  
54
 Lewis, ‘An African American Appraisal’, 245. 
55
 Lewis, ‘An African American Appraisal’, 245. 
56
 Allen Dwight Callahan, ‘Paul’s Epistle to Philemon: Toward an Alternative Argumentum’, HTR, 
86, 4 (1993), 357-376, (357-363). 
174 
 
the letter was not that Onesimus was a real slave (for he was not), nor that Onesimus 
was not a real brother to Philemon (for he was), but that Onesimus was not a beloved 
brother to Philemon’.57 In conclusion, Callahan argues: 
It is perhaps as an exemplar of reconciliation that the epistle recommended 
itself to its first audience, and perhaps it is as an exemplar of reconciliation 
that Paul's Epistle to Philemon must recommend itself to its audiences 
today.
58
 
Clearly Lewis and Callahan provide different readings of the text at the historical 
level, but the significance of their approaches at this stage does not lie with the 
relative success of each argument, but rather with their ability to hold together three 
key concerns. Firstly both are fully aware that the text is ‘odious to many black 
exegetes’ in Lewis’s terms, because of its apparent ambiguity on slavery, and its 
tradition of being used to inhibit bids for freedom. Secondly, against this backdrop, 
they both offer close readings of the text in its own context. As such, they maintain a 
strong degree of openness to the text as text, without assuming that it will either turn 
out to be unusable, or that it could be co-opted to reinforce a pre-given perspective. 
Lewis neither exonerates nor condemns Paul. His conviction about slavery does not 
lead him to portray Paul either as pro-slavery or as an abolitionist, because close 
attention to the text shows that it will not easily support either conclusion.
59
 Callahan 
appears to depict a more acceptable Paul, but principally by arguing that slavery is 
not the issue of the letter. Thirdly, this openness is extended to the theological level, 
each drawing out places where the text offers theological resources that point beyond 
the ambiguities of human contexts to the freedom that was apprehended in the 
presence of God, mediated through scripture and even through Paul.
60
 In short, they 
offer grounds for hope through close and open attention to the text as it speaks of 
God. It is not my place to argue whether either writer successfully deals with the 
‘odious’ nature of the text, and clearly the two perspectives are not neatly 
compatible. But my argument is that at the level of approach, both illustrate the kind 
of perseverance that characterises the hopeful reader. The result is not necessarily 
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‘better’ exegesis of the text, but the sustenance of a better conversation, keeping the 
text open for theological interpretation in the face of serious difficulties. This 
perseverance maintains openness to the text, and indeed in this case to the possibility 
that God may speak in some sense in spite of the apparent ambiguities. Thus while 
there remain difficulties in reconciling their interpretations at the historical level, it 
can be seen that their interpretations are able to offer coherence at the theological 
level, coherence which need not be undermined if one or other historical perspective 
proves to be untenable. However, alongside this openness, we shall now consider the 
important element of steadfastness in hopeful reading.  
 
3.2. The Hopeful Reader 2: Perseverance and Steadfastness in Hope 
 
i) The other side of the circle 
 
 The argument of section 3.1 essentially followed the hermeneutical circle of 
hope from one side. The initial grasp of hope in the biblical texts leads to a reshaped 
view of reality, and hence new forms of action. One of these actions is to return to 
the texts, persevering with them in openness to God. This section will, in a sense, 
view the circle from a different starting point; because the action of rereading the 
texts is energised by a grasp of hope’s grounds and contents, that hope will 
necessarily shape subsequent readings. Thus the hopeful reader is disposed to seek 
the interpretive good, with that good focused on ways in which the biblical texts 
point beyond the confines of present existence in a manner which reflects the 
hopeful promise and presence of God. However, this means that the sense of 
openness is held in tension with a kind of steadfastness, a grip on the initial 
understanding of hope’s grounds. The result of this tension will be rereading that 
takes time, which is why both openness and steadfastness are described as 
ingredients of hopeful perseverance.  
 This section will proceed in three moves. Firstly, the effect of hope on 
subsequent readings will be described with reference to Green’s depiction of the 
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imagination, such that the reader is able to grip onto their apprehension of hope 
whilst remaining alert to alternatives. Secondly, the manifestation of hope as 
steadfastness or even stubbornness in reading will be discussed in relation to 
problematic texts. Thirdly, I will address the management of the tension between 
openness and steadfastness in discerning readings in hope.   
 
ii) The hopeful reader and the transformed imagination 
 
In chapter two it was argued that being hopeful involved being disposed to 
live in accordance with a particular view of reality, a perspective grounded in God, 
looking both to the imminent present and the ultimate future. It was argued that 
anyone could be hopeful in the Christian sense, for the precise reason that Christian 
hope begins with God’s breaking into the present, opening up a seemingly closed 
reality. But equally, hope becomes a matter of transformation, and hence of 
character. The hopeful person is primarily engaged in a process of growth, such that 
living hopefully becomes a matter of action engendered through transformation. 
There is thus a complex interplay between acting out of choice and acting out of a 
growing nature; as such it remains possible to speak of being hopeful in the context 
of extreme pressure, and indeed it is often in such situations where hopeful action is 
most clearly visible. In relation to the question of biblical reading, this balance is 
well captured by the work of Paul Ricoeur, who draws on Christian theologies of 
hope (especially Moltmann) to develop his primarily philosophical hermeneutics. 
Writing on the parables of Jesus, and in particular the parable of the treasure in the 
field (Matthew 13.44), Ricoeur suggests that ‘the Kingdom of God is compared to 
the chain of these three acts: letting the Event blossom, looking in another direction, 
and doing with all one’s strength in accordance with the new vision’.61 The ‘Event’ 
itself comes to encompass ‘encounters’ with the kingdom of God in the parables, and 
mutatis mutandis other biblical texts. The textual encounter does not precipitate a 
mechanical response, though Ricoeur does speak of a responsive ‘choice’. Rather, 
the reading leads to a fresh vision, and in my view this term helpfully carries the 
                                                          
61
 Ricoeur, Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 241. 
177 
 
interrelation of being transformed in hope (disposition) and actively responding to 
the call of God in hope (choice).  
To listen to the Parables of Jesus, it seems to me, is to let one’s imagination 
be opened to the new possibilities disclosed by the extravagance of these 
short dramas. If we look at the Parables as at a word addressed first to our 
imagination rather than to our will, we shall not be tempted to reduce them to 
mere didactic devices, to moralizing allegories. We will let their poetic power 
display itself within us.
62
 
Thus as above, the biblical texts may be seen to transform the imagination such that 
the reader sees the world differently, in growing correlation to God’s promise and 
creative reality. Indeed, to read in hope is to read with the expectation that such 
transformation will occur, but if this is so, it can begin to be seen that reading in 
hope necessarily shapes subsequent reading of the Bible.  
As noted above, before anything else is said it could be immediately objected 
that the cycle between the reader and the text is thus a vicious one. If the text shapes 
the reader’s perception of reality, and this in turn shapes the subsequent reading of 
the text, then it may appear that the reader’s world collapses into the world of the 
text such that they are only able to see what the text will allow them to see. Even if 
the reader is opened up to new interpretive possibilities in the first instance, it might 
seem that they will eventually become blinkered to other ideas, a situation which 
could only be remedied by a rejection of the framework of the text. In this case we 
are faced with the original modern objection to theological interpretation, that 
theological categories and vision predetermine the results of biblical interpretation. 
While a number of writers point out that historical-critical interpretation may 
become equally blinkered, my argument is that the virtue of hope helps to clarify 
what is at stake because hope as hope remains fully conscious of where it differs 
from its environment. As shown above, to become blinkered to alternative 
perspectives is to slip from hope to presumption.  
Garrett Green notes that it is more common for scholars within the field of 
theological interpretation to speak of reading the Bible as scripture than to state that 
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the Bible is scripture.
63
 Following his distinction between the ‘is’ of certainty and the 
‘as’ of imagination, he suggests that to read the Bible as scripture is to read with a 
particular vision of reality that is nonetheless alert to other construals. While this 
dichotomy is perhaps not entirely necessary, it helps clarify the distinctiveness of 
speaking of theological interpretation in terms of hope. Following Moltmann’s 
concept of ‘contradiction’ and Cone’s concept of ‘absurdity’, hope quite specifically 
deals with seeing reality through hope in God, in the context of an environment that 
may see reality differently.
64
 Without this awareness of other possibilities, hope 
becomes presumption. But in hope, the reader’s imagination allows them to see new 
possibilities in the text, possibilities that speak to present reality without blocking 
their awareness of the logic of other readings. Because of this, we can begin to speak 
of the imagination being employed by the reader as an action of hope in the process 
of reading. Again, I wish to maintain that the imagination is first and foremost a 
faculty that is addressed by God through the text. However, in the midst of 
competing construals of the world, it is necessary for the reader to engage in the task 
of discerning between competing imaginative construals of what is real, and thus 
competing interpretive possibilities. To this end, the hopeful reader employs their 
imagination to test ways in which specific texts might point beyond the confines of 
present existence in a manner which reflects the presence of God in creation and the 
promises of God for new creation. As Bauckham and Hart argue: 
Only insofar as we are able to envisage how things might be different from 
the way they are in this world, how they might change in the future, how they 
are intended by God ultimately to be, do we have any final grounds for 
refusing to accept the way the world presently is.
65
 
Bearing this in mind, the employment of the imagination in reading is not simply 
about generating new interpretive possibilities for their own sake, but about seeking 
and testing interpretations that bear witness to the reality of divine hope in specific 
situations.  
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iii) Perseverance as stubbornness in rereading problematic texts 
 
 As noted above, the idea of hope as perseverance in openness stands in 
tension to clear examples where hope is manifest as steadfastness, perhaps even 
stubbornness. The very description of Abraham’s hoping ‘against’ hope (par’ elpida 
ep’ elpidi)66 suggests a hope which steadfastly contradicts apparent possibility.67 As 
such, the apprehension of divine possibility leads to a stubborn refusal of the 
prevailing notion of the world, of what is humanly possible. Thus the kind of 
stubbornness in view is not a stubborn refusal to be addressed (in direct contrast to 
openness), but a refusal to let go of the promise and presence of God in the face of 
challenges or confusion. As Hart suggests: 
Refusing to buckle under the painful weight of actuality (whether that be 
persecution, exile or whatever) the faith which holds fast to such hope resists 
and contradicts it, insisting upon living as if it were not thus, living in the 
light not of the way things are, but of the way things will be in God’s 
future.
68
 
I choose the specific term ‘stubbornness’ deliberately for two reasons. Firstly, it 
suggests a characteristic that is not self-evidently good, in the sense that 
commending the stubborn reader seems counter-intuitive in the context of recent 
discussions of hermeneutics. This of course is not enough to commend the term, but 
the oddity of the word thus forces us to rethink the potentially self-evident nature of 
‘openness’ in a way that more saleable terms like ‘persistence’ or ‘conviction’ do 
not.
69
 But secondly, stubbornness seems to me to capture the important point that 
hope often stands in the face of a prevailing perspective. It was argued earlier that 
this is not always the case, and thus I am not arguing for an a priori stubbornness. 
But my argument is that the dialectic of stubbornness and openness characterises the 
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perseverance of the hopeful reader. In particular, this dialectic will help clarify the 
shape of perseverance in the face of problematic texts. 
Returning to the example of Philemon, Blount notes that the text was often 
used by white preachers in support of slavery and specifically as a tool to inhibit 
slaves from trying to escape. But in response to their apprehension of the gospel, 
slaves rejected such interpretations, and at times critiqued the text in itself.
70
 
However, Blount goes on to argue that ‘[t]his doesn’t mean that the New Testament 
text lost its authority for the slaves. But it does mean that their perception of God in 
their midst was more authoritative’.71 As argued in chapter three, this does not 
constitute a straightforward hermeneutic of pragmatic affirmation, and this argument 
may be clarified by the discussion of imagination. It can be seen that the ‘perception 
of God’ describes a construal of reality itself, which as Martin highlighted coheres 
with the ‘central thrust’ of the biblical gospel.72 In other words, it is the hopeful 
imagination of reality that actually leads to a specific moment of dissent from the 
text. Indeed it is this hopeful perception of reality in the light of the overall biblical 
witness that renders the specific text problematic. However, Martin notes that while 
some readerly dissent took form in a wholesale rejection of the text, it also occurred 
through resistance to any hermeneutics that seemed to undermine the ‘parenthood of 
God’.73 From this angle, readers continued to persevere with Paul’s letter through a 
steadfast grip on their perception of reality, a perception that could not support 
slavery.  
Bearing this in mind, it can be seen that Lewis and Callahan hold onto a 
fourth concern that rightly stands in tension with their openness to the text of 
Philemon. While their approaches are primarily historical (and sociological in the 
case of Lewis), they hold onto a fundamental conviction concerning the dignity of 
the human person which renders slavery inherently evil. Thus the reality within 
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which the text is read is imaginatively understood to be one which will not 
ultimately support slavery, a hopeful perspective on reality that is grounded in the 
presence and promise of God. As such, the theological resources that they draw from 
the text in part derive from being hopeful in this manner, and are thus an operation of 
the imagination because their view of reality stands in contrast to alternative views 
(on which, see below). As such, the theological aspect of their interpretation derives 
from the tension between their openness to the text on its own terms, and their 
perspective on reality borne in hope. There is a right stubbornness in the refusal to 
leave the question of human freedom out of the discussion for the sake of a so called 
objectivity. Because that issue lies at the heart of Christian hope, and thus the 
construal of reality, it remains right that it is brought into the discussion of a text 
whose interpretation has necessary implications for contemporary theology. In this 
manner the hopeful reader draws out places where the biblical texts point beyond the 
confines of present existence, fostering genuine hope in contemporary readers. By 
noting this communal aspect, it becomes easier to maintain the sense of circularity in 
the process; hope in one reader leads to the interpretive good of fostering hope in 
others. 
Of course, reading with the vision of hope may be considered to introduce an 
element of bias, but in my argument it constitutes the pre-understanding of the reader 
about the very reality within which the text is read. The problem with the vision of 
hope is not that it is a bias per se, but that it stands in contrast to seemingly dominant 
biases and perspectives about the reality of the hermeneutical situation. This is why 
it is necessary to hold stubbornness and openness in tension. On the one hand, the 
theological exegete must contend for their construal of reality in the face of other 
competing perspectives. On the other hand, it will not do to suggest that ‘standard’ 
perspectives are always to be suspected, as though the good would never prevail. 
Clearly then, there must be cases when the pre-understanding, even as that of hope, 
must give way to the weight of textual evidence. But because hope pertains to 
reality, this pre-understanding should not give way on the basis that it is somehow 
non-objective. Against that suggestion, it is right to speak of a degree of 
stubbornness in tension with openness. Ultimately, there is no straightforward way to 
determine when the reader should change his or her mind, and it is for this reason 
that this dialectic constitutes the perseverance of hope. But as such, the reader may 
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persevere in the genuine hope of better grasping the truth and promise of God 
through their attention to the text. Having said this, it is worth considering options 
for discerning when a reading may be said to be genuinely hopeful, and to this 
question we now turn.  
 
iv) Discerning hopeful reading 
 
As noted in chapter three, part of this argument stands close to the 
perspective of Francis Watson. Watson argued that ‘[t]he story of the creation of the 
community is set within the story of the creation of the world and its final destiny’.74 
In broad terms the canon as canon creates its own framework of creation and 
eschaton, with Jesus as the ‘mid-point’. Watson notes that the accounts of creation in 
particular are told from a patriarchal perspective, but that in the manner discussed 
through Mosala’s work, it is possible to recover an alternative perspective in spite of 
the patriarchal telling. This would be useful in any situation, but by arguing for an 
original and final equality in the respective accounts of creation and new creation, 
Watson suggests that gender equality is present in the biblical accounts of creation 
and new creation. Furthermore, because the history between the two depicts the 
place inhabited by the contemporary reader, it is possible to read against the grain of 
the patriarchal lens of scripture, whilst remaining faithful to the biblical story.
75
 In a 
similar manner, it is worth noting that Lewis’ argument was made by reading 
Philemon in relation to Galatians 3.28, an approach that has been used many times in 
various strands of liberation theology.
76
 Thus while Watson moves from the big 
picture to the specific, and Lewis moves from the specific kernel to broader textual 
engagements, both moves are hermeneutically similar by drawing on a textual thread 
that is understood to relate to divine and human reality and history as a whole. In this 
sense, neither Watson nor Lewis posits just a canon within the canon, but rather they 
posit a reality within which the canon is read. As such, there are strong similarities 
between these views and the hermeneutics of hope argued here, because it has been 
                                                          
74
 Watson, Text Church and World, 138. 
75
 Watson, Text Church and World, 190-201. 
76
 Lewis, ‘An African American Appraisal’, 233. 
183 
 
argued that hope involves an imaginative construal of reality based on divine 
promise and presence. Crucially, by describing hope (and in this case, the contents of 
hope), as a hermeneutical framework Watson offers a point from which the reader 
might discern when theological interpretation in the mode of hope has gone astray. 
This framework will have to operate alongside others (including even historical-
critical ones) and thus theological interpretation will remain at all times accountable 
to various critical questions. However, the basic thrust of the argument allows for 
two helpful points in the discernment of good reading. Firstly, if scripture is read 
within a framework of Christian hope, then the overarching narrative of hope from 
creation to new creation provides a framework by which specific readings may be 
tested. Specific readings may be discerned to be genuinely hopeful to the extent that 
they flow with the broader picture of Christian hope. Secondly, as noted above, this 
perspective may allow the reader legitimately to dissent from the plain sense of a text 
whilst reading it theologically.  
However, it could be argued that such a framework does ultimately constitute 
a canon within the canon, and unless the framework itself remains open to revision, 
it might unhelpfully predetermine what a specific text is able to say. Hence by 
contrast to Watson, it was noted that Brueggemann’s view of the imaginative reader 
focused on the specificity of each biblical text in contrast to the broad canonical 
narrative. While Brueggemann recognizes that there is a strong tradition behind 
speaking of ‘the’ biblical narrative, he worries that such a view is ‘excessively 
systematic’. He argues that ‘[t]he Bible offers many small dramas, some of which 
are not easily subordinated to the large “drama of salvation”’.77 He argues that 
readers should allow individual texts to speak on their own terms, free from 
systematic construal. As such, he stands apart from Watson, suggesting that each text 
be allowed to fund the imagination independently. Following this, it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which the transformed imagination of the hopeful reader 
becomes a bias, overriding the individuality of specific texts. In turn, can a reading 
be described as hopeful without that simply meaning that it has collapsed into 
bolstering an abstracted view of ‘the’ biblical narrative? 
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In essence this dilemma represents a particular angle on the question of how 
the whole of the Bible relates to its parts, but again my aim is to describe this 
hermeneutical circle with specific reference to the theology of hope. Returning to the 
start, it was argued that Christian hope is first and foremost in God, and specifically 
in God as the creator, the redeemer of humankind in Christ and the one who 
promises the fulfilment and renewal of creation at the eschaton. Our apprehension of 
this reality is partial, and as such it remains a wager. But it is a wager built on trust in 
God, and trust that God has in fact spoken and remains faithful to creation and to 
God’s promise of new creation. Furthermore, it is to trust that God’s renewal of 
human beings has begun through the Spirit in the present. As such, being hopeful 
does not begin with the adoption of a coherent framework, but with a relationship 
that gradually shifts and renews one’s perception of reality, history, and the future, in 
accordance with God. As such, while the hopeful reader does indeed read with a 
transformed imagination or construal of reality, this perspective does not derive so 
much from the conscious adoption of a hermeneutical lens, but from the growth in a 
divine-human relationship. In the end, this proposal is guilty of the charge of leaving 
the reader bereft of interpretive criteria, but because of the reality of judgement it 
must be maintained that no definitive framework for theological interpretation can be 
possessed as such, though provisional frameworks may be employed. 
On this basis, to read in hope is to read specifically in the hope that God 
speaks, is faithful, and thus may be heard in the specific moment of each reading. As 
such, even though the reader’s hope may be understood in principle to cohere with 
the character of divine promise as mediated through scripture, each moment of 
attention to a specific text is characterised by attention to the voice of God through 
the specificity of that text. However, in persevering with the text for the sake of God, 
the hopeful reader reads in trust that if God is to be heard, even in the specific 
interaction of text and context, God’s faithfulness means that the reader may 
anticipate coherence between the specific reading and the whole narrative of divine 
hope. Returning then to the examples of Lewis and Callahan, both writers suggest 
ways in which the text, interpreted theologically, points beyond the experience of the 
present in accordance with Christian hope, yet both take care to avoid warping the 
text to fit a pre-given framework. Lewis concludes by seeing ‘even Paul struggling 
with the fact that a gospel that subverts the fundamental distinction between Jews 
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and Gentiles would not leave the issue of slavery alone’.78 As noted, he does not 
repaint Paul as a proto-abolitionist, but does argue for a reading which points beyond 
the confines of slavery in accordance with a Christian hope, without negating the 
historical specificity of the text. Callahan argues against viewing the text as relating 
to slavery, but does suggest that the text depicts possibilities for human 
reconciliation. Clearly the exegetical differences between the two present a problem, 
but from a theological perspective, this problem may not be primary. In the first 
instance it can be seen that there are resonances between both readings at the 
theological level, and it may be at this level that both perspectives are best brought 
into dialogue for the sake of tightening the historical aspect of the exegesis. To put it 
another way, if God is in any sense to be understood as capable of speaking through 
the text, then the potential coherence of the theological possibilities outlined in both 
articles is not necessarily undermined by the different historical reconstructions. 
Even if one historical view is disregarded, the theological reading need not 
necessarily go with it. 
 Finally, while the hopeful reader rightly seeks coherence between the specific 
hope of a specific text and their overall perception of hope in God, it is crucial to 
remember that the perception of hope, and thus the efficacy of the imagination are 
necessarily provisional. As Alison Searle notes, ‘[t]o imagine biblically [...] is both 
to recognise the evil and suffering that characterises the present, but also to 
anticipate the eschaton with a creativity simultaneously provisional and fostered by 
hope’.79 Given this, specific texts must be allowed to challenge the reader, and thus 
to reshape their perception of divine promise and the nature of Christian hope. There 
is thus no final way (within human grasp) of deciding whether a reading may be 
understood to be theologically appropriate, and it is for this reason that discernment 
alongside other readers is so important. As Kathryn Tanner suggests, at this point the 
imagination serves against ‘complacency’ by refusing interpreters the chance to 
settle.
80
 As in the case of the comparison between Lewis and Callahan, what matters 
is not the attempt to close down interpretation onto a final, ‘correct’ reading of each 
specific text. But nor is each text simply a means for sparking the individual 
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imagination of the reader. Rather, the hopeful reader is involved in the sustenance of 
a theological conversation for the sake of better living with God and others in the 
light of divine promise and presence. Clearly it will not do to offer two or more 
readings as interesting interpretive artefacts without any means of moving forward, 
but nor will it do to require that one is to be judged hopeful and one is not. Rather, 
both readings may be ‘hopeful’ if they contribute to the corporate process of 
discerning the reality of God through the text and sharing the discernment of God’s 
promised future and its impact on the present. In other words, the hopeful reader is 
neither one who seeks to finish the task of interpretation, nor one who simply accepts 
interpretive pluralism without recognizing the urgency of discerning good 
interpretation from bad. The hopeful reader pursues the specific text for the sake of 
offering resources to the community in order to energise the shared journey towards 
God. Thus all other things being equal, the reader who hopes in God and whose 
imagination is shaped by divine promise and presence is more naturally able to see 
ways in which each text might contribute to the shared life of hope in God. Given 
this, we now turn to consider the role of the community in the task of theological 
interpretation.  
 
3.3. The Hopeful Reader 3: Plurality and Coherence through reading with 
others 
 
i) Initial comments 
 
In chapter three, questions were raised concerning the possibility of 
interpretive dialogue with others and the limits of interpretive plurality. It was noted 
that if the criteria for good interpretation are local and community specific then 
dialogue with other reading communities becomes more problematic in the absence 
of public, universally agreed methods and aims. If this depiction is accurate then the 
potential for one group to impose their interpretations on another is compounded, if 
local interpretations are passed off as universal. Furthermore, the problem of power 
interests influencing interpretation was shown to be theologically grounded, in the 
187 
 
sense that human beings are susceptible to the desire to impose their own interests on 
others. As a result, dialogue between reading communities becomes a highly 
complex and potentially dangerous affair. 
 However, it was also argued that the Christian hope described in chapter two 
has consequences for this scenario. Firstly, Christian hope begins with the inbreaking 
promise of God, and as such it is possible for that voice to be heard independently of 
the local interests of the reading community. Given this, dialogue becomes possible 
to the extent that God can be said to speak to humanity across pre-given boundaries. 
Secondly, it was argued that Christian hope involves the transformation of human 
persons in love. This creates the possibility for a renewed common humanity which 
in itself becomes the basis for a shared dialogue. But by being renewed in love, self 
interest is also eclipsed. As such, a renewed humanity does not take shape through 
the imposition of a homogenous perspective, but through the risky possibility that 
the stranger, encountered as such, may become a friend. As such, reading together 
need not lead to homogeneity, but may lead to coherence.  
 Broadly speaking, in chapter three it was argued that dialogue with others is 
possible; in this section, it will be argued that in hope it is necessary. The hopeful 
reader cannot read in isolation, but rather seeks dialogue with as wide and distant a 
group of others as possible. This necessity has begun to emerge already in the above 
discussion as it was suggested that the discernment of good theological interpretation 
in hope must be a corporate affair. But in turn, the formation of human community is 
itself a vocation of hope, and as such to read in hope is to read as part of this 
vocation. In particular, it will be argued that readers must work together to seek 
coherence amidst varying readings, such that the emerging life of hope can be said to 
be coherent amidst plurality.  
 Arguments for reading with others have been fairly widespread in recent 
literature, and Richard Burridge has argued that a core feature of contemporary New 
Testament ethics must be an ‘open, inclusive community’.81 My argument will be 
that such activity has more to do with the hopeful character of the person than with 
taking communal reading as a matter of method. Furthermore, the discussion of hope 
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thus far requires some conceptual precision with regard to what is meant by reading 
in community with others.  
 
ii) Communities and the Church 
 
 While much of the recent interest in reading with others is to be welcomed, it 
was noted that at times there can be a lack of clarity concerning exactly what is 
meant by the reading community. Specifically, by foregrounding the importance of 
reading communities in the formation of interpretive interests, writers such as Fowl 
and Jones seem to slip between talk of communities (plural) in general, and talk of 
the Church. Thus Webster has expressed concern that: 
[...] we do not allow theological language about the church to dissolve into 
generic language about ‘forms of life’, ‘sociality’ or even ‘ecclesiality’ [...] 
‘ecclesiality’ and ‘church’ are not concepts of the same kind; and to talk of 
the latter we need to say much of God and the gospel.
82
  
While this complaint perhaps overlooks the fact that Fowl and Jones do offer 
theological resources for reading within the Church, Webster suggests a distinction 
between talk of the Church (singular) and communities (plural) that is worth taking 
into account. In my judgement, the importance of this distinction lies with the idea 
that the Church as such has an eschatological vocation to witness to the renewed 
humanity which constitutes part of the contents of Christian hope. In this respect, it 
must be argued that the hopeful reader reads with others not only as a matter of 
communal accountability and formation, but as a matter of the action of being 
hopeful in the first place. 
This particular aspect of the Church’s vocation and existence is discussed by 
Rowan Williams who holds together the necessary tension of diversity and unity that 
was outlined in chapter three. Williams challenges what he terms the ‘incarnational 
consensus’ of much Anglican theology, namely that the incarnation is essentially 
affirmative of human social relations as they are, as opposed to setting up some rival 
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institution. By contrast, he argues that the doctrine of the incarnation does not strictly 
lead to a social vision, but that almost the reverse is true; rather, the doctrine of the 
incarnation itself emerged from the fact that a new covenant people had begun to 
form around Christ in a way that crossed all preordained boundaries, manifest in the 
calling of the marginalised and the mutually marginalising.
83
 The incarnation as a 
concept thus derives from the acceptance that such a covenant people emerged as a 
gift of God. Furthermore, while this people was not unbounded it was missionary, 
and the scope of its mission was effectively unbounded. Following this, the Church 
as such ‘proclaims and struggles to realize a ‘belonging together’ of persons in 
community in virtue of nothing but a shared belonging with or to the risen Jesus’.84 
Given this, the character of the Church as a community of persons is bound up with 
its missionary vocation, which in turn is bound up with the eschatological promise of 
God for humankind.  
The Church claims to show the human world as such what is possible for it in 
relation to God – not through the adding of ecclesiastical activities to others, 
and not through the sacralizing of existing communal forms, but by 
witnessing to the possibility of a common life sustained by God’s creative 
breaking of existing frontiers and showing that creative authority in the 
pattern of relation already described, the building up of Christ-like persons.
85
 
The kind of common life here described is first and foremost a gift given in Jesus. 
But in the very nature of the giving, i.e. the incarnation, cross and resurrection, it is a 
common life that is defined by openness to a common humanity as gift, and thus is 
characterised by vulnerability and trust. Furthermore, it is a common life that bears 
witness to God’s ‘breaking of existing frontiers’ and as such it calls for trust that 
extends quite firmly into the potentially unknown, given the scope of that movement. 
Indeed it is a common life that is hopeful about the possibility of trust and 
enrichment, particularly in its encounter with the stranger, a theme also discussed by 
Williams: 
There is no alternative to the work of mutual trust – which already implies a 
certain relinquishing of power. The hope is for a shared and reciprocal 
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empowering for growth towards the Kingdom. [...] It is not without each 
other that we move towards the Kingdom; so that Christian history ought to 
be the story of continuing and demanding engagement with strangers, 
abandoning the right to decide who they are.
86
 
The kind of common life being described begins to look very similar to that offered 
by Fowl and Jones and also Burridge, particularly in their emphasis on being open to 
the voices of those outside reading communities.
87
 The decisive difference lies in the 
primary focus on the activity of God in creating a strange new humanity, or rather 
‘reconciling’ humanity in a way which in the (eschatological) final analysis calls into 
question both the idea of plural communities, but equally the assumption of 
uniformity. As such, the vocation of the Church to embody this kind of common life 
is a direct function of the eschatological hope that it is called to proclaim.
88
 
Following this, to read in the Church is to read toward this kind of common 
existence, and this entails careful attention to near and distant voices concerning the 
interpretation of scripture. In distinction to Burridge there remains the need to 
maintain the sense of strangeness in the other as a matter of respecting their human 
dignity,
89
 but in distinction to Fowl and Jones it is equally important to maintain a 
unifying hope beyond pluralistic communities.  
 
iii) Plurality and coherence: hope and judgement in reading together 
 
 So far it has been argued that in hope, interpretive dialogue is possible, and 
that in keeping with the Church’s vocation as witness to an eschatological humanity, 
it is necessary. However, such a task is inherently difficult, because it attempts to 
tread a path between two tempting and problematic options. On the one hand, the 
recognition that universal criteria remain out of reach makes optimistic pluralism an 
appealing response to interpretive conflict, but the urgency of hope grounded in the 
real possibility of divine action renders this option highly problematic. On the other 
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hand, the risk of uncritically universalizing one’s local interpretive criteria, thereby 
subduing the readings of others, has been shown to be theologically problematic 
because of the human condition. But if between these options lies the possibility of 
interpretive coherence, or ‘wholeness’ as described following Watson, it is necessary 
to consider what form this coherence might take.
90
 
In the first instance, the hard work of ‘mutual trust’ described by Williams 
coheres well with the above argument that reading hopefully entails close attention 
and perseverance. As well as giving attention to the text, it would involve sustained 
listening to the reading and interpretation of others. In particular, Adam is correct to 
note that all hermeneutics are ‘special’ in the sense that the individual’s 
hermeneutical assumptions are not universal but local, so attention is required not 
only to actual interpretations, but to the context and hermeneutical perspectives that 
surround them.
91
 In addition to the suggestion that dialogue itself is necessitated by 
the hope of the Church, the very concept of interpretive virtue highlights the 
possibility that good interpretation is not only a matter of method, but of character. 
As such, those readers whose character leads them to fruitful interpretation may be 
spread far and wide, and thus the process of interpretive dialogue becomes a search 
for such readers. In regards to wisdom, Ford has argued that wise readings may thus 
be found in unexpected or unexplored places.
92
 In turn, it might be suggested that the 
hopeful reader seeks out expert witnesses, readers whose hope leads them to fruitful 
appreciation of the grounds and contents of Christian hope, and in turn readers 
whose lives witness to the promise and reality of God as creator and redeemer. 
However, if this depiction is valid, it creates a further problem. What has been 
suggested thus far has close affinities with Adam’s argument concerning differential 
hermeneutics in the process of engaging in dialogue with others. In particular, Adam 
argues that ‘the unity by which believers bespeak their allegiance to the one God 
derives not from their consensus about the textual meaning of Scripture but from the 
obligation to bear with one another’.93 While I agree with this, this perspective on the 
unity of the Church itself derives from a localised interpretation of certain texts. 
Recognizing this highlights the fact that the whole argument for sustained attention 
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to the other clashes with certain aspects of the perspective of James Cone and other 
liberation theologians, who argued that sustained attention to dominant perspectives 
was in fact part of the problem. 
Cone argued that ‘Christianity came to the black man through white 
oppressors who demanded that he reject his concern for this world and his blackness 
and affirm the next world and whiteness’.94 Sustained attention to this other (white, 
dominant) perspective would thus equate to focusing on a pacifying and 
dehumanizing vision, unless such attention was sustained to the end of offering a 
radical critique.
95
 Indeed, the affirmation of human dignity at the heart of Black 
theology suggests that there is more hope in rejecting the demand for attention from 
the oppressor, and first of all affirming one’s own inherent ability to interpret the 
Bible as a person before God. If there is a critique to be made of an a priori openness 
to other contexts and persons, then this is surely it. This point was touched upon in 
chapter three where it was noted that this approach, as a suspension of trust may well 
constitute a hopeful perspective before the eschaton. But if this is so, it is necessary 
to consider how these two approaches – openness and suspicion – might be held 
together. My argument is that both poles cohere under the rubric of hope precisely 
because the hopeful reader is part of an eschatological community. As such, 
discerning exactly how being hopeful should shape the individual reader’s 
engagement with the community becomes a matter of discerning the eschatological 
shape of present human relations. Put simply, whether being a hopeful reader means 
openness or ‘closedness’ to other readers depends on the corporate discernment of 
social relations as understood in light of the promises and presence of God.  
To some extent, this point has been proposed by many writers who suggest 
that the poor and marginalised have a specific hermeneutical relationship to the text, 
because it is primarily to the poor that the hope of the gospel is addressed. Cone 
argues that ‘there is no truth for and about black people that does not emerge out of 
the context of their experience’.96 Given this, he states that scripture can only be 
interpreted in the light of the experience of the oppressed.
97
 This connection between 
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the experience of oppression and the interpretation of scripture is of course widely 
made in liberation theology, and has thus been picked up by a number of western 
writers. In particular, Moltmann argues that the specific hope of divine promise is 
primarily addressed to the poor who thus become the group of readers best attuned to 
hear and understand it.
98
 For precisely this reason, it has thus been argued that 
western readers must pay closer attention to liberation theology and to the exegesis 
of the oppressed. Rowland and Corner argue that the contextual attention of 
liberation theology has much to offer the ‘first world’ by awakening it to its own 
contextual placing.
99
 But beyond this, they highlight how themes drawn out by 
liberation exegetes speak directly to situations of power, noting in particular Jesus’ 
word of judgement for the rich.
100
 In turn, they argue that privileged readers need to 
engage more seriously with liberation theology for the sake of socio-political self 
criticism, and must attempt to side with the oppressed by critiquing and challenging 
their own unjust structures of power.
101
 
What is not often made explicit is the fact that in order to achieve this, a 
different kind of hermeneutic must be adopted by the power holder. To be sure, 
liberation theology calls both rich and poor to pay attention to their own context, and 
to become alert to the socio-political implications of the text. Furthermore, it is 
possible to unmask power structures from both angles. But if the experience of 
oppression is itself a crucial aspect of liberation hermeneutics, then clearly the 
powerful cannot read in the same way. Firstly, for the theology and political praxis 
of the rich and poor to pull in the same direction, biblical texts will need to be read in 
different ways with different emphases. Secondly, in the process of engaging in 
dialogue between oppressed and oppressor, there is a sense in which liberation 
theology requires that the oppressed speak, and the oppressors listen. This is valid to 
a point, but because it has been shown that even liberation movements can have 
blind spots, it is necessary to consider in more depth how any reader discerns when 
to speak in the interpretive debate, and when to be spoken to. It is my argument that 
the cultivation of hope is crucial to this discernment.   
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Throughout the thesis it has been argued that hope entails both affirmation 
and judgement, and that indeed the two concepts are inseparable because Christian 
hope looks to the renewal of humankind as a matter of divine grace. The aspect of 
judgement is universal in the sense that no human may claim finality for their 
perspective or their interpretive judgements. This becomes important even in the 
case of liberation movements so that such groups remain open to blind spots. But 
even this judgement is a matter of hope because it gives way to receiving one’s 
humanity from God. As such, the aspect of affirmation is also universal in the sense 
that all persons are under God; thus as many liberation theologians have argued, 
even the oppressor may be liberated from their oppressiveness.
102
 However, on this 
point it becomes clear that even if the twin aspects of judgement and affirmation are 
universal in scope within the framework of Christian hope, the implications for what 
it means to be hopeful are varied. But crucially, even if the hope of judgement entails 
great cost for the individual, this may be understood to be hopeful if it is taken in the 
light of its implications for the whole community, and ultimately for the whole of 
creation. By way of analogy, we might suggest that the rich man of Mark 10 fails in 
his response to Jesus’ command at precisely this point. Jesus tells him to sell his 
possessions and give the proceeds to the poor, but the man is unable to respond 
positively. Taken in isolation, the required act thus becomes a moment for despair, 
for the choice seems to be between two negatives. But taken in a social and 
eschatological perspective, the cost may yet be a thing of hope; for the individual, 
there remains the promise of ‘treasure in heaven’ if the cost can be counted, and for 
the poor there is the hope of a more equitable existence in the here and now. 
Furthermore, there is hope for the rich man of experiencing social relations in the 
present which conform to the promised kingdom. Placing the cost of the text within 
this light shifts it from a point of despair to a point of hope, while remaining a 
genuine cost. In turn, the hopeful person may be described as one who is able to 
locate individual moments of action, and thus interpretation, in this wider context.  
The argument is thus that the hopeful reader, through the transformation of 
the imagination, is better able to locate their own moment of reading within this 
perspective of divine promise and hope as it pertains to the whole community of 
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humankind and creation. As such, they are better able to discern when the text 
affirms their present existence, and when it challenges them. But in particular, the 
hopeful reader seeks to discern when the one text will entail judgement for them and 
affirmation for the other, by locating the communal relations in the context of divine 
hope. While this possibility remains necessary for all readers, the argument is 
directed particularly to those readers who recognize their own positions of privilege. 
I wish to stress that in this specific scenario, to read hopefully does not necessarily 
mean to read in a manner which is self affirming. Indeed for the powerful, hopeful 
reading may more commonly entail cost, but even so it remains hopeful because it 
results in a form of life which reflects divine promise and presence. As such, it is 
possible that the oppressed reader may read a text in a manner which affirms the 
struggle for liberation, while the powerful reader interprets the same text in a way 
which challenges their own status and calls them to account. But both readings 
cohere at the theological level as a product of being hopeful, because in tandem both 
readings may point towards God’s promise for human relations in creation and new 
creation. In this respect, the hopeful reader will seek out this kind of interpretive 
coherence, where different readings are corporately tested for their ability to speak 
with a coherent theological voice. For some this process will be costly, but it remains 
a thing of hope.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter has been to describe the characteristics of a hopeful 
reader, and hence the characteristic action of reading hopefully. Firstly, the 
relationship between hope and imagination was discussed in more detail, and in 
particular, Garrett Green’s description of the imagination was highlighted. Green 
describes the imagination as a faculty for comprehending both possibility and reality, 
and in particular his emphasis on ‘seeing as’ helped clarify the operation of the 
imagination in relation to competing construals of reality. As such, the imagination 
perceives the good through a vision of reality that maintained its awareness of 
alternative perspectives. While the imagination has been suggested as a potential 
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interpretive virtue itself,
103
 it was argued that Brueggemann’s depiction of 
imaginative reading, while helpful, created confusion over the question of how the 
appropriateness of imagination was to be discerned. As such, the Christian 
imagination fits better within a framework of hope.  
 Following this, the characteristic action of the hopeful reader was depicted in 
three interlocking moves. Firstly, the hopeful reader perseveres with the text in order 
to deepen their apprehension of the grounds and contents of their hope. In the first 
instance, this perseverance requires a sustained openness to the details of the text, 
and to the voice of God through the process of reading. Secondly, it was argued that 
the hopeful reader is one whose imagination of reality has been transformed through 
encounter with the hope of God. As such their reading of the text will be shaped by 
this grasp of reality, and so they persevere in rereading with a closed, steadfast grip 
on hope. By drawing on Green’s view of the imagination as faculty for construing 
reality, it was possible to maintain the fact that the hopeful reader remains alert to 
competing perspectives, and as such they do not become blinkered by their grasp of 
hope. Rather, reading in hope helps the reader to perceive new interpretive 
possibilities in the text, specifically possibilities which elaborate on the grounds and 
contents of divine hope, and render possibilities for hopeful living projected by the 
text in the present. Overall, openness to the text is held in tension with a steadfast, 
even stubborn, grip on hope in God. The discernment of the appropriateness of 
readings undertaken in this light was in the first instance considered to be a matter of 
relating reading to trust in the faithfulness of God to God’s covenant promises. Even 
so, because the argument has focused on the character of being hopeful, there can be 
no straightforward way of predetermining what would count as a hopeful exegesis. 
 Finally, it was argued that the hopeful reader reads with others as a matter of 
necessity, and in particular, distant others from varying cultural contexts. Following 
Rowan Williams, it was argued that the Church as such has a vocation to witness to 
God’s renewal and reconciliation of humanity, and so the hopeful reader must read 
in response to this vocation. Because this humanity is neither homogenous nor 
isolated, the Church’s communal relations must take the form of loving openness to 
each other as strangers. Thus there remains a real interpretive plurality, particularly 
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as the voice of God is heard in so varied a range of situations. However, amidst this 
plurality it is necessary to seek coherence because hope’s genuineness demands the 
corporate process of discerning the voice of God in scripture. It was argued that this 
coherence comes through recognizing that the varying contextual demands and 
implications of the text are nonetheless grounded in God. In particular, where power 
relations are an issue it is possible to recognize that a single text may entail 
affirmation for one group and judgement and cost for another. Even so, if both 
moments of reading are taken together, both may rightly be described as hopeful if in 
tandem they point to a coherent hope grounded in God. 
 While this final point was made as a matter of general principle, it was 
primarily directed to readers who inhabit positions of power or privilege. It was 
important to maintain that reading hopefully does not necessarily equate to reading 
with self affirmation and hence the reading of many texts by the powerful will entail 
the recognition of cost. Thus, as we now move to consider a test case of hopeful 
reading, the discussion will take place with attention to the present context of 
writing. The main aim of the test case will be to locate examples of hopeful reading 
in contexts other than my own. However, it will then be crucial to consider how such 
readings influence a further reading which pays attention to my own situation. In this 
respect, we will be able to test whether or not a costly reading may cohere with other 
readings in a manner which allows the discussion, as a whole, to be described as 
hopeful.  
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Chapter Five 
‘Love your enemies’: Hopeful Reading in Practice 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 The aim of this final chapter is to engage in a test case for the thesis so far, to 
examine a concrete example of how Christian hope might fruitfully shape the 
theological reading of a specific text. This test case will operate in two dimensions. 
Firstly, the major part of this chapter will examine readers whose interpretation and 
appropriation of biblical texts manifests, in some sense, the kind of hopeful reading 
described thus far. In particular, I will focus on how these readers persevere with 
both openness and steadfastness in their theological response to the text. Secondly, 
these readers will be drawn from contexts different to my own, so that the whole 
chapter effectively works out the argument that hopeful reading involves reading 
with others. On this basis, I will conclude with a rereading of the text from my own 
perspective, taking into account the perspectives of the interlocutors, and searching 
for the kind of theological coherence discussed in the final section of chapter four. 
  
1.2. Approach 
 
 Because it has been argued that reading hopefully includes reading with 
others, the aim of this chapter is to examine readers from contexts other than my 
own. Inevitably, the range of potential interlocutors is enormous, and furthermore, 
because this thesis is concerned with the theological reading of scripture, the search 
for readers cannot be confined to those engaged in analytical exegesis of a given 
text. As such, I have attempted to allow the contexts to determine the texts and 
format for this discussion. Through a personal connection I began to explore the use 
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of scripture in Southern Sudan,
1
 and this led to a consideration of Jesus’ command to 
love enemies in the context of local conflicts between various groups. This 
exploration in turn led back to the context of African American theology, and 
Howard Thurman’s Jesus and the Disinherited which explores love in the context of 
oppression. It is important to note that neither context has yielded what might be 
thought of as detailed analytical exegesis of the texts (Matthew 5.43-45; Luke 6.27, 
32-35a). However, both contexts involve biblically literate readers, in the sense that 
theological and ethical reflection and action flow from biblical reading. Thus, while 
the examples will be more discursive with regard to the concept of love for enemies, 
and less analytical with regard to the textual artefacts, it is my argument that the 
discourse is partly but directly drawn from a hopeful reading of the relevant texts. 
Following this, the aim of each test case is threefold. Firstly, I will describe what is 
said about love for enemies. Secondly, I will show why this discourse is a 
manifestation of hope in the reader. Thirdly, after both cases have been examined, I 
will consider how each might shape my own rereading of the text, and how each 
speaks to the thesis as a whole.  
 The chapter will proceed as follows. Section two will examine Thurman’s 
writing, noting that his work retains a strong degree of critical integrity, though it is 
not his stated aim to exegete a specific text. However, it will be shown that his 
discourse on Jesus is fully informed by scripture, and as such his argument is of 
great significance to the theological reading of the texts on love for enemies.  Whilst 
raising some critical questions, it will then be shown that his writing manifests the 
kind of hopeful perseverance with the textual witness for which this thesis has 
argued. Section three will discuss the relationship between love for enemies and 
peacemaking in Southern Sudan, which in Nicholas Lash’s terms, offers a kind of 
communal ‘performance’ of the text. It is crucial to note that this section will not 
attempt to outline the Sudanese view, nor will it be possible to provide a 
comprehensive historical account of the events described. Rather it will be argued 
that the resources available, in themselves, offer valuable responses to enemy love 
that in turn constitute important readings of the text. Again, it will be argued that 
these responses manifest hope in the relationship between text and context.  
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 These readings will then be brought into dialogue with my own context, and I 
will suggest ways in which a coherent theological picture might be drawn. My own 
context remains dominated by critical analysis and I will show that the theological 
discussion may yet retain its critical integrity. However, the principal aim is to 
examine the text at the theological level. Finally, the whole process will be reviewed 
as a test case for the thesis. In this respect, the overarching task of the chapter is not 
to construct an argument about the texts on love for enemies, but to show how 
reading in hope has influenced the pursuit of good readings.  
 
2.1. Howard Thurman’s Jesus and the Disinherited 
 
 Howard Thurman is a popular and appealing author, and his writing has 
become highly accessible over a very wide range of contexts. However, his 
accessibility may create certain difficulties as a choice for this chapter, especially 
given the ongoing dialogue with Black liberation theology. Firstly, Thurman broadly 
predates that movement, and while he addresses similar issues, he does so for the 
most part without reference to liberation theology per se. Secondly, Thurman is 
known for his focus on the inner life, and it was noted in chapter two that the 
imposed focus on inner spirituality from white theologians created problems for 
writers such as Cone. Given Thurman’s accessibility on this point, care will be 
needed when turning to my own reading not to neutralize either the challenge in 
Thurman’s work, or the challenge of later writers on this subject. Having said that, it 
is worth noting from the outset that Roberts believed Thurman had to some extent 
anticipated the turn Black theology would take,
2
 and crucially, Gay Byron notes that 
Thurman’s view of the inner life was directly related to outer, social and political 
matters: 
During the tumultuous years of social protest during the sixties, instead of 
rallying the streets, Thurman set forth directives for self-mastery that would 
enable Civil Rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Whitney 
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Young to focus their efforts on developing resources and strategies for an 
inward journey toward freedom. This “inward journey” would enable them to 
stand firm in their faith in God who is able to tear down demonic strongholds 
and bring about change. Thurman wanted his students and protégés to gain a 
type of “strange freedom” that would empower them to meet the spiritual and 
political challenges of their time.
3
 
In Thurman’s passing autobiographical note, he states that Jesus and the 
Disinherited began life as a critical response to the question of a Hindu friend 
concerning how Thurman, as an African American, could remain a Christian given 
Christianity’s questionable history with regard to human oppression and slavery.4 In 
Callahan’s view, Thurman ‘returned to the story of Jesus in the Bible and, in seeking 
to answer for himself the pointed question of his Hindu interlocutor, found 
profounder meaning in his own faith’.5 The result is a careful and thought provoking 
outline of the significance of the ‘religion of Jesus’ for those who live with ‘their 
backs to the wall’.6 Thurman’s book thus derives from a concrete set of questions 
concerning what resources Jesus may offer for the lives of the oppressed. Given this, 
he focuses on Jesus’ teaching, and this leads him to discuss a range of potential 
responses of the oppressed to their oppressors, culminating in a discussion of love. 
The result is a serious examination of whether love for enemies is possible or 
desirable as a stance of the oppressed, and whether it offers a ‘technique of survival’ 
as a ground and action for hope in the present. Given this, Thurman’s book does not 
offer a detached analysis of the relevant texts, but nor does it jump straight to 
mechanical application of the concept. I will show that in fact, Thurman attempts to 
get at the theological heart of Jesus’ command as it pertains to Jesus’ context and to 
Thurman’s; his aim is to examine the contemporary religious significance of the 
biblical witness to Jesus. On this basis, Thurman’s text may rightly be understood as 
a theological reading of the biblical texts.   
 In the final analysis, it could be argued that Thurman is not critical enough at 
the historical level, but my point at this stage is that while he is not interested in 
purely historical questions, he remains fully aware of the importance of that range of 
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approaches. This partly demonstrates the importance of the text within his 
theological discourse, but crucially, his essentially positive account of Jesus takes 
place in the midst of a fully conscious awareness of other approaches. In the 
previous chapter, it was argued that this awareness is vital to the hopeful reader. 
However, before this point is detailed it is necessary to turn to the argument of the 
book as a whole. 
 
i) Fear, deception and hate 
 
In successive chapters, Thurman describes fear, deception and hate as three 
possible responses of the oppressed to their enemies. He describes how such traits 
may be simultaneously found in the oppressor, and astutely highlights how each has 
an immediately positive role for the oppressed. However, he argues that in each case, 
allowing the characteristic to develop ultimately dehumanizes the oppressed, just as 
it will have dehumanized the oppressor.  
Thurman describes fear as a response to the loss of personal significance and 
security. For the marginalised, fear is most clearly a response to the threat of 
violence and death in a context where no provision is made for protection. Yet at the 
same time the strong will develop fear from the ever-present threat of uprising 
induced by oppression.
7
 For both the weak and the strong, fear becomes a ‘protective 
mechanism’. In the former case, it keeps one alert to danger and thus affords a better 
chance of avoiding violence and death, given the lack of protection. In the latter 
case, fear of uprising is used to legitimize the oppressive measures of the powerful 
that protect the status quo.
8
 In both cases, Thurman is realistic about the positive 
contribution of fear, and why it is thus hard to counteract. However, he objects that 
fear ultimately leads to death by setting individuals at odds with one another, and 
equally by forcing the powerless to yield ‘all claim to personal significance’ in order 
to obviate suffering. ‘In the absence of all hope ambition dies, and the very self is 
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weakened, corroded’.9 For Thurman, Jesus’ response to this is to assert the status of 
the poor and disinherited as children of God; referring to Jesus’ description of God’s 
providential care (Matthew 6.26-30), he states that ‘to be assured of this becomes the 
answer to the threat of violence – yea, to violence itself. To the degree which a man 
knows this, he is unconquerable from within and without’.10 
 Thurman’s basic argument is that to fear another person is to wrongly 
estimate the relative worth of that person, oneself and God. Jesus’ response is to 
show that all persons are equally valued by God, and that as such, fear may be driven 
out. Beyond this, the knowledge of one’s worth in relation to God and other humans 
provides the inner strength to survive in the face of oppression. Of Jesus, Thurman 
suggests that ‘[b]y inference he says, “You must abandon your fear of each other and 
fear only God [...] Love your enemy”’.11 Two points are worth highlighting at this 
stage. Firstly, because of the close relation between fear and hope, it is unsurprising 
that the focal points of Thurman’s hope as noted in chapter two form the basis of his 
response to fear in this case. This emphasis emerges at several points in the book.
12
 
Secondly, this inner strength relates directly to the relationship between oppressed 
and oppressor, and as suggested in the preceding quotation, forms a crucial step in 
his reading of love for enemies. Quoting Luke 17.21, Thurman states: ‘Deep from 
within that order [Jesus] projected a dream, the logic of which would give all the 
needful security. There would be room for all, and no man would be a threat to his 
brother’.13 This link between the inner life (as in Luke 17.21) and the outer reality is 
crucial to the whole book.  
Deception is the second potential tactic for resistance. Thurman is aware that 
deception is much harder to challenge given that sometimes it will seem essential, 
but he is concerned that ultimately, deception corrodes the moral agency of the 
deceiver and thus they dehumanize themselves as they become more and more 
accustomed to deception.
14
 He argues that this is the issue behind blaspheming 
against the Holy Spirit (Matthew 9.34 and parallels), in the sense that those under 
discussion in this passage (deliberately) name something as bad that is actually 
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good.
15
 But as before, as well as noting the inner effect of deception on the self, 
Thurman focuses on how deception affects the estimation of relative status before 
God.  
 Thurman quotes Jesus’ words on speaking truthfully (Matthew 5.37) 
alongside the words of non-resistance (Matthew 5.39, 43), and asks: 
What does he mean? Does he mean that the factors having to do with 
physical survival are trivial or of no consequence? Is this emphasis merely 
the counsel of suicide? […] It may be argued that the insistence upon 
complete sincerity has only to do with man’s relation to God, not with man’s 
relation to man. […] Unwavering sincerity says that man should always 
recognize the fact that he lives in the presence of God, always under the 
divine scrutiny, and that there is no really significant living for a man, 
whatever may be his status, until he has turned and faced the divine 
scrutiny.
16
 
But Thurman then turns to the parable of judgement in Matthew 25.31-46, and draws 
out the linking of human relations with divine-human relations.  
The climax of human history is interpreted as a time when the inner 
significance of men’s deeds would be revealed to them. But here a new note 
is introduced. Sincerity in human relations is equal to, and the same as, 
sincerity to God. If we accept this explanation as a clue to Jesus’ meaning, 
we come upon the stark fact that the insistence of Jesus upon genuineness is 
absolute; man’s relation to man and man’s relation to God are one relation. A 
death blow is struck to hypocrisy.
17
 
As before, this leads Thurman to argue that sincerity has the power to effect truthful 
and equal relations between the oppressed and their enemy, because to be sincere is 
to relocate that relationship under divine judgement. Thus: 
                                                          
15
 Thurman, JD, 64. 
16
 Thurman, JD, 71. 
17
 Thurman, JD, 72. 
205 
 
 Instead of a relation between the weak and the strong there is merely a 
relationship between human beings. A man is a man [...] The awareness of 
this fact marks the supreme moment of human dignity.
18
 
Thurman reads a close relationship between Jesus’ command of sincerity and his 
challenge on the lex talionis, because he sees that both direct the oppressed to assert 
their own dignity and sense of self in relation to the oppressor, while properly 
esteeming the enemy-oppressor as an equal before God. As such, it can be seen that 
this again forms part of the backdrop to Thurman’s reading of the love command.  
Thirdly, hatred is described as ‘a source of validation for your personality [...] 
your hatred gives you a sense of significance which you fling defiantly into the teeth 
of their estimate of you’.19Again, hatred creates a skewed relationship between 
enemies because it leads to inaccurate appraisal of the relationship. Yet Thurman is 
rightly realistic about what he calls the ‘positive attributes’ of hate. Not only is it a 
logical response to enmity, but it serves as a means to undergird the rightness of a 
struggle, both for the oppressed and the oppressor. Thurman sees this taking shape in 
the lex talionis, implying that the rightness of even measured retaliation derives from 
justifying hatred of the enemy.
20
 Further, he notes that in times of war, hatred of the 
enemy becomes ‘respectable’.21  
In response to this, Thurman quotes Jesus’ command to love enemies (here, 
Matthew 5.44-45), suggesting that this constitutes Jesus’ counsel ‘against hatred’. 
From this, he argues that, ‘despite all the positive psychological attributes of hatred 
we have outlined, hatred destroys finally the core of the life of the hater’.22 The 
apparent respectability of hatred insulates the conscience of those engaged in war or 
struggle, such that the problematic nature of violence is masked. Thus, as with 
deception, hatred of the enemy can only become self destructive in the long run, 
because it ‘blinds the individual to all values of worth’.23 Again, this maps out the 
context within which Thurman reads the love command, but it does so by 
highlighting reasons for Jesus’ challenge on the lex talionis, and beyond that on any 
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form of aggressive stance towards the enemy. At this point, Thurman turns to the 
positive possibilities of love. 
 
ii) Love 
 
Bearing in mind these possible responses to the enemy-oppressor, Thurman 
turns to the subject of love, and in particular, love for those outside one’s social 
boundaries. He argues that love is central to the religion of Jesus, and reads the 
relationship between the love commands and the parable of the ‘Good Samaritan’ 
(Luke 10.25-37) as indicating that ‘neighbourliness is non-spatial; it is qualitative’.24 
For Jesus, this ethic is worked out vividly in his encounter with the Syro-Phoenician 
woman (Matthew 15.26-27, Mark 7.27-28), where in Thurman’s view he is drawn 
out of his own tradition to recognize the demands of his new ethic through the 
request of the woman.
25
 From this starting point he turns the question of love for 
enemies, examining three concentric scenarios in which that command might apply. 
In outlining these scenarios, Thurman pays equal attention to the context and life of 
Jesus and to his own context.  
Firstly, to love the personal enemy is to seek reconciliation, such that a 
relationship that was positive, within one’s own social group, is restored. For Jesus, 
this would pertain to those among his people who rejected or opposed him, and 
Thurman suggests that it is this kind of situation that stands behind Jesus’ ‘charge’ to 
be reconciled before presenting gifts at the altar (Matthew 5.23-24).
26
 He suggests 
that this is the easiest form of love for enemies, and is thus the most common 
interpretation found in churches, resulting in the following epithet; ‘Love those who 
have a natural claim upon you. To those who have no such claim, there is no 
responsibility’.27 However, he suggests that this view is too narrow, and as the 
interpretation likely to be found in both black and white churches, it fails to require 
either group to reach beyond its own boundaries.    
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The second layer refers to loving those who have become enemies by 
shaming or compromising a social group. In Jesus’ context, an example of this kind 
of enemy would be the tax collectors. Here, there is not only personal enmity, but 
potentially a deep rooted sense of betrayal which makes love all the more 
demanding. It is important to note that Thurman never suggests that loving enemies 
means ignoring their errors, and so within this category, he suggests: 
Jesus demonstrated that the only way to redeem them for the common cause 
was to penetrate their thick resistance to public opinion and esteem and lay 
bare the simple heart. This man is not just a tax-collector; he is a son of God. 
Awaken that awareness in him and he will attack his betrayal as only he can – 
from the inside.
28
 
Quoting this time Luke 6.27, he suggests that Jesus’ calling of Levi directly works 
out this imperative. This kind of love does not cover over wrongs, but is focused on 
restoring the relationship between the enemy and the group from which they have 
been separated. Again, it is focused on the humanity and identity of the enemy, and 
the political consequences follow directly from addressing the human, interpersonal 
dimension of the scenario. 
The third level relates to the enemy outside of a social group, the impersonal 
enemy that threatens the survival of the group. For Jesus, Thurman states that this 
enemy is Rome. For the disinherited black community in America, it would be the 
white holders of power. For Jesus: 
This was the hardest task, because to tamper with the enemy was to court 
disaster. To hate him in any way that caused action was to invite the wrath of 
Rome. To love him was to be regarded as a traitor to Jesus’ own people, to 
Israel, and therefore to God.
29
 
As before, the means and end of this imperative derive from the need to shift the 
relationship from the impersonal to the personal; instead of oppressed and oppressor 
remaining defined by their enmity, each had to be capable of relating to the other as 
a human being. ‘To love the Roman meant first to lift him out of the general 
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classification of enemy. The Roman had to emerge as a person’.30 But equally, 
loving the enemy-oppressor becomes for Thurman the means by which the humanity 
of the oppressed survives and flourishes; ‘The religion of Jesus says to the 
disinherited: “Love your enemy. Take the initiative in seeking ways by which you 
can have the experience of a common sharing of mutual value”’.31 
 Thurman suggests that this idea is worked out by Jesus in his encounter with 
the Roman Centurion (Matthew 8.5-13, Luke 7.3-10). This encounter (which 
immediately follows the sermon) requires the meeting of two enemies in a context of 
personal grief and need which levels the relationship. The Roman has to relinquish 
his pride in approaching Jesus: 
The Roman was confronted with an insistence that made it impossible for 
him to remain a Roman, or even a captain. He had to take his place 
alongside all the rest of humanity and mingle his desires with the longing of 
all the desperate people of all the ages. When this happened, it was possible 
at once for him to scale with Jesus any height of understanding, fellowship, 
and love.
32
 
Thurman is consistently realistic about the degree of difficulty involved in such a 
task, but is insistent that this is the most appropriate response for the sake of the 
humanity of those involved. To love the enemy is to maintain one’s humanity. So 
too, Thurman believes that the black American is called upon to see the white person 
in their humanity.
33
 This last point really summarizes the heart of Thurman’s view, a 
perspective that emerges consistently throughout the book. The call to love the 
enemy is firstly a call to see them differently from the way in which one is 
accustomed to see them, to view them as a human being like oneself, neither too low 
nor too high in status. In response to the appeal of fear, Thurman argued that: 
One of the practical results following this new orientation is the ability to 
make an objective, detached appraisal of other people, particularly one’s 
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antagonists. Such an appraisal protects one from inaccurate and exaggerated 
estimations of another person’s significance.34 
The task of loving one’s enemies, particularly in the third category where the enemy 
is an impersonal aggressor, is the task of challenging the impersonal status of the 
enemy, and thus the very category of ‘enemy’ itself.35 On the one hand, the enemy’s 
status is lowered in the sense that they are denied the ability to determine the worth 
of the oppressed. But in a sense, their status is raised inasmuch as they are seen for 
what they really are, also human beings. Thurman remains realistic about the risk of 
such love as estimation; there is no guarantee that the enemy will respond in kind by 
re-evaluating their estimation of the oppressed, and thus he is also aware that love 
for enemies is the most demanding of spiritual disciplines.
36
 But his argument is that 
attempting the hard task of loving enemies is the best way, offered by Jesus, of 
preserving the God-given humanity of the disinherited, and it is thus the best means 
for the survival of the dignity of the human person. Love for enemies remains a 
political ‘technique’ in this respect, but it is a technique that draws its force from 
addressing the humanity of the persons involved as children of God, and for 
Thurman this technique is thus rooted in the deepest of spiritual realities.  
 
2.2. Thurman as a Hopeful Reader 
 
A significant amount of scholarly energy has been spent on debating the 
scope of Jesus’ command to love enemies, with textual critics and ethicists alike 
discussing whether the ‘enemies’ (echthroi) in question are personal or political.37 
While Thurman begins by outlining three concentric layers of enemies, his work 
ultimately dismantles the distinction between personal and impersonal enemies, 
precisely because he sees loving the enemy as fundamentally concerned with their 
personhood. To describe a person as an enemy is to locate them within an 
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impersonal category, regardless of whether they had been known previously. To love 
them is to ‘lift’ them from the impersonal category by recognizing their humanity. 
Thus the so-called impersonal enemy is in fact a person, or a group comprising 
human persons, and cannot finally be described as falling within a different category 
as the personal enemy. The point is not simply that Thurman takes one particular 
perspective as to the scope of echthroi in this command. Rather, because love 
requires that all enemies be viewed as persons, there can be no distinction as to the 
range of meaning, and thus any debate itself misses the point.
38
  
 Thurman certainly understands love for enemies as a ‘technique of survival’ 
for the oppressed. While he is under no illusion that such a stance will definitely 
change oppressive structures, he is nonetheless committed to it as something which 
grounds concrete, present hope for the disinherited. We noted that Thurman sets out 
with the deliberate goal of finding something more substantial in the religion of 
Jesus, something that will offer hope for the present life, and in this respect, his 
perspective is at first glance at odds with writers such as Ulrich Luz, who argues that 
‘[l]ove-with-the-goal-of is not love and not that which Jesus has intended’.39 On the 
other hand, some commentators view love for enemies in primarily strategic terms, 
be it as an evangelistic strategy or a socio-political one.
40
 However, Thurman offers 
something of a third way, by holding on to two simultaneous aspects of love with 
regard to the enemy. On the one hand, love is indeed a means of undermining the 
enmity between persons with the hope of undoing oppression. But equally, because 
the enemy is viewed in terms of their humanity, and not their impersonal status as 
enemy, love becomes an end in itself, to the extent that human persons are an end in 
themselves. Because love is the end of the religion of Jesus, it becomes the means by 
which genuine change occurs. 
It is my argument that part of what allows Thurman to take this perspective is 
his hope. This is not to suggest that Thurman operates with a conscious hermeneutics 
of hope, but rather that his approach in this book demonstrates the kind of 
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interpretive hope for which this thesis argues. It is crucial to note that Thurman’s 
own understanding of Christian hope differs from others, and as Luther Smith 
highlights, Thurman shows little interest in post-mortem hope at all.
41
 But just as 
Thurman’s hope is grounded in created human potentiality, so too he believes that 
this potentiality may be realised in renewed community as a future hope within 
history. As noted in chapter two, while this human renewal remains latent within 
human nature for Thurman, it remains simultaneously a God-given hope. As such, 
the hermeneutical consequences of this hope remain close to those described in 
chapter three, because this hope looks to divine-human and human-human renewal in 
community, grounded in God. Thus Thurman’s hope is shaped by the possibility of 
divine-human understanding, and it takes form in the action of persevering with the 
text in the light of his hope for a renewed human community. A crucial distinction 
lies in the fact that he says little about the nature of scripture, and his ambivalence 
over Paul’s writing suggests that his perseverance does not relate to a conviction 
about the Bible per se. Thus while I will argue that he displays hope as a reader, 
towards the end of this chapter I will specify how Thurman’s example might modify 
the thesis.  
Firstly, Thurman displays perseverance in openness to the text, and this point 
is made clear through the seriousness with which he takes the general opposition to 
white Christian tradition, along with specific challenges to the concept of enemy 
love. In the case of general opposition he perseveres in seeking resources offered by 
Jesus for the survival of the oppressed, in the context of acknowledging that 
Christianity has often served as a tool of oppression. But in the specific case he fully 
acknowledges why love for enemies may be problematic, and this takes shape in his 
detailed discussions of fear, deception and hate. He treats each of these in detail 
precisely because he is able to recognize that each offers a compelling alternative to 
love, and as such each challenges the assertion that love is the best mode of life for 
the oppressed. The recognition of the seriousness of these challenges undergirds the 
necessity of persevering with close attention to (rather than merely rereading or 
reasserting) the command to love enemies. Furthermore, while it must be stressed 
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that Thurman gives no special status to the text in relation to the word of God, his 
perseverance does nonetheless relate to the possibility of encountering some kind of 
religious truth in the accounts of Jesus. While I will return to the fact that he does not 
neatly follow the thesis of chapters three and four, he does demonstrate open 
perseverance in the task of theological interpretation.  
Secondly, Thurman’s openness operates alongside his steadfast grip on hope, 
and in particular his hope grounded in the created dignity of humanity. This grasp 
clearly shapes his reading, but because he remains conscious of alternative 
perspectives (at the ethical and political level), he may be said to read with a hopeful 
imagination or construal of reality (Green’s ‘as’ faculty), rather than a blinkered bias 
of hope. In chapter two it was shown that Thurman’s perspective on hope was 
heavily grounded in the dignity inherent in humankind from being created in the 
image of God. In part, this reading of Thurman’s hope derives from Jesus and the 
Disinherited, but it is clear that in this specific discussion of love for enemies, he is 
interested in what hope Jesus’ command offers for the present day survival of the 
disinherited. However, this imminent hope can be seen to emerge from its broader 
grounding, because Thurman understands this present survival to come from an 
apprehension of one’s created and innate human worth. If love for enemies 
constitutes a truthful estimation of the self and the enemy as human persons, then 
this seems to derive from the conviction that this human identity is already, in some 
sense, a reality. Similarly, if love is understood to be genuinely effective as a 
strategy which is nonetheless focused on the inner disposition of the person, then this 
would derive from a (theological) conviction about the efficacy of love as such. For 
Thurman, love for enemies may be described as a truthful estimation of human 
relations that is effective of social change and is thus a ground for imminent hope. 
But my argument is that this interpretive possibility only makes sense within the 
theological conviction that human beings are created with innate dignity, and that 
human love is effective because in some sense it flows from divine love. In this 
sense, Thurman’s reading of love for enemies and its imminent hope seems to be 
drawn from a broader hope, expressing a perspective on reality grounded in God’s 
creation of humankind.  
Smith notes that Thurman’s thought is shaped by both hope and optimism, in 
the sense that Thurman remained temperamentally optimistic about his hope coming 
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to fruition within history. Smith concedes Thurman’s optimism is more ‘vulnerable’ 
to criticism because the witness of history towards this progress is ambiguous at 
best. Rather, Smith argues that Thurman’s hope is ‘more profound’ and: 
[...] is derived from the feeling of security, power, and meaning received 
through religious experience. Thurman’s mysticism, his reliance upon the 
God-encounter, assured him that love can be experienced in the midst of hate, 
meaning in chaos. [...] God can provide the sense of community even though 
conditions and forces would seek to prevent it.
42
 
This sense of reconstruing reality in hope is important. Thurman argued that: 
 A man need not ever be completely and utterly a victim of his circumstances 
despite the fact, to be repetitive, that he may not be able to change the 
circumstance. The clue is in the fact that a man can give his assent to his 
circumstances or he can withhold it, and there are a desert and a sea between 
the two.
43
 
Following these points I would argue that Thurman’s hope (in distinction to his 
optimism) takes action in part through the imagination as described in chapter four, 
because he seeks to construe reality and humankind as created in God’s image, and 
hence his perspective remains conscious of alternate views. The degree of this 
consciousness is hard to assess accurately, and we will presently note some critical 
questions that must be posed to his text from alternative viewpoints. However, 
Callahan argues that Thurman’s approach avoids practices that have the ‘effect of 
placing claims of faith above criticism’, because he returns to the biblical texts with 
a spirit of critical enquiry.
44
 While Thurman works with concrete theological and 
ethical questions, he remains alert to historical and critical issues with the text. In his 
opening chapter, Thurman describes how Jesus’ thought would have been shaped by 
his own situation as a marginalised Jew.
45
 Callahan observes that this focus on the 
Jewishness of Jesus was unusual at a time when European scholarship was still 
                                                          
42
 Smith, Howard Thurman, 213-4 
43
 Thurman, ‘What can we believe in?’, 117. 
44
 Callahan, Talking Book, 245. 
45
 Thurman, JD, 16-19. 
214 
 
largely interested in Jesus apart from his Jewish context.
46
 It may be Thurman’s own 
ready identification with this aspect of Jesus that allows him to anticipate the 
direction that interest in the historical Jesus would later take. Yet at the same time, 
Thurman does not attempt to explain Jesus as only a product of his time, as though in 
the end there was nothing distinctive about Jesus: 
Any explanation of Jesus in terms of psychology, politics, economics, 
religion, or the like must inevitably explain his contemporaries as well. It 
may well tell why Jesus was a particular kind of Jew, but not why some other 
Jews were not Jesus. And that is, after all, the most important question, since 
the thing which makes him most significant is not the way in which he 
resembles his fellows but the way in which he differed from all the rest of 
them.
47
 
Taking all this into account, it is my judgement that Thurman’s reading may 
properly be described as hopeful because it derives from his grasp on an imaginative 
construal of reality that remains conscious of other perspectives. 
 
2.3. Critical Questions 
 
As noted in the introduction, Thurman is a particularly accessible writer, and 
as such it is worth considering some alternative perspectives on love for enemies 
within the African American and Black liberation tradition. This task is particularly 
important in order to establish that he does not appear hopeful because of his 
accessibility. To clear the groundwork for my own rereading, it will be necessary to 
explore how other writers draw out the more challenging aspects latent within 
Thurman’s work. 
 Much of James Cone’s work fits well with Thurman’s but in his vigorous 
engagement with politics and Black Power, he outlines this problem with great 
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clarity. Cone describes two crucial problems with regard to love for enemies, as 
viewed from the perspective of the oppression of black Americans. Firstly, Cone 
noted the disenchantment that emerged towards Martin Luther King’s non-violence, 
suggesting that black Americans in the 1960s could not be expected to love their 
enemies until they had learned to love themselves. He cites Malcolm X’s observation 
that ‘[i]t’s not possible to love a man whose chief purpose in life is to humiliate you 
and still be what is considered to be a normal human being’.48 Immediately we can 
see a very different perspective to the one described in Thurman’s work; for 
Malcolm X, love for enemies dehumanizes, whereas Thurman believes the opposite.  
It is almost impossible for an outside observer to attempt to arbitrate between these 
two claims, except to note that in different ways both Malcolm X and Howard 
Thurman speak from their own experience and convictions. Cone however described 
his work as standing at the intersection of these two perspectives, inasmuch as he 
attempts to grapple much more directly with the Black Power movement as it 
emerged.
49
 As a result, he is much more circumspect about the possibilities for 
loving one’s enemies, particularly as it seems too close to the theology of white 
Christianity. 
 There are broadly two aspects to this problem. The first is that love for 
enemies has been used to directly or consciously undermine black liberation. Cone 
notes that this was a problem early in the emergence of Black theology, where even 
the concept of Black theology as such was seen as divisive and contrary to Christian 
love.
50
 More recently, Robert Beckford has argued that love for enemies was used to 
pacify slaves and thus undermine any possible change: 
From my analysis, ‘enemy love’ was probably grounded in a corrupt teaching 
to Caribbean slaves. Certain forms of African-Caribbean Christianity taught 
that a literal reading of Matthew 5:38-44 (loving your enemies) would 
enhance personal piety. Under this scheme retribution for the wicked would 
come from God, beyond history.
51
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While Beckford does not refer directly to Thurman, the latter’s interest in what might 
be termed piety suggests that his work, while in a different context, might stumble 
against the same problem. In any case, it could well be argued that for a white 
thinker to hold up Thurman as a good exegete is to take the place of the oppressor, 
highlighting the inward aspects of love for enemies in a way that undermines the 
need for social change in the present. There is no straightforward response to this 
issue, but a significant amount of the discussion would turn on whether or not it is 
agreed that Thurman’s belief in the genuine efficacy of love and the nature of the 
human person is well founded. But if Thurman’s argument is to be accepted, then his 
writing ceases to be as comfortable for the privileged reader than it might at first 
have seemed. As stated above, my aim is not to rest with Thurman as though the 
search for a hopeful reading were over. Rather, it is to suggest that his reading must 
be allowed to reshape a reading of the text in my own context, taking into account 
his own estimation of the context of oppression. The argument of this thesis has been 
that to read in hope with a writer like Thurman is to allow the present context to be 
challenged by his writing. Only when this task has commenced will we be able to 
return to this issue. 
 The second dimension to this problem is more insidious, and for Cone occurs 
when white ‘help’ actually serves to hinder black liberation.  
It seems that whites forget about the necessary interrelatedness of love, 
justice and power when they encounter black people. Love becomes 
emotional and sentimental. This sentimental, condescending love accounts 
for their desire to “help” by relieving the physical pains of the suffering 
blacks so they can satisfy their own religious piety and keep the poor 
powerless.
52
 
He notes that it was the assumption that whites knew what was best for the civil 
rights movement that led to their exclusion from various marches in the 1960s.
53
 
This is a particularly complex problem because while Cone remains opposed to 
separation, he was far more vehement in his opposition to white involvement in 
black liberation, stating that ‘[w]hite people must be made to realize that 
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reconciliation is a costly experience’.54 On this point, he openly disagreed with 
James Deotis Roberts’ work in Liberation and Reconciliation. While Roberts was 
very much aware of the need for social change, Cone argued that he was too ready to 
allow blacks and whites to work together without sufficient confrontation over white 
oppression. He believed that Roberts’ approach would allow whites to become 
involved without having to face up to their collusion with injustice, and in turn 
allowing whites to ‘set the terms’ for reconciliation.55 As far as the white 
sympathizers were concerned, Cone stated that: ‘We must make it clear to them that 
we will not be distracted from our liberation with their obscene talk about “love” and 
“forgiveness”’.56 
 Despite his gentler tone, Thurman seems well aware of this problem. In order 
to humanize the enemy and thus ‘attack [...] the enemy status’, points of contact and 
genuine fellowship were needed. But Thurman noted that all too often, positive 
contact remained framed within a master-servant relationship, and thus inequality 
was enshrined and masked by the relatively good natured mood of the context. 
Thurman described this as ‘a kind of armistice for purposes of economic security’.57 
Nonetheless, he saw no alternative than to find points of contact, and particularly in 
the context of worship where the objective reality was at least that all would be equal 
before God, even when this was at odds with the subjective reality.
58
 
 While Cone’s earlier writing has a more militant tone in contrast to Thurman, 
I do not wish to oppose him to Thurman. Far from it; the dangerous suggestion that 
reconciliation can occur without cost must be challenged with full force, and it shall 
be argued that Christian love must be most costly for the powerful. Rather, there are 
certain key similarities between their work that allow us to see the ways in which 
Thurman’s thought fits the agenda of liberation, potentially over against any agenda 
that may be prematurely imposed upon him. 
 Firstly, Cone is highly sympathetic towards Thurman’s focus on the dignity 
and worth of the oppressed as human beings created by God. While noting the limits 
of Thurman’s theological analysis, Cone remarks upon the profundity of Thurman’s 
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work on the spirituals, particularly with reference to the ‘somebodiness’ of the slaves 
in the face of a context that denied them their value as persons.
59
 While we noted 
divergent views over how to effect a sense of self love or self worth, Cone agrees 
with Thurman that it is a core issue, and that the love of God defines the worth of the 
person over and against any definition imposed by another human being.
60
 In turn 
this discovery is crucial to becoming involved in the struggle for freedom. Michael 
Brown recalls an anecdote used by Thurman to argue that the struggle for freedom is 
innate to all beings created by God. Thurman had described how, when younger, he 
trod on a snake and realised that its struggle for freedom reflected the struggle for 
freedom embarked upon by all who experience oppression. Brown notes that: 
If Thurman’s claim regarding liberation is correct, as black theologians 
believe it is, then the eminent example of freedom is God. Freedom, an 
essential aspect of God that makes God who God is, is a property of existence 
that God bestows on all living beings as such.
61
 
In this sense, while Thurman appears more focused on the spiritual, inner life, and 
Cone on the political, the inner and outer worlds are explicitly linked by both 
writers.
62
  
The second point worth noting concerns whether or not love does, in the end, 
pacify those who have a justified demand for justice. Again, it is easy to read this 
problem into Thurman’s focus on the inner life, and thus ignore any political potency 
within his work. Can love for the enemy be reconciled with a just desire to call the 
enemy to account, when the enemy has in fact perpetrated gross injustices? 
Numerous writers have argued that it can, and must be. For both Cone and Roberts, 
the key point is to recognize that God’s love must be understood to be interwoven 
with God’s power and righteousness.  
I submit that a God who is absolute in both power and goodness makes sense 
to blacks. Absolute goodness is important as well as absolute power. 
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Absolute power ensures the ultimate triumph of the good; but absolute 
goodness assures us that absolute power will not be abused.
63
 
 But the new blacks, redeemed in Christ, must refuse their “help” and demand 
that blacks be confronted as persons. They must say to whites that authentic 
love is not “help”, not giving Christmas baskets but working for political, 
social, and economic justice, which always means a redistribution of power.
64
 
The need for confrontation derives from the nature of God as judge, and the 
concomitant need to assert the personhood of the oppressed.
65
 Beckford’s God of the 
Rahtid again articulates this issue, formulating a concept of ‘redemptive vengeance’, 
described as: 
[...] a way of responding to injustice that redeems both the sufferer and the 
perpetrator. In this sense vengeance is a form of retaliation geared towards 
the salvation of both the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. In essence redemptive 
vengeance is the process of returning evil with good.
66
 
This calls to mind a range of other contexts where love leads to confrontation with 
the hope of liberating both the oppressed and the oppressor. It is found in Desmond 
Tutu’s writing on the Truth and Reconciliation commission,67 and among a range of 
Latin American liberation theologians on the liberation of the rich.
68
 Given these 
points of reference, if we concede that love genuinely can and must accommodate 
calling the enemy to account, then it will be possible to retain this thread from within 
Thurman’s own work. For example, we noted that Thurman’s description of 
sincerity became the means to unravel the deceptive tendencies of the oppressor.
69
 In 
this sense, if Thurman is a hopeful interpreter, it is not because he offers us a vision 
of love that covers over injustice. As such, any privileged reader of Thurman must 
engage with the fact that in Thurman’s view, the humanization of the oppressor 
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requires them to sacrifice their pride and status. If my own reading is to draw on 
Thurman, it must begin with this point.  However, before we consider such a 
reading, we will now turn to the second set of interlocutors on this text.  
 
3.1. People to People Peace in Southern Sudan  
 
 In this section, love for enemies will be explored in the work of the New 
Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), in the period at the turn of the millennium. In 
Howard Thurman’s writing on love for enemies, the enemy in question was 
identified primarily, and naturally, as the oppressor. However, Thurman argued that 
for the most part, churches read the command as referring to localised disputes only, 
and as such his aim was to argue that it should also pertain to the enemy-oppressor. 
In this section, we will focus on an aspect of conflict within Southern Sudan where 
the enemies in question are apparently more evenly matched. ‘Apparently’ is an 
important qualifier, firstly because the Sudanese conflict has been so complex, but 
secondly, as we shall see towards the end of the section, because the nature of any 
conflict will be construed differently by the various parties involved. While a 
superficial characterisation of a conflict might portray two groups as evenly 
matched, the experience of individuals or sub-groups may well be one of oppression 
and helplessness. As a result, the Sudanese situation highlights the complex interplay 
of different levels of conflict, and thus the reflections of love for enemies will also 
display this complexity. Furthermore, this section will explore a different kind of 
interpretive medium, drawing on documentary evidence for actual peace building 
initiatives. In particular, this approach gives focus to Nicholas Lash’s assertion, 
noted in chapter one, that ‘the fundamental form of the Christian interpretation of 
scripture is the life, activity and organization of the believing community’.70 
Alongside commentary and interpretations of the events, the aim of this section is to 
argue that the NSCC peace initiative was in itself, as understood by the NSCC, a 
hopeful interpretation of the command to love enemies.  
3.2. Background to Conflict 
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International description of Sudan has often focused on conflict, primarily 
because the country slipped into civil war not long after its independence from 
condominium rule in 1956.
71
 Since then, the conflict was characterised in British 
journalism as being fought between the Arab, Muslim North, and the African, 
Christian South. While this is a useful shorthand, it does not do justice to the 
situation, particularly since the second civil war which began in 1983. While the 
North-South dimension of conflict was dominant, the South became increasingly 
troubled by internal conflicts between various tribes or ethnic groups within the 
region.
72
  This dimension of conflict grew out of pre-existing disputes over issues 
such as fishing and grazing rights, but was exacerbated by the influx of modern 
weaponry.
73
 Furthermore, these tribal distinctions ran through the liberation 
movement, leading for example to a serious split within the SPLA/M in 1991.
74
 This 
split forms the backdrop to the growth of the People to People Peace initiative (PPP) 
of the NSCC. 
This problem of tribal conflict between Southern groups grew during the 
second war, and it becomes increasingly prevalent in Christian literature during that 
period. Even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2005 and Southern independence in July 2011, it is not hard to find references to the 
problem of internal Southern conflicts.
75
 In 2000, an NSCC review of its attempts to 
broker peace within the South described the problem as having been compounded by 
the civil war: 
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Inevitably, such a context became a fertile ground for the cultivation of 
“tribalism” and the manipulation of ethnic violence by elite groups in the 
sub-regions. This is true of how the northern based governments and regimes 
have administered power in southern Sudan. However, it is also true of how 
many of the southern liberation movements have organised their internal 
affairs: wilfully allowing ethnic fault lines to persist rather than harnessing 
their cultural richness as an inspiration for the unity of the Sudanese people. 
As a result, forces of unity and disunity have become interwoven in the 
southern Sudan people’s contest for liberation. This trend has continued up to 
present times.
76
 
This is by no means a neutral assessment of the situation, but it does reflect a 
widespread perception of the problem within the Sudanese Churches. Indeed, it is 
precisely the NSCC’s lack of neutrality that makes it an interest focus in our study, 
as it attempted actively to address the problem of ‘tribalism’ thus perceived. The 
above quotation comes from a review of the NSCC’s ‘People to People Peace’ (PPP) 
initiatives, and it is this process of tackling tribal conflicts that will be examined in 
this section. In particular, the review dates from a year after the historic Dinka-Nuer 
West Bank conference, held at the village of Wunlit on the West bank of the Nile 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Wunlit’). In Wheeler’s assessment ‘there can be little doubt 
that the most hopeful event at the close of the 1990s was the signing of the Wunlit 
Covenant and Resolutions in March 1999’.77 
At Christmas 1999, the year of the Wunlit conference, Catholic Cardinal 
Zubeir Wako wrote: 
We have to add a new chapter to our presence in Sudan. In that chapter, we 
will no longer identify ourselves as Ndogo, Zande, Nuer, Dinka, Lotuho [...] 
with each one claiming for himself the right to jump at the other’s throats [...] 
but simply as “Children of God!” – that means, Brothers and Sisters.78 
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At first glance there is a shift here from earlier perspectives where tribal distinctions 
were seen as gift, provided that they did not descend into conflict.
79
 However, it is 
probably necessary to see the rhetorical force in these words; it is unlikely that Wako 
or any other writer sees Southern diversity as negative per se, but the will for 
peaceful resolutions drives the need for powerful exhortations during this period. 
Bishop Francis Loyo, of the Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) perhaps best 
describes the careful balance between unity and diversity that was sought at the time 
by church leaders. Writing in the NSCC newsletter in 2000, Loyo argues that diverse 
ethnic groups and cultures are in themselves to be valued, but that ‘in this 
community [the church in Sudan], God affirms the humanity of all ethnic groups 
equally’.80 The year before, celebrating the centenary of the Sudanese Episcopal 
Church (ECS), Loyo wrote: 
The Church in the Sudan advocates a human community that is not only 
based on the similarity of its members – the same race and same language, 
the same class, the same views and the same morals. These are the things 
that always bind people together. We find people who are different from us 
disturbing. That is why we love our friends and hate our enemies and 
despise strangers. [...] The Christian Church lives quite differently to this 
law of homogeneity. It lives in recognition of other people in their 
otherness, and that means reconciliation.
81
 
This perspective represents a crucial tension at the heart of the PPP; on the one hand, 
tribal diversity remains affirmed along with various aspects of traditional culture. 
But the urgent need for peace drives with it a sustained reflection of unity within the 
Church, and the wider cultures. It is a tension that NSCC itself experienced, an 
ecumenical body from its start and thus also subject to the same challenges.
82
 
One of the NSCC founders, Catholic Bishop Paride Taban reflected that 
‘many friends of Sudan are very keen on relief work but spending on relief alone is 
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like fattening a cow for slaughter, so how long can one be doing this work without 
dealing with the root causes of the war and poverty’.83 Thus the PPP became a means 
to focus on one of these ‘root causes’: internal Southern conflicts. Taban himself 
remained publically active in promoting peace with the North and within the South, 
and in a pithy, practical manner. Referring back to the second war in a 2010 speech, 
Taban reflected: 
Sometimes, I was told by Friends: "commander so and so wants to kill you 
Bishop Taban, be careful". When I heard this, I took my car and drive [sic] to 
Commanders' house and took Cup of Coffee with him, played with his 
children. Some People who heard such things told about them, feared and 
fled the Country. I remained with the People till the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
84
 
 
This anecdote reflects Taban’s outlook that reconciliation is a fundamentally 
relational, rather than legal, activity, and that enemies must be sought out with 
love.
85
 This practical approach perhaps stands behind Taban’s development on the 
Kuron Peace Village from the late 1990s. In 1998, Taban was involved in the 
construction of a bridge across the Kuron River to link the Upper Nile region with 
Eastern Equatoria.  
Eighty-one families of different ethnic groups from Toposa, Jiye, Murle, 
Nyangatom and Kachipo decided, on their own, to settle around the bridge in 
order to protect it. Although these communities trace their origin to a 
common ancestry, they view themselves as traditional enemies due to cattle 
raiding, competition for control and access to natural resources, mainly water 
sources and grazing land.
86
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Taban describes how the bridge exacerbated the problem of cattle raiding by giving 
better access to other land, and yet by focusing efforts on the diverse community that 
gathered round the bridge, the village itself began to turn traditional enemies into 
neighbours. This particular example of inter-tribal peace building is slightly more 
isolated and perhaps esoteric than the PPP, but it is worth noting here because of the 
way in which Taban has construed what has happened. Taban, as with other Church 
leaders seems to describe the tribal peace efforts in terms of traditional enemies 
learning to love one another, or become neighbours. The enemy status derives from a 
number of factors, but the most common is cattle raiding or other issues that 
essentially relate to the welfare and livelihood of the group. In other words, a key 
factor in making groups enemies is the conflict of welfare interests, and thus to 
challenge the enemy status is to seek a common solution to the problem of survival. 
In practice, tribal conflict is far more complex, but this aspect does emerge 
frequently, and it is worth highlighting because it suggests one reason as to why 
different groups become enemies. In turn, ‘loving enemies’ is often related to 
seeking their welfare. A 2002 paper for the Sudan Catholic Bishops Regional 
Conference defines reconciliation by taking account of the relational aspects, and the 
need for the desire for common welfare: 
Reconciliation is a process of agreement between formerly opposing persons 
or groups (enemies) who agree to respect and not to violate the basic dignity 
and human rights of the other party and to cooperate for better with the other 
party in aspects of life that foster the common good of both.
87
 
 
 
 
3.3. The Wunlit Conference 
 
The increasing availability of modern weaponry during the second war turned 
once small scale, local conflicts over issues like cattle raiding, into something far 
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more devastating.
88
 However, as noted above, a number of other issues created 
serious conflicts between Southern groups, particularly with military and political 
opposition to the North. In 1991 there was a serious split within the SPLA/M, 
primarily between the Dinka and Nuer, two of the largest groups within the South. 
Division along military and tribal lines inevitably carried with it division along 
denominational lines, which in turn threatened the NSCC as an ecumenical body. 
The NSCC’s initial connection with Torit meant that it was easily associated with 
John Garang, the SPLA and the Dinka, and thus its neutrality amid the conflict was 
hard to maintain.
89
 At the same time, the NSCC’s ability to challenge various 
practices of the SPLA meant that the relationship between the two was also fraught.  
 During the 1990s, and especially the latter years, the NSCC worked to broker 
peace between these various groups, culminating in the most famous and best 
documented meeting at Wunlit in 1999. A number of other meetings had led up to 
this conference, with the ultimate aim of agreeing a covenant of peace between the 
two groups, through bringing them together in dialogue. As a result, the majority of 
the several days of the conference were spent in storytelling, with Dinka and Nuer 
chiefs and others given the chance to explain their grievances and respond to 
accusations. The conference included Christian prayers and worship, generally led 
by members of the NSCC. However, the NSCC was always clear that the process 
should be indigenous, understanding its role as a broker of peace and not as the 
bringer of peace.
90
 Thus, Wunlit also included the sacrifice of a white bull (Mabior), 
a traditional reconciliation ritual. The ritual involves the idea of directing the 
antagonism between the two groups into the bull, which is then killed, and the meat 
shared.
91
 It has been noted that the nature of the sacrifice allows for some quite 
natural links to be drawn with the crucifixion of Christ, leading to understanding the 
cross as a means of reconciliation between people as well as with God.
92
 In a similar 
sense, sharing the meat of the bull offers a logical counterpart to the Eucharist. While 
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Nikkel and Stancliffe agree that the Eucharist was not celebrated widely at the time, 
it is at times described in primarily reconciliatory terms.
93
 
 The Churches’ construal of the Wunlit conference draws on the concept of 
love for enemies. Early in the NSCC account of the PPP, it is stated: 
Jesus repeatedly teaches and demonstrates that the practice of love is the will 
of God – He says that the greatest of the commandments is to love God 
wholly, and the second one is to love your neighbour as yourself. Christians 
are called to love neighbours, and strangers, and adversaries, and even 
enemies. Jesus urged non-violence, and the practice of love as the way for his 
disciples, such as turning the other cheek to violence.
94
 
As in other cases, this quotation seems to contain a mixture of reflection and 
exhortation, but the clear sense is that conflicting parties are being called upon to 
love their enemy. Conferences like Wunlit thus became a framework within which 
this activity might begin. Although Wunlit ended with the signing of a formal 
covenant agreement, the NSCC’s desire for the people to own the process, and the 
narrative character of the process itself, suggest that the relational element was 
understood to be primary. The above mention of non-violence is likely to serve as a 
rhetorical function rather than suggesting pacifist ethics, partly because the NSCC 
did maintain links with the SPLA, and partly because in the context of Southern 
conflict resolution, non-violence would at times be quite a practical possibility.   
 Similarly, on the first day of Nuer narratives at Wunlit, John Akumo 
preached on love for enemies: 
God tells us that we must love our enemies. Humanly speaking this is very 
difficult. But if you are a true Christian you must love your enemy. By doing 
so, even the word Jellaba will not come into your mouth. For God has said 
you must love your enemy. This is expressed in Luke 6:37, you may read this 
exhortation. I want to read but one verse: "But love your enemies. Do good to 
them, and lend to them without expecting to get anything back. Then your 
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reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, because he is 
kind to the ungrateful, and the wicked."
95
 
While this sermon was primarily directed to the Dinka-Nuer conflict, it is interesting 
to note the comment about the word ‘Jellaba’ a derogatory word for the Arab people 
of the North. As in Wako and Taban, this suggests that love for enemies is not seen 
as a localised requirement, and yet it is important to note that the word does in fact 
appear several times in the narrative records. On the first day, Salvar Kiir spoke thus: 
The Jelaba is our enemy. Let us put our efforts toward building up our true 
friends. Our true friends are peace and reconciliation and unity. Our real 
enemy, the Jelaba Government in Khartoum, shall, with absolute certainty, 
be defeated, and the New Sudan be born.
96
 
Similarly, one of the Nuer chiefs, Peter Rin Patai Kun, describing the uniting of 
Southern people suggests that ‘When our enemy, the Jilaab hears this, he will be 
angry and become ill’.97 The significance of these comments lies in the fact that 
many of the participants at Wunlit describe the process in terms of the reconciliation 
of Southern brothers or neighbours, alongside uniting against a common enemy. In 
other words, love for enemies as such is not seen by all as an aspect of the process. 
This is not always the case; six months after Wunlit, an NSCC progress report offers 
an unnamed quotation that states that the two groups ‘have moved from being 
enemies to brothers and sister. Now our unity strengthens the security for both Dinka 
and Nuer’.98 A further quotation suggests that the result of the process ‘is no longer a 
Dinka and Nuer peace. It is the way to unite the whole South and bring peace to all 
of Sudan. Those who fought against their neighbours are now joining the peace. 
Everyone is welcome’.99 These reflections suggest that participants were open to the 
idea of reconciliation between enemies, including those beyond the Southern 
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boundaries. Having said that, the fact that they are part of an NSCC report suggests 
that they may have been singled out to reinforce the NSCC description of the 
process. It is worth noting that the NSCC was worried about the idea of uniting the 
South against a common enemy, partly on theoretical grounds, and partly because 
such unity would be undermined if peace was made with the North.
100
 
 The crucial point here is that the same process of reconciliation has been 
construed in at least two distinct ways. Some of the participants saw Wunlit in terms 
of the reuniting of brothers who shared a common heritage and bond, a bond not 
shared with the Arab people of the North. On day four, the Dinka Dr Michael Wal 
Duony appealed to the Nuer in the following terms; ‘I invite the Nuer chiefs what 
has gone wrong that we, children of one mother, should have fought each other for 
so many years’.101 Similarly, a year on, Awut Aweil representing the Dinka women 
described the result of Wunlit; ‘Our children have not died in the hands of our own 
brothers, no more hostilities between two brothers’.102 While none of this is to 
suggest that the participants did not also want peace with the North, the basis for 
Southern peace was drawn from a common heritage. Indeed the NSCC shared this 
perspective, noting that through certain shared aspects of culture, including creation 
myths, ‘the Dinka and the Nuer view themselves as “brothers”’.103 This basis would 
be even more crucial when the PPP addressed conflicts within the Nuer as a single 
group. While the emphasis on brotherhood through a shared history is a strong one 
for reuniting conflicting groups, the narratives at Wunlit suggest that it is also more 
effective on the local scale. 
 By contrast, the connection of Wunlit specifically with love for enemies 
comes primarily from the Church. While the NSCC did appeal to common bonds, 
the language of love for enemies suggests a slightly different basis for resolving 
conflict, and to some extent this construes the conflict itself differently. This 
construal derives its force from the teaching of Jesus, and thus conflict resolution 
becomes a kind of ethical imperative. The problem is that for this particular 
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imperative to be effective, it is necessary for the parties to see themselves as enemies 
in the first place, and it is not clear that the participants at Wunlit all did. However, it 
seems that the Churches’ own role in the process suggests that they did recognize the 
enmity between Dinka and Nuer as making them enemies. From this perspective, it 
follows that the internal Southern conflict and the North-South conflict fall under the 
same imperative, because there is no suggestion that enemies need a common bond 
in order to love one another. Having said that, Cardinal Wako in particular suggests 
that love for enemies does derive from the restoration of a common bond, but in his 
view this common bond is found in the fact of being human, and thus love for 
enemies pertains to any form of human reconciliation. In one of his prayer-poems, 
Wako writes; 
Your birth, Lord, is the Father’s hymn  
To the glory of every man and woman, 
In you each one of them 
Is the Father’s precious gift to the others.104 
 
The poem goes on to reflect on the value of all, including ‘oppressors and 
persecutors’ with the hope of ‘building a new world/ In which each and every man 
and woman/ Will become a living image of God, Perfect as the Heavenly Father is’. 
In this respect he intermingles the reconciling imperatives of enemy love and the 
restoration of common bonds. 
 The point of this discussion is to suggest that varying perspectives on Wunlit 
demonstrate the complexity of the categories of ‘friend’ or ‘neighbour’ and ‘enemy’. 
It might be suggested that for some of the Wunlit participants, those who had begun 
as neighbours or brothers had become estranged, and thus needed to return to their 
original friendship; in this view, there is no particular imperative to reconcile with 
the enemy because the enemy as such does not share this bond. On the other hand, 
even if it is conceded that enemies need not share a common bond, the Church 
recognized in the command to love enemies an imperative to seek friendship with 
them, regardless of whether or not these enemies had been neighbours previously. In 
this sense, reconciliation shifts from restoring a common bond, to creating one with 
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the enemy. Thirdly, and particularly in the writing of Wako, these two perspectives 
are drawn together by suggesting that all humankind shares a common bond. As 
such, the category of enemy inherently refers to a person with whom one shares this 
bond, but with whom one is at odds. Thus the emphasis shifts back to restoring a 
common bond, whilst retaining the category of the enemy. This may seem like an 
over analysis of the situation, but it is crucial to assessing the scope of the command 
‘love your enemies’, and furthermore it demonstrates how theological perspectives 
on human reality shape the interpretation of both the text and the interpretive 
context. This complexity means that our conclusions as to the ‘meaning’ of the PPP 
must be tentative, but it is possible to suggest ways in which a theological 
perspective has shaped the Churches’ reading of text and context, and thus ways in 
which this reading might be described as hopeful.  
 
3.4. The Church at Wunlit as a Hopeful Interpreter 
 
 The argument so far is that the Church at Wunlit has construed that peace 
conference at least in part as a response to the command to love enemies, and that as 
such, we may describe the conference itself as an interpretation of this command. 
Given this, a couple of points are worth highlighting. Firstly, love for enemies seems 
to have a strong practical aspect; the context of enmity was focused on the welfare 
and livelihood of each group, and in the context of peacemaking, love thus comes to 
connote a practical concern for the needs of the ‘enemy’ group. But the structure of 
the conference itself suggests that love is not understood to be purely instrumental. 
The time given to individual storytelling in particular, along with the rituals of 
reconciliation, show that love is understood as an expression of the common bond 
between peoples, and that love inherently requires attention to each other. The 
potentially impersonal enemy from the other group is listened to, and through this 
activity of love they become known, in some sense, personally. Finally, while no 
commentator was naïve about the possible results, there were indicators that love 
was understood to be inherently effective. In other words, the practical effect of love 
does not depend on it being understood in purely instrumental terms.  
232 
 
 There are two senses in which the Wunlit ‘reading’ may be seen to be 
hopeful. Firstly, it was argued that hopeful readers persevere through difficulties, 
open to hearing God in some way. While there is little documentation of exegetical 
perseverance as might be found in a written commentary, the shape of Wunlit 
demonstrates a corporate perseverance, at least from the Churches’ perspective, in 
bringing the text to bear on the actions of the people. In my judgement this is 
particularly clear in the storytelling aspect. As noted, it could be possible to 
characterise the conflict in question as relatively even, given the means and status of 
the groups or tribes involved. From this, it could be possible to read love for enemies 
in relatively general terms as a command for reconciliation. However, the difficulty 
with this superficial reading emerges when one pays attention to the specific 
instances of conflict, and the individual grievances of the persons involved. At this 
level, it can be seen that the conflict will not be perceived as equal at all, because one 
individual may only have suffered at the hands of the enemy, and may not have 
directly perpetrated any wrong themselves. As a result, the command to love the 
enemy becomes a far more costly and troubling command, because the grievance 
brought forward is genuine and the conflict feels one-sided. In the context of this far 
more difficult approach to conflict resolution, it requires greater perseverance to 
speak about love for enemies because this command is no longer read with regard to 
a superficial characterisation of the situation. It is my suggestion that to persevere 
with openness to this command, whilst simultaneously focusing on the complexity of 
the conflict demonstrates the action of hope in reading.  
 Secondly, it was argued that reading hopefully aids the perception of 
possibilities in the text according to divine promise and presence. As before, this 
hermeneutic is never made explicit in the sense that there is no self-conscious 
attempt to read hopefully. Rather, the reading associated with Wunlit displays the 
action of hope implicitly. The Church seems to be able to see beyond the present 
conflicts to the possibility of enemies becoming friends. Indeed, by using the 
language of love, enemies and friends, there is a stronger sense in which the process 
is expected to transcend present reality than would be the case if it were described 
solely in terms of reconciling estranged brothers and sisters. Beyond restoring what 
may once have been the case, there is a sense in which the text is read to point to an 
imminent new reality which will itself point beyond to further reconciliation. Even if 
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the idea of love for enemies is used in tandem with the assertion of a common 
humanity, there remains the sense of pointing beyond present conflicts to a total 
renewal, and this is why it makes sense for writers such as Wako to blend the 
reflections on the internal Southern conflicts with reflections on the North-South 
conflict. As before, the distinction between types of enemies is at times dissolved by 
the hope of total human renewal. At times the rhetorical force of much of the 
documentation masks any sense in which the perspective of hope constitutes an 
imaginative construal as opposed to a blinkered viewpoint. In this respect, it is 
harder to argue that any of the readers involved read with hope as opposed to 
optimism. On the other hand, the very context makes it almost impossible to suggest 
that the perspective of the readers emerges from an unqualified optimism; the belief 
in the possibility of transcendence is rarely expressed without any reference to the 
myriad competing forces that imply hopelessness.
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
 In this section I have attempted to show that while the Churches’ 
interpretation of Wunlit differs from some of the participants, there are clear 
indicators that the Churches’ own involvement was understood to incorporate a 
reading of the command to love enemies. I have noted ways in which this 
understanding displays both perseverance, and the sense of ‘pointing beyond’ that 
manifests the hope of the readers. It was noted that from an external perspective, the 
Southern conflicts may appear relatively even, but that part of the perseverance of 
the Church was shown in working beyond the superficial level to hear individual 
experiences. This means that in our reading of these events, care must be taken not to 
characterise the conference as superficially hopeful, as though the process was 
uncomplicated. To suggest that Wunlit counts as a hopeful reading is not to suggest 
that the external observer may draw hope from it without recognizing the challenge 
its inherent complexities pose to their own interpretive context. It is only hopeful 
because it pays close attention to the complexities. Bearing this in mind, it is 
necessary to return to my ‘home’ context of interpretation, to complete the test case 
of hopeful reading. Here, the task is to consider how the readings of Thurman and 
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Wunlit might reshape a reading of the text in my own situation in a manner that 
coheres with the hope displayed in those situations.  
 
4.1. Returning to the ‘home’ context 
 
 In chapter four it was argued that to read in hope entails reading alongside 
diverse other readers, and this chapter has been structured as a whole towards testing 
this argument in practice. So far, two interpretive contexts have been discussed, and 
thus it is now time to return to the ‘home’ context in order to explore ways in which 
the above readings might reshape a reading at home. This task is crucial to the 
argument because it will not do to imply that the readings discussed are hopeful for 
my own context because they are relatively positive in outlook. In fact, both manifest 
hope but the readings present quite serious challenges to the privileged reader.  
 Because this rereading is my own, it is a far more problematic task to show 
that I display the kind of interpretive hope that was highlighted above, and as such I 
will not attempt to argue that my reading is hopeful in the same way. While it is 
rarely acknowledged in studies of interpretive virtue, the success of this reading does 
partially depend on an external observer evaluating whether or not it manifests virtue 
in some way, and so my principal aim is simply to outline some concrete 
possibilities from this thesis. The more modest aim of this section is to demonstrate 
the potential implications of reading with others in the manner described in chapter 
four, by offering a reading which takes seriously the perspectives examined thus far, 
and seeks theological coherence with them whilst focusing on the specificity of my 
own context.  
 
 
 
4.2. Who is my enemy? 
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The identity of the enemy is a crucial factor for the interpretation of Jesus’ 
command, and it is brought into sharp focus by the contexts discussed above. For 
Thurman, the obvious enemy would be the white power-holder, while in Southern 
Sudan the enemy may be either the Northern government or another tribal group. Yet 
in both situations it is striking that the command is not read within the limited scope 
of the context; particularly in Thurman, it is clear that any kind of enemy falls within 
the imperative of love, even when the enemy is an oppressor. From my own 
perspective, it is worth asking to what extent the texts will sustain this reading, but 
more importantly, how they relate to readers who are oppressors, or who are at least 
privileged in some way.  
 In much western discussion of the texts, scholars tend to divide over whether 
echthroi refers to disputes within local communities (e.g. Horsley) or whether it does 
speak to the question of military violence and political threat (e.g. Hays).
105
 This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the debates occur in a context that raises questions 
over local antagonism and global military action. But given that in wider usage 
echthroi can refer to all kinds of enemies, it is worth considering whether the 
readings examined here rightly shed light on this question, and thus in turn raise 
other dimensions of the text that are germane to western readers. 
 Horsley is right to highlight that in the ‘focal instances’ of love for enemies, 
local, interpersonal interaction must be in view. Doing good or lending to enemies 
(Luke 6.35, Matthew 5.42) requires the possibility of local interaction, just as those 
who mistreat Jesus’ hearers must also be in some sense personally present.106 While 
this does suggest that in its immediate context of usage, echthroi refers to enemies 
who are personally present, Horsley is wrong to suggest that this means they must be 
local or personal enemies from within a small-scale social group. Thurman was 
particularly aware of this point, describing how even in the context of worship it was 
possible to identify enmity between two groups – the dominant and the oppressed – 
who were nonetheless personally present, and known to each other.
107
 This led him 
to the case of the Roman centurion who sought Jesus’ help and as in the general 
case, the Roman, who embodies the ‘impersonal’ category, ‘had to emerge as a 
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person’.108 Thurman shows that the sharp distinction between impersonal and 
personal enemies is actually blurred, if not absent, in Jesus’ own context, and thus 
the command of enemy love does not easily support a confined focus.  
Within the context of tribal conflict in Southern Sudan, we are much closer to 
the kind of scenario that Horsley envisaged for Jesus’ teaching. Horsley notes how 
desperate economic circumstances can lead to conflict among marginalised groups, 
arguing that this forms the likely backdrop to Jesus’ command.109 But if this is 
correct, it is interesting to note that there is some ambiguity as to whether the 
conflicting tribal groups in Sudan do consider themselves enemies. By contrast, there 
is no doubt that the North, perceived as the oppressor, is the enemy. Although we 
cannot then conclude that Jesus’ hearers would have thought the same way, we must 
remain open to this possibility given that the language used allows for it. In other 
words, it may be historically plausible that Jesus’ hearers would have thought of 
Rome, even if his examples pertained to more immediate acquaintances. Within the 
scope of the language, there is a degree of inevitability that the hearers will turn to 
whichever enemy (ecthros) seems most prominent, regardless of the immediate 
dialogue.  
The significance of this argument is that by highlighting the open-ended 
scope of the command, theological readers are required to look beyond their own 
immediate context of threat, at least to the extent that they are more able to perceive 
where they might pose a threat to others. In turn, it may be possible to recognize 
where enmities have been masked or covered over, and this is particularly crucial for 
the privileged reader. It is my contention that both Thurman and the PPP show where 
the unquestioned privilege of the powerful is necessarily threatened by the 
emancipation of the oppressed, and in this respect there is a hidden enmity. If the 
scope of Jesus’ command is in fact unlimited, then might it not apply to the 
privileged reader in a manner which differs from, but coheres with, the readings 
offered thus far? 
 
4.3. Love for enemies for the privileged reader 
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At first glance, it was suggested that the issue of tribal conflict in Southern 
Sudan offers a case where love for enemies was considered with respect to relatively 
evenly matched enemies. However, the methods of the PPP demonstrate that the 
picture is far more complex. Within two apparently evenly matched groups, some 
will hold more power than others, and some will have been the victims of abuse, 
while others have acted more as perpetrators. The experience of individuals and 
subgroups thus shifts aspects of the overall picture from even conflict to oppression. 
Furthermore, the growing enmity depersonalizes the apparently personal or local 
conflicts.
110
 The methodology of the PPP involves a kind of ‘repersonalizing’ of the 
conflict by drawing individuals to face one another and confront each other with 
wrongs committed and suffered. As a result, those who hold more power are forced 
to face up to a claim upon them from a weaker party. It is at this point that the 
differences of opinion over whether or not they are enemies become significant. But 
at least in the Church leaders’ formulation, viewing the weak as the enemy of the 
strong serves to highlight the conflict of interests, and moreover, the fact that 
reconciliation will cost the stronger party. To describe both groups as ‘enemies’ is to 
call specific individuals to recognize their enemy status because their welfare comes 
at the expense of others’. My argument is that even if Jesus’ context is limited to 
marginalised groups, his command to love enemies may challenge those with some 
power to care for those whose livelihood is threatened by the powerful person’s 
security. 
 Thurman suggested that in many ways, the powerful also experience threat. 
In his chapter on fear, Thurman wrote: 
Obviously, if the strong put forth a great redemptive effort to change the 
social, political, and economic arrangements in which they seem to find their 
basic security, the whole picture would be altered.
111
 
In this passing comment, Thurman acknowledges that some oppression is less a 
result of deliberate malice, than it is of the desire to maintain the comfort and 
security of those already in power. As a result, the ‘strong’ would hardly describe the 
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‘weak’ as an enemy, and yet Thurman argues that even in this scenario, the 
possibility of threat is not far away. In his specific context, Thurman suggests: 
The fear that segregation inspires among the weak in turn breeds fear among 
the strong and the dominant. This fear insulates the conscience against a 
sense of wrongdoing in carrying out a policy of segregation.
112
 
The ‘weak’ are not described as an enemy, but Thurman points out that their 
emancipation is perceived as posing a threat to the comfort and security of the 
‘strong’. The difference between the weak and the strong in this case is simply that 
the strong are able to better insulate themselves from threat. It is interesting to note 
that in the context of terrorism, the strong perhaps experience the fear of a threat to 
their lifestyle much more acutely, but Thurman’s point seems to be that once 
insulated from threat, the strong become blind to the fact that they are the enemy, 
and thus to the possibility that the flourishing of the weak will cost them. Indeed, 
Laurie Johnston argues that in the climate of fear from terrorism, preaching on love 
for enemies thus tends to retreat to the solely personal dimension.
113
 While the idea 
of identifying the weak as the enemy of the strong may seem far from hopeful, my 
argument is that it is crucial to the unmasking of injustice because it requires the 
powerful to recognize the full cost of freedom. Thus for example, in the context of 
terrorist threats, the command to love enemies might entail the recognition that the 
perception of threat is in fact two-way.
114
 
While Jesus’ focal examples do refer primarily to local situations, the 
rationale in both Matthean and Lukan contexts draws much force from the idea that 
in loving enemies, the hearer imitates God.
115
 Whether or not Jesus directly 
addressed those with power, his logic retains the possibility that they are addressed 
even if the logic remained dormant for a time. Care will be needed not to overstate 
the case at this point, given that the reference to God’s nature is persuasive rather 
than doctrinal, but even so the concept of God’s universal benevolence introduces an 
angle on enemy love that is sometimes overlooked by commentators but may be 
crucial to a hopeful reading of the text. The point here is that God’s love is not 
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reactive, but proactive. The focal images that describe love for enemies are primarily 
reactive, in the sense that love is commanded as a response to a prior threat.
116
 As a 
result, the vast majority of commentators describe love for enemies in reactive terms, 
wherein the enemy (especially the oppressor) defines the terms of engagement, and 
love is somehow worked out in response. But God’s love is proactive in the sense 
that God seems actively to seek out the objects of his love without regard to their 
relation to God; God eschews any sense of isolation from threat for the sake of 
loving his creation. Significant strands of New Testament theology suggest that God 
seemingly abandons security for the sake of seeking out those who may even be 
opposed to God. In this respect, God’s love for enemies is proactive.117 Even if Stott 
is correct that Matthew 5.45 (and Luke 6.35c) refer to ‘common grace’, a natural 
state of goodness in creation, we must maintain that God in Christ is depicted as 
being proactive in loving those opposed to God in some sense.
118
 As a result, it 
becomes possible to see that some of the Lukan text in particular suggests a more 
proactive approach to loving enemies, particularly in terms of doing good ‘to those 
who hate you’, and praying ‘for those who abuse you’ (Luke 6.27). 
There is of course danger in describing God as a paradigm given that this 
section is focused on the privileged reader, and it might seem that a parallel is being 
drawn between God’s benevolent love and the benefaction of the powerful.119 This 
would fall foul of, for example, Cone’s rejection of white help. As such, we must 
maintain the absolutely fundamental difference between God and humanity, whilst 
drawing upon Thurman’s insistence that all humankind is equally dignified as God’s 
creation. The specific point I wish to argue is that the command to love enemies 
requires the powerful to eschew isolated security for the sake of human equality. Just 
as Thurman highlights the Roman’s need to relinquish power and pride to allow an 
encounter between human persons, so the privileged reader is called to leave behind 
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the privilege that makes them the enemy, and to pursue such human encounters 
today.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The rereading undertaken above is necessarily limited, but it has been offered 
for two reasons. Firstly, it was argued that reading with others in hope must move 
beyond identifying uplifting interpretations from other contexts, to a reassessment of 
one’s own perspective. Any rereading that follows need not be the same as that of 
the interlocutors, but it may be theologically coherent. In the case of love for 
enemies, I have drawn different emphases from the text to those of the dialogue 
partners, but have shown that they cohere at the theological level. While further 
attention to my own context would be needed, the simple aim has been to show what 
a hopeful rereading may look like. 
 Secondly, this rereading has aimed to demonstrate that hopeful reading will 
not always equate to comfortable reading. In chapter two it was argued that if 
Christian hope contains judgement and the radical transformation of human 
existence, then it does not simply involve the augmentation of one’s present 
experience. To be hopeful is thus to live with the possibility of cost for the sake of 
pointing beyond the present to a more Godly reality. So too, reading in hope 
involves recognizing the potential cost of the text as an interpretive good. 
 This last section has aimed to outline what it means to read with others in 
hope, while the bulk of this test case chapter has been taken up with examining how 
Thurman and the PPP manifest the tension between openness to the text and 
steadfastness of perspective, the hermeneutical tension that was argued to derive 
from Christian hope. This tension emerged from the argument that was followed 
through chapters two, three and four; the contours of Christian hope as described in 
chapter two were used to argue for certain hermeneutical possibilities in chapter 
three, and this led to the characteristic reading argued for in chapter four. However, 
because this argument was drawn from contours of the argument of chapter two, it is 
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worth concluding by noting that each context brings specific emphases to the nature 
of hope which must inevitably give specific shape to the work of hope in reading.  
 With Thurman and the PPP it was suggested that the hope displayed is 
grounded in the kind of theological anthropology highlighted in chapter two, namely 
that humankind is created and dignified by God. Furthermore, in both there is the 
indication that the possibility for communal transformation relates closely to the 
presence of God. As these emphases were followed through chapters two to four, I 
wish to maintain that the concrete discussion here does offer a good demonstration 
of this thesis in practice. Put simply, the argument in chapter four concerning the 
operation of hope as an interpretive virtue is heavily dependent on just these 
emphases. However, while it was argued in chapter two that Christian hope must 
relate to the future action of God, it is clear that the transcendent or post-mortem 
future does not feature in the discussion of this chapter, though it is not strictly 
negated. Furthermore, because the whole thesis has attempted to explore this issue 
by engaging in dialogue with another tradition (Black liberation theology), and while 
a constructive dialogue between these traditions has served the whole argument, it is 
worth noting how the dialogue between specific, contextual actions of hope might be 
taken seriously.  
 The reduction in emphasis on the transcendent future places a greater burden 
on what is possible in the present, and thus implicitly what is hermeneutically 
possible. In practice, it is worth noting that Thurman, for example, remains fairly 
circumspect in his approach in the sense that he does not try to construct a systematic 
version of Jesus’ teaching. But at the same time he reads with the clear hope of 
finding resources for the present, and this requires a certain confidence in the results. 
In chapter two it was suggested that the emphasis on the future in much recent 
western theology may derive from the recognition of the potential failures of 
modernist hopes and optimism. If so, it may in turn be suggested that the degree of 
provisionality for which I have argued is more appropriate to that context. By 
contrast, the confidence that Thurman and the PPP require in the texts’ relevance 
may be more appropriate to their own expression of hope, though as noted above, 
Thurman remains ambivalent about the Bible as a unit. But in view of the overall 
dialogue, their confidence might remind the privileged reader of the urgency of 
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acting in hope in the present, but this time with a greater degree of consciousness of 
what other communities are saying.  
 The basic point of this argument is that reading with others requires attention 
to the specific character of their interpretive virtues in their own context, as well as 
to their specific interpretations. The greater the degree of coherence that can be 
found in the understanding of these virtues, the easier the dialogue might become, 
though care is still essential. But even when two contexts might operate with quite 
different conceptions of a given characteristic (such as hope), dialogue remains 
possible provided that attention is given to both the difference in hope (or another 
virtue) as well as the differences in reading.  
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to argue that a theological depiction of biblical 
reading would benefit from being worked out within a framework of hope. Working 
within the broad field of interpretive virtue, I have argued that Christian readers of 
scripture should seek to pursue hope in their reading, and I have outlined in detail 
exactly what may be meant by hope, and what range of effects it will have on the 
reading process. While interpretive virtue never prescribes an interpretive method, it 
has been argued that it is possible to discern the kind of interpretive fruit that might 
result from the pursuit of hope, and hence the final chapter has shown how certain 
readers display this kind of hope in actual readings of biblical texts.  
 The reason for focusing on hope was broadly threefold. Firstly, it represents 
something of a gap in the literature; whereas both faith and love have received a 
great deal of attention within the field of theological interpretation, hope has been far 
less prominent, though it occupies a major place within Christian tradition as one of 
the three ‘theological’ virtues. Secondly, because Christian hope relates directly to 
God’s transformation of humankind, yet also denotes a human characteristic, it helps 
to address some potential objections to virtue theory itself. A number of writers have 
raised concerns over the linking of virtue theory with biblical interpretation, partly 
with regard to the relationship between divine action and human effort (which relates 
the virtue theory in general), and partly with regard to how well virtue theory as such 
fits with the contents of the biblical texts. In addition to this, it was noted that if the 
message of the Bible is in any sense directed to ‘sinners’ for their sake, then it 
becomes self-defeating to suggest that virtues are somehow required to interpret the 
texts. In response to these issues, it was argued that the virtue of hope uniquely helps 
to clarify what is at stake in each case, a point which would be elaborated in the 
discussion of hope in its own right. It was argued that because Christian hope relates 
directly to God’s creation and transformation of humankind, focusing on the 
interpretive virtue of hope would help give clarity to the relationship between divine 
transformation and human formation. From this, it was also shown (and elaborated 
in chapter three) that while the Bible should rightly be understood to be accessible to 
anyone, the growth of the reader remains significant as a facet of this transformation. 
244 
 
In terms of fit with the contents of scripture it was argued that there are sufficient 
points of contact between virtue theory and the Bible to recognize the significance of 
human character, but that in the specific case of hope there was a clear sense that the 
cultivation of hope was in itself an ‘end’ of scripture. 
This point represents the third main reason for discussing hope. To the extent 
that scripture itself is focused on cultivating hope in the reader, it follows that hope 
in some sense becomes central to living as a disciple in the present. And if hope is 
central to Christian life, then it becomes significant in leading the reader back to 
scripture to deepen that hope. While this creates a degree of methodological 
circularity, it was argued that this circularity represents a theologically legitimate 
hermeneutical wager that in the process of reading and rereading, the reader deepens 
their hope and understanding. As such, the bulk of the thesis could only represent an 
instance in this longer process, because the content of the argument would be, by its 
own definition, provisional. It was also noted that this argument about the purpose of 
scripture drew the thesis close to the medieval interest in anagogy. This discussion 
was largely bypassed for the sake of scope, but it should be noted that the overall 
discussion would benefit from closer attention to the anagogic sense. This represents 
one important direction for further research. 
Given this, the aim of the thesis was to provide a way of thinking about a 
hermeneutical circle for theological interpretation that took account of the 
significance of hope. The discussion proceeded in chapter two by examining the 
nature of Christian hope. It was argued that hope may be understood by its grounds, 
contents and actions, three parameters that would in turn shape the rest of the thesis, 
and would help clarify the distinction between different kinds of hope, optimism or 
wishful thinking. Firstly, these parameters were outlined in the work of Jürgen 
Moltmann and the tradition of thought that broadly followed him. Moltmann in 
particular sought to emphasize the importance of divine promise for the future as the 
grounds of Christian hope, whilst maintaining that to be hopeful involved acting in 
the present in accordance with that future vision. However, in order to balance this 
perspective, the work of James Cone and other Black liberation theologians was 
discussed with reference to the same parameters. Retrospectively, it should be 
clearer that this approach relates to the eventual argument that reading in hope 
should result in dialogue with other contexts, but even at this stage it was shown that 
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the dialogue between these traditions would yield important results for a doctrine of 
hope. In particular, it was shown that alongside divine promise, divine creation and 
presence were important for the theologies of hope represented by Cone and others. 
In turn, the action of this hope included a degree of subjective confidence, precisely 
because this was challenged by the context of racial oppression. In both Moltmann 
and Cone it was argued that because hope relates to God’s action, anyone could be 
hopeful regardless of prior temperament. This would be crucial to any argument of 
interpretive virtue, in order to prevent fruitful biblical interpretation from becoming 
captive to circumstance. Whilst crucial differences in perspective were highlighted, it 
was argued that certain contours of Christian hope emerged that would form the 
basis of the subsequent argument. Firstly, hope is grounded in God, in creation, 
God’s presence, and in the promise of new creation. Christians rightly hope for the 
future renewal of creation and human relationality as an act of God, but may also 
hope for transformation and change in the present; there should be no sense in which 
both are mutually exclusive. Finally, the action of this hope in essence derives from a 
vocation to live in accordance with its grounds and contents in the present. Even 
when the content of that hope is located in God’s future, to be hopeful in the present 
entails living in character with the anticipated future. Moving beyond any dichotomy 
of actions against dispositions, I described characteristic actions of a hopeful person.  
 Following the contours of grounds, contents and action, chapters three and 
four examined what it would mean to approach biblical reading in hope. In chapter 
three, the grounds and contents of Christian hope were discussed as they pertain to 
the questions of hermeneutics, because both relate to matters of human nature and 
reality. Hope for reading becomes a sub-aspect of the broader Christian hope. As 
such, it would be maintained that the hopeful reader of scripture does not strictly 
read with the hope of understanding scripture, but rather reads with the hopeful 
perspective outlined in chapter two. Nonetheless, this hope has crucial implications 
for the possibilities of biblical reading. Two main lines of argument were pursued, 
both of which were relevant to the hermeneutics of biblical reading, but also to the 
hermeneutics of dialogue with others about the text. Firstly, it was noted that a 
number of recent writers on theological interpretation highlight complexities in the 
relationship between meaning and community. If meaning depends on community, 
then the idea of determinate meaning in texts becomes hard to sustain. While this 
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point is well made, it was argued that if God speaks independently of human 
situatedness, then there could be hope for genuinely hearing God through the biblical 
texts, independently of one’s communal formation. As such, the perception of the 
voice of God through the texts becomes an important interpretive good. Furthermore, 
if dialogue with others is limited by this human finitude, there remains hope for such 
dialogue if Christian hope includes the renewal of humanity. However, in both cases 
hope awaits fulfilment, and as such there can be no legitimate present claim to the 
final determinate meaning of the text.  
 The second line of argument related to the hermeneutics of suspicion, noting 
that dialogue was inherently susceptible to power games. Again it was argued that 
the hope for human renewal entails hope for the transcendence of human self 
interest, and that as such dialogue would be possible, free from selfish power bids. 
However, it was at this point that the provisionality of hope becomes particularly 
important, otherwise hope could be claimed as another tool for grounding a 
dominant perspective. Following Cone and Thurman, it was argued that in fact, hope 
necessitated careful attention to the other, partly as a factor of love, partly because 
Christian hope also includes the individual dignity of persons, and partly because the 
promise of judgement negates the self-assurance of the powerful in the present. As 
such, there is hope for dialogue with others concerning the biblical texts, but this 
dialogue must be undertaken in the knowledge that one cannot claim inherent 
superiority for one’s own view. In this respect, suspicion cannot be finally ruled out.  
 From arguing that there is hope for biblical understanding on the basis of the 
broader Christian hope, chapter four turned to explore what the action of this hope 
would be in the act of reading. Firstly it was noted that a number of writers explicitly 
link hope with the exercise of the imagination, and this relationship was discussed in 
order to provide certain conceptual tools for the argument. In particular Garrett 
Green’s view was highlighted, in which the imagination is understood to construe 
reality as a whole whilst remaining conscious of alternative perspectives. The point 
would go some way to dealing with the objection that reading in hope constitutes a 
bias on the interpretation. To a certain extent this objection is correct, but Green’s 
depiction of the imagination argues that all perspectives in some sense entail bias, 
but the consciousness of alternatives allows one to hold onto one’s perspective with 
a strong sense of critical integrity.  
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 Following this point, it was argued that the hope involves perseverance in 
pursuit of the voice of God in the text, and takes particular shape as a tension 
between an openness to the text, and a ‘closed’ steadfast grip on one’s own sense of 
hope. Both of these together constitute hopeful perseverance. On the one hand, if 
there is hope that God may speak through the biblical text, but that in awaiting the 
fulfilment of hope we cannot presume to have concluded the text’s final meaning, 
then rereading must always occur with a degree of openness. This could be 
problematic in the face of difficult texts, but it was shown that such openness may be 
possible even while the reader dissents from the plain sense of the text. In contrast to 
this openness, it was shown that being hopeful also entails steadfastly holding onto 
one’s perspective of hope. Following the discussion of imagination, it was argued 
that the hopeful reader rightly reads in a manner which is shaped by their hopeful 
construal of reality as a whole, whilst remaining conscious of competing viewpoints. 
They are, in this sense, able to employ the imagination to perceive ways in which a 
text might point beyond present confines towards God’s promised reality, but they 
do so without becoming blinkered to other readings or critical questions. The idea of 
steadfastness captures the suggestion that if hope aids the pursuit of the voice of 
God, it does so with the particular sense of aiding the deeper pursuit of God’s 
promise and presence as the grounds of hope.  
 Finally, it was argued that as Christian hope includes the possibility of human 
community, the hopeful reader must seek to read with others. While this idea has 
been prevalent in recent literature, it was suggested that to act in hope is to seek a 
genuine sense of theological coherence through such dialogue, though this may 
include different theological emphases specific to each context. Furthermore, 
because of the hope of judgement, hopeful reading may thus lead some readers to 
encounter the challenge and cost of texts, but that in the context of dialogue, such 
costly readings may still be described as being hopeful because they cohere with 
positive possibilities for another.   
 In chapter five, this argument was tested in practice, though it can be seen 
from this point that the attempt to engage in a dialogue with Black liberation 
theology throughout the thesis draws some logic from the final step of the argument 
in chapter four. While it could be argued that there is a problem in drawing the 
methodology of the whole thesis from the argument of the penultimate chapter, it 
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strengthens the overall thesis because the theoretical argument concerning hope (in 
chapter two) bears a far stronger relation to the specific hopes manifest in the test 
cases contexts.
1
 As such, while the hopes of the interlocutors in this chapter have 
their own specific emphases, they can clearly be seen to relate well to the contours of 
the hope that created the structure for the conceptual argument. Even then, the 
specificity of each context was noted, and it was argued that dialogue with others 
would require attention to their own hopes (or any other interpretive virtue) as well 
as to their interpretation. Clearly, the limit of this argument would be reached if the 
hopes of an interlocutor could not sustain the necessity of the dialogue itself, but 
because chapter three showed that the possibility of dialogue was sustained by a 
broad range of perspectives in Christian theology, the argument that Christian hope 
should proceed to dialogue remains strong. In turn, I would assert the value of 
maintaining the dialogue throughout the thesis, despite the questions it might raise. 
 The majority of chapter five was spent examining two readings of Jesus’ 
command to love enemies, one from Howard Thurman’s Jesus and the Disinherited, 
and one from the Southern Sudanese Churches’ Peace Process focused at Wunlit in 
1999. While neither case claimed to offer exhaustive exegesis, both offered 
instructive scenarios in which the texts in question were read theologically with 
attention to the context of each. In both cases it was shown that the texts were read 
with the twin sense of openness and steadfastness, and as such the resultant readings 
were themselves worthy of attention. It was not argued that any of the readings were 
novel, nor that they could be described as decisive, but rather that they manifested a 
form of hope in the readers, and that the resultant readings were theologically 
significant. Given this, it is important to note that the approach detailed in this thesis 
does not promise novel readings, nor does it claim to lead to readings that are correct 
because they manifest hope in some way. What was shown was that in both cases, 
reading hopefully was an important part of how the biblical texts were drawn upon 
for the sake of living faithfully and generating hope in the specific contexts of 
reading. Hope was a crucial factor in moving the texts from abstraction to 
immediate, local significance, through theological reading.  
                                                          
1
 This is more obvious with regard to Howard Thurman. While there is relatively little explicit overlap 
between the Sudanese literature and black liberation theology, important points of overlap were noted, 
especially with regard to the issue of human dignity and hope for imminent change. 
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Following this, I turned to describe a rereading of the text from my context, 
in dialogue with the two test cases. It was noted that this rereading could not be 
argued to be hopeful from the first person, but it served to highlight the fact that any 
dialogue undertaken in hope would have to feed back into my own situation. 
Furthermore, it was necessary to demonstrate how a reading could be potentially 
hopeful whilst also being costly. Again, it was not argued that the rereading achieved 
this conclusively, but rather that it demonstrated the possibility in practice.  
 Finally, it was noted that while each scenario examined did manifest the kind 
of hopeful reading for which the thesis has argued, each would have its own 
emphasis within Christian hope, and in turn the action of that hope in reading would 
vary. In response to this point it was noted (as above here) that the constructive 
argument about hope in chapter two had taken account of a broader dialogue that 
related well to the test case contexts, and as such, the hermeneutical consequences of 
the specific hopes would still cohere with the broader thesis. At the same time, the 
very fact that each reader’s hopes cannot be contained under one straightforward 
rubric means that dialogue must necessarily take account of, among other things, the 
specific nature of the readers’ hope. Again, it was for this reason that care was taken 
from chapter two onwards to engage in such dialogue, but it can be seen that by its 
very nature, it must remain ongoing. Further research would be beneficial into other 
contexts, not only with regard to the specifics of hope, but following this lead, into 
contextual variations in the understanding of wisdom, love and so on. 
 
 Overall, this study has shown that Christian hope by its very nature speaks 
directly to our understanding of the situation in which we read the Bible as Christian 
scripture, and especially to the question of how human nature shapes the process of 
reading. Because Christian hope includes the transformation of humanity, it must 
recognize that this transformation will continually reshape the reader’s interpretation 
of the text. But because being hopeful is itself a crucial aspect of living as a 
Christian, hope itself will rightly and inevitably shape the reading of scripture. In 
broad terms, it was argued that from the perspective of theological interpretation, one 
crucial interpretive good is the cultivation of hope in the reader and the wider 
community. But hope is itself the interpretive virtue that leads to this good. While 
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this movement is circular, it was argued that as a wager on the truth of God’s 
transformation, it is not a closed or vicious circle. Rather, hope begins with God’s 
gracious speaking, but in response, the reader is energised to pursue the voice of God 
in the text, and this in particular includes pursuing the voice of God as it speaks of 
the grounds of that hope. Although the idea of a regula spei was suggested, I have 
not pursued that term because while it does capture the basic thrust of the thesis, I 
have argued that real care is required to test the foundation of one’s hope. As such, it 
would not do to argue that the cultivation of any vague sort of hope counts as an 
interpretive good. Put simply, it is not appropriate to speak of a rule of hope as 
something that may be straightforwardly applied to a text in order to generate a 
theologically ‘correct’ reading.  
 Particularly through the test case, it was argued that as the contents and 
action of Christian hope cannot be finally determined in the present, each reader will 
understand their hope slightly differently, and hence the action of that hope in 
reading will vary from place to place. As such, attention is required not only to the 
interpretations of others, but also to the kind of hope that has shaped their approach 
to the text. This attention is necessarily fluid, and indeed there will be perspectives 
on hope that make this attention to others less significant. But it was shown that 
there are sufficient points of contact across a range of Christian traditions to make 
this dialogue meaningful, though still requiring care. In turn, this suggests that the 
same care is required in considering variations in any kind of interpretive virtue. 
 While interpretive virtue is never used to refer to an interpretive method, this 
study has shown how the pursuit of hope may nonetheless legitimately shape the 
actual act of reading scripture. It was shown that hope opened up theological 
possibilities within the command to love enemies, possibilities which nonetheless 
retained a strong degree of critical integrity. It was noted that Pardue is probably 
right to argue that it will not do to suggest that an interpretation is correct because 
the reader is somehow more virtuous than others.
2
 But the argument of chapter five 
was not that the interlocutors were correct in their reading because of their hope, but 
rather that their readings were important parts of a wider picture concerning the 
theological significance of scripture, and this was in part due to the action of hope in 
                                                          
2
 Pardue, ‘Athens and Jerusalem’, 305. 
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the process of reading. On this basis, theological discussion of actual biblical texts 
would benefit greatly from closer attention to readers that display interpretive 
virtues, including hope. Because it has been shown that there are good theological 
reasons for recognizing the potentially significant insight of non-academic readers, a 
much wider group of readers may be drawn into biblical scholarship, without 
confining studies of non-academic readers to their own niche. On this basis, further 
research into theological interpretation would benefit from research into the reading 
of academic and non-academic readers alike, with particular attention to the effects 
of hope, love, wisdom and so on. From the perspective of theological reading, this 
thesis has shown that Christian hope may aid readers in the pursuit of a rich, 
coherent and credible theological dialogue.  
 Because of the heuristic nature of the proposal, and the fact that interpretive 
virtue focuses on the character of the interpreter rather than the methods they 
employ, this thesis has never claimed to provide a novel interpretive paradigm, nor 
has it claimed to generate a novel rule by which interpretations may be judged to be 
correct. What this thesis has done is to follow the increasing awareness that if the 
Bible is to be read theologically, it cannot be abstracted from theological depictions 
of reality. Rather, theological interpretation must take full account of every aspect of 
human existence, and this must include hope. This thesis has provided a framework 
for articulating how and why hope should shape the task of biblical reading, and it 
has shown that while hope may not solve any technical problems within biblical 
interpretation, it will be an important factor in sustaining a theologically responsible 
conversation. I have shown that the cultivation of hope is one important part in the 
ongoing process of forming good readers of scripture. 
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